

## Guidelines compliance table

#### EBA/GL/2017/16

20 November 2017; Date of application – 1 January 2021 (Updated 22 Feb 2022)

# Guidelines on PD, LGD estimation and treatment defaulted exposures

The following competent authorities\* comply or intend to comply with the EBA's Guidelines on PD, LGD estimation and treatment defaulted exposures:

**Complies or** 

		Competent authority	intends to comply	Comments
Member State				
BE	Belgium	National Bank of Belgium	Yes	AS at 03.03.2021, notification date.  The National Bank of Belgium (NBB) is compliant with these Guidelines and has implemented them in its supervision via a circular of 8 December 2020 (NBB_2020_047).  The circular is published on the NBB's website (French and Dutch):  Link to French version:  Circulaire NBB_2020_047 / Orientations de l'ABE sur les estimations de probabilité de défaut (PD), les estimations de perte en cas de défaut (LGD) et sur le traitement des expositions sur lesquelles il y a eu défaut (EBA/GL/2017/16)   nbb.be  Link to Dutch version:



		Competent authority	Complies or intends to comply	Comments
				Circulaire NBB_2020_047 / EBA- richtsnoeren inzake PD-raming, LGD-raming en de behandeling van blootstellingen ten aanzien waarvan zich een wanbetaling heeft voorgedaan (EBA/GL/2017/16)   nbb.be
BG	Bulgaria	Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank)	Intends to comply**	By 01.01.2021.
CZ	Czech Republic	Czech National Bank	Intends to comply**	By 01.01.2021.
DK	Denmark	Finanstilsynet	Intends to comply**	By 01.01.2022.
DE	Germany	Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsa ufsicht (BaFin)	Yes	As of 01.01.2021. Date of notification: 09.02.2022.
EE	Estonia	Finantsinspektsioon	Yes	As at 20.06.2018, notification date.
IE	Ireland	Central Bank of Ireland	Intends to comply**	By 31.12.2021.  Since the initial confirmation of the intention to comply for this GL the EBA have revised the effective implementation date to the 1st of January 2022. Hence, the CBI's effective implementation date is also extended to reflect this.
EL	Greece	Bank of Greece	Intends to comply**	By 01.01.2021.
HR	Croatia	Hrvatska narodna banka (Croatian National Bank)	Yes	As at 08.03.2021, notification date. HNB complies with these guidelines. Circular letter (no: 57-093/093/21-3/MD) has been sent to the institution in order to comply with these guidelines.
ES	Spain	Banco de España	Yes	As at 08.03.2021, notification date.
FR	France	Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution	Yes	As at 05.06.2018, notification date. Please note that the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR) published on 05



		Competent authority	Complies or intends to comply	Comments
				June 2018 on its official register a notification declaring its compliance with the Guidelines on PD estimation, LGD estimation and the treatment of defaulted exposures (EBA/GL/2017/16).
ΙΤ	Italy	Bank of Italy	Intends to comply**	By 01.01.2021. The Bank of Italy informs the EBA that it intends to comply with the Guidelines by 1 January 2021, making a reservation to partially comply with paragraphs 135 (treatment of the artificial cash flow) and 153 (treatment of incomplete recovery processes) of the Guidelines for the reasons outlined below.***
СУ	Cyprus	Central Bank of Cyprus	Not applicable	The Guidelines do not apply in my jurisdiction since no institution in Cyprus apply the IRB approach.
LV	Latvia	Financial and Capital Market Commission	Intends to comply**	By the date a relevant institutions exists in the jurisdiction. In Latvia, LSI banks use the standardised approach to calculate capital requirements for credit risk; therefore there are no market participants to whom these guidelines are applicable at the moment. However, the FCMC intends to comply with the GLs by the date a relevant institution exists in the jurisdiction. By the date a relevant institution exists in the jurisdiction. In Latvia, LSI banks use the standardised approach to calculate capital requirements for credit risk; therefore there are no market participants to whom these guidelines are applicable at the moment. However, the FCMC intends to comply with the GLs by the date a relevant institution exists in the jurisdiction.
LT	Lithuania	Bank of Lithuania	Intends to comply**	By 01.01.2021.
LU	Luxembourg	Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF)	Intends to comply**	By 01.01.2021.



		Competent authority	Complies or intends to comply	Comments
HU	Hungary	Central Bank of Hungary	Intends to comply**	By 01.01.2021.
MT	Malta	Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA)	Intends to comply**	By such time as the necessary legislative or regulatory proceedings have been completed.
NL	Netherlands	De Nederlandsche Bank	Yes	As at 11.03.2021, notification date.
AT	Austria	Austrian Financial Market Authority	Intends to comply**	By 01.01.2021.
PL	Poland	Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego	Yes	As at 20.06.2018, notification date.
PT	Portugal	Banco de Portugal	Yes	As at 10.03.2021, notification date. Circular Letter No CC/2020/00000038 (https://www.bportugal.pt/cartacir cular/cc202000000038)
RO	Romania	National Bank of Romania	Yes	As at 09.03.2021, notification date. Guideline has been transposed through NBR Instructions from 13.08.2019. https://www.bnr.ro/DocumentInformation.aspx?idDocument=32132&directLink=1
SI	Slovenia	Banka Slovenije	Yes	As of notification date, 22.02.2022. Regulation on the application of the Guidelines on PD estimation, LGD estimation and the treatment of defaulted exposures was published in the Official gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 43/2018 (page 6998) of 22 June 2018.  URL: https://www.uradni-list-rs/vsebina/2018-01-2136/sklep-o-uporabi-smernic-o-ocenjevanju-verjetnosti-neplacila-in-izgube-ob-neplacilu-ter-o-obravnavi-neplacanih-izpostavljenosti
SK	Slovakia	Národná banka Slovenska	Intends to comply**	By 01.01.2021.



