# EBA REPORT <br> RESULTS FROM THE 2020 MARKET RISK BENCHMARKING EXERCISE 

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## Abbreviations

| APR | all price risk |
| :---: | :---: |
| CA | competent authority |
| CDS | credit default swap |
| CO | commodities |
| CRD | Capital Requirements Directive |
| CRR | Capital Requirements Regulation |
| CS | credit spread |
| CS01 | credit spread value of 1 basis point changes |
| CTP | correlation trading portfolio |
| CV | coefficient of variation |
| EBA | European Banking Authority |
| EQ | equity |
| ES | expected shortfall |
| EU | European Union |
| FRTB | fundamental review of the trading book |
| FX | foreign exchange |
| HPE | hypothetical portfolio exercise |
| HS | historical simulation |
| IMV | initial market valuation |
| IQD | interquartile dispersion |
| IR | interest rates |
| IRC | incremental risk charge |
| IT | information technology |
| ITS | implementing technical standards |
| LGD | loss given default |
| MC | Monte Carlo |
| MR | market risk |
| MRWA | market-risk-weighted asset |
| P\&L | profit and loss |
| PD | probability of default |
| Q\&A | question and answer |
| RTS | regulatory technical standards |
| RWA | risk-weighted asset |
| sVaR | stressed value at risk |
| VaR | value at risk |

## 1. Executive summary

1. This report presents the results of the 2020 supervisory benchmarking exercise pursuant to Article 78 of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) and the related regulatory and implementing technical standards (RTS and ITS) that define the scope, procedures and portfolios for benchmarking internal models for market risk (MR).
2. The report summarises the conclusions drawn from a hypothetical portfolio exercise (HPE) that was conducted by the EBA during 2019/20. The primary objective of the exercise is to assess the level of variability observed in risk-weighted assets (RWA) for market risk produced by banks' internal models.
3. The exercise was performed on a sample of 54 European banks from 14 jurisdictions. The relevant institutions submitted data for 73 instruments recombined in 59 market portfolios in all major asset classes, i.e. equity (EQ), interest rates (IR), foreign exchange (FX), commodities (CO) and credit spreads (CS), as well as two correlation trading instruments recombined in four portfolios (CTPs), for a total of 63 benchmark portfolios. Thus, the exercise covers the entire population of EU banks with internal models for MR at the highest level of consolidation.
4. The analytical part of the exercise delivered by the EBA as summarised in this report provided to the competent authorities (CAs) a list of outliers to be examined in detail. The banks with the most significant number of outliers were also considered for interviews to discuss the assumptions behind banks' models that produced the outliers. In the 2020 exercise, no interviews with banks were carried out. There were several reasons for this, including the following: problematic model in the process of decommissioning, inspection already ongoing, issues already clarified during preceding exercises, limited resources available to banks/CAs due to Covid-19 outbreaks. The issues detected in the benchmarking exercise were nonetheless considered and addressed, where possible, by banks and CAs. Moreover, CAs and the EBA still collected feedback on how to improve forthcoming benchmarking exercises.
5. Finally, taking into consideration the results of the benchmarking exercise, CAs were asked to provide the EBA with responses to a questionnaire on the actions they plan to take with regard to each participating bank's internal model.

### 1.1 Main findings of the benchmarking analysis

6. The report measures variability in terms of the interquartile dispersion (IQD) ${ }^{1}$ and the coefficient of variation (CV) ${ }^{2}$ observed within each benchmark portfolio. The IQD is more robust than the CV when the sample is drawn from an unknown, fat-tailed distribution. As far as the market-risk-weighted asset (MRWA) variability is concerned, the IQD metric suggests a level of dispersion for all the risk measures provided by banks that needs to be monitored.
7. The primary considerations are that the 2020 analysis shows a reduction in the dispersion in the initial market valuation (IMV) with respect to the 2019 exercises with regard to the equity, interest rate and credit spread asset classes; see, for instance, Table 1. This improvement was expected and reflects the instruments' simplification as applied in the 2019 exercise: the instruments in this exercise consist of more plain vanilla instruments than in the previous (20162018) exercises. Also, a natural improvement in the understanding of the instruments in the exercise is expected from the first to the second exercise. Nonetheless, some variability in the results - in the FX and commodity asset class - persists despite the simplification; this mainly stems from the fact that a few instruments appear to have been understood differently by a minority of banks, which pushed up the dispersion coefficients. Some of these issues were addressed, where possible, and the quality of the data has improved during the exercise thanks to subsequent resubmissions.
8. As in previous exercises, data quality is still an issue in this exercise. There are a wide variety of reasons for low data quality. Some types of errors are trivial, such as the wrong unit reported, especially in the case of equity instruments. In order to improve data quality, the EBA notes that several rounds of iteration with submitters will be required, which can be difficult within the short time frame of the exercise. Other errors were linked to the misunderstanding of some instruments, such as instruments 38,39 and 47. The redraft of the legal text of the exercise in time for the next exercise should further improve the data quality in these respects.
9. The majority of the significant dispersions have been examined and justified by the banks and CAs. A minority of the outlier observations remain unexplained and are expected to be part of the ongoing activities of supervisors, who are expected to monitor and investigate the situation (see Section 1.2 and Chapter 6 of this report).