		Competent authority	Complies or intends to comply	Comments
FI	Finland	Finanssivalvonta (FIN- FSA)	Yes	As of notification date, 10.02.2022
SE	Sweden	Finansinspektionen	Yes	As at 15.06.2018, notification date.

#### **EU Institutions – Agencies**

ECB	ECB	ECB	Yes	As of notification date, 22.03.2021.  * Significant Institutions as defined in Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions
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#### **EEA - EFTA State**

IS	Iceland	Fjármálaeftirlitið (The Financial Supervisory Authority, Iceland)	Yes	As of notification date, i.e. 04.03.2021.
LI	Liechtenstein	Financial Market Authority Liechtenstein (FMA)	Yes	As at 09.03.2021, notification date.
NO	Norway	The Finanicial Supervisory Authority of Norway	Yes	As at 22.06.2018, notification date.

### \*\*\* Bank of Italy adds:

<sup>\*</sup>The EEA States other than the Member States of the European Union are not currently required to notify their compliance with the EBA's Guidelines. This table is based on information provided from those EEA States on a voluntary basis.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Please note that, in the interest of transparency, if a competent authority continues to intend to comply after the application date, it will be considered "non-compliant" unless (A) the Guidelines relate to a type of institution or instruments which do not currently exist in the jurisdiction concerned; or (B) legislative or regulatory proceedings have been initiated to bring any national measures necessary to comply with the Guidelines in force in the jurisdiction concerned.

<sup>&</sup>quot;1. Paragraph 135 of the Guidelines deals with exposures that return to non-defaulted status ("cured exposures") and specifies that the outstanding amount of such exposures at the "cure date" should be treated as an "artificial cash flow" and discounted back to the default date. In our opinion this approach leads, in



some circumstances, to an inappropriate recognition of economic losses (unduly increasing the LGDs) even when the debtor pays in full the amounts due at the cure date, for two drivers.

Firstly, in case of amortizing loans, the financial cost that banks pay when the exposure enters into the default status is due to installments that are in arrears. Discounting back - from the cure date to the default date - the outstanding amount can bias the LGD upwards and unduly penalize the banks. Secondly, paragraph 135 requires discounting the artificial cash flow by using the same discount rate as for other - i.e. not cured - defaulted exposures. Therefore, even if obligors are usually obliged by contract to pay an additional interest when installments are in arrears (late fees), these fees do not necessarily compensate the discounting effect, in particular by applying the standardized discount rate provided for by the Guidelines. The interplay between these two drivers will be further assessed in the context of the national implementation of the Guidelines. Bearing this in mind, we make a reservation to partially comply with paragraph 135 as there are circumstances in which the application of this paragraph lead to overestimation of losses.

2. Paragraph 153 of the Guidelines concerns the treatment of incomplete recovery processes. In line the general rule prescribed in Level 1 text (cf Art. 181, Regulation 575/2013), it requires that all defaults observed during the historical observation period are used within the data sources for LGD estimation. We, however, deem some reasoned guidance is needed as its strict application could lead to a bias in the long-run average LGD calculation when recently observed defaults are used: if applied to defaults with a limited time-in-default (e.g. default observed 1 week before the calibration) this rule could imply that institutions perform their LGD estimation excessively relying on estimated recovery. This would, in turn, increase model risk and hinder resilience and reliance on /RB models.

Bearing this in mind, we make a reservation to partially comply with paragraph 153 as there might be well-justified cases where observed defaults with incomplete recovery processes might not carry relevant information for LGD estimation. We take this chance to draw your attention on an additional issue relating to paragraph 101 and 153 of the Guidelines.

Paragraph 101 deals with the treatment of multiple defaults and requires a minimum 9-months 'observation' period ("independence period") for the LGD. The same independence period is not required for other risk parameters such as the PD: this could lead to a bias in the calculation of the expected losses as far as the number of defaults is not fully consistent across all risk parameters. In addition, in our view it is not clear how this paragraph of the Guidelines is to be interpreted in conjunction with the draft RTS on the Assessment Methodology (which is expected to be approved by the European Commission in the coming months) according to which defaults must be treated consistently (article 52, let. d). In this respect, we deem necessary to provide clarification on this matter in order to ensure a consistent treatment of multiple defaults across all risk parameters."

#### **Notes**

Article 16(3) of the EBA's Regulations requires national competent authorities to inform us whether they comply or intend to comply with each Guideline or recommendation we issue. If a competent authority does not comply or does not intend to comply it must inform us of the reasons. We decide on a case by case basis whether to publish reasons.

The EBA endeavour to ensure the accuracy of this document, however, the information is provided by the competent authorities and, as such, the EBA cannot accept responsibility for its contents or any reliance placed on it.

For further information on the current position of any competent authority, please contact that competent authority. Contact details can be obtained from the EBA's website <a href="https://www.eba.europa.eu">www.eba.europa.eu</a>.