[^0]10. From a risk factor perspective, equity, interest rate and FX portfolios exhibit a lower level of dispersion than the commodity and credit Spread asset classes. This lower level of variability is likely to be due to the use of more consistent practices and assumptions that are more homogeneous across the banks (see Table 4: Interquartile dispersion for IMV and risk metrics by risk factor).
11. Regarding the single risk measures, across all asset classes except for commodity the overall variability for value at risk ( VaR ) is lower than the observed variability for stressed VaR ( sVaR ) ( $18 \%$ and $29 \%$ respectively, compared with $21 \%$ and $30 \%$ in 2019). ${ }^{3}$ More complex measures such as incremental risk charge (IRC) and all price risk (APR) show a higher level of dispersion ( $49 \%$ and $45 \%$ respectively, compared with $54 \%$ and $37 \%$ in 2019). We would point out that a direct comparison between 2019 and 2020 IQDs is possible because the structures of the two exercises and the instruments of which they were composed are the same.
12. As for the past exercise, to deepen the analysis of VaR and further investigate the variability drivers, different VaR metrics were computed and compared with the banks' reported VaR, in particular:

- an alternative estimation of VaR, called profit and loss (P\&L) VaR, computed by the EBA using the 1-year daily P\&L series submitted by banks using a historical simulation (HS) approach; and
- a comparable VaR, called HS VaR, which corresponds to the regulatory VaR reported by those banks that use an HS approach (only).

13. When comparing the variability between the regulatory VaR and these 'alternative' risk measures, we find a slight decrease in the IQD when considering a more homogeneous sample (i.e. HS banks only). In fact, for all the risk types, the dispersion observed for the P\&L VaR tends to be lower. This finding suggests that the modelling approach is not the only driver of the observed VaR variability. Other drivers, such as risks not captured in the model or the choice of absolute versus relative returns, offer further explanations for the results' variability (see Table 4: Interquartile dispersion for IMV and risk metrics by risk factor).
14. Even so, within the subset of banks using an HS approach, modelling choices (see Table 6: Coefficient of variation for regulatory VaR (controlling for HS) by modelling choice) seem to make a noticeable difference. Scaled 10-day VaR and the use of a lookback period greater than one year tend to produce lower dispersion than other modelling configurations for EQ, FX and CS. In terms of conservativeness, the calibration of more than one year seems to produce even more conservative results, at least for EQ, FX and CS (see Table 7: Average regulatory VaR by modelling choice). This observation differs from the finding of the 2019 exercise, which was run

[^1]over different portfolios. Overall, it is clear that this analysis is extremely sensitive to the different portfolios used to produce the statistic and to the low number of subjects available, so it is difficult to generalise the results.
15. The dispersion in sVaR figures is generally higher than the dispersion observed for regulatory VaR (see Table 21 and Table 22). The stressed period used was the one applied by the bank for capital purposes, so it was not harmonised in the sample. Different choices for the stressed period are permitted by the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and these choices are considered and challenged in the regulatory approval process. While allowing banks to use their own individual stress periods reduces the comparability of the sVaR results across the sample, doing so facilitates the estimation of implied capital needs from the HPE. Nonetheless, banks in the exercise are asked to report the stressed period applied. As a result, the EBA drew up a subset of homogeneous, in time windows applied, and ran the benchmark for this subsample. It appears clear that when a homogeneous stress window is applied the sVaR figures tend to be less dispersed (see Table 41: Stress VaR statistics (2008-2009 stress period only)).
16. In addition to carrying out these analyses, the EBA conducted a comparison across banks of the ratio between sVaR and VaR for each of the hypothetical portfolios included in the benchmarking exercise (see Table 5: sVaR-VaR ratio by range (number of banks as a percentage of the total)). The ratio generally varies significantly between the portfolios, especially for instruments subject to credit spread risk (from 0.75 to 8.15 ). However, on average, the ratio comes in at around 2.9 (see Table 25: sVaR/VaR statistics).
17. As expected, for the larger banks with significant trading activities the benchmarking portfolios are generally relevant to their actual trading book. For smaller banks, this is less the case, and this is why the EBA included simpler and more plain vanilla instruments in the 2019 exercise. The challenge remains to design a benchmarking exercise that can fit banks that have a specialised business model. Overall, the portfolios are, however, reflective of the risk factors experienced by most banks. In the 2020 exercise, EBA notices a reduction of the VaR dispersion, which is generally below 20\% IQD, except for the CS asset class (see Table 21: VaR statistics). Some single portfolios exhibit a significantly high dispersion, but in many cases this is driven by a substantially low value of the VaR in terms of absolute numbers, which tends to exacerbate the IQD figure. The aggregate portfolios also feature notably low levels of IQDs.
18. Regarding IRC, average variability (as measured by the average IQD for this category of portfolios) is higher than that observed for all other metrics considered in the report (49\%). This high variability is slightly lower than in the previous exercise - IQD was $54 \%$ on average in the 2019 exercise (see Table 13: IRC statistics and cluster analysis). The understanding of the IRC dispersion was further analysed by disaggregating various modelling choices (see Table 14, Table 43, Table 44, Table 45 and Table 46). While the number of risk factors applied does not seem to make a difference in terms of dispersions, applying non-market conventions to the source of LGD seems to reduce the dispersion of the IRC. In any case, these results need to be further tested in future exercises.
19. Regarding APR, average variability (as measured by the average IQD for this category of portfolios) is noticeably high in relation to the other metrics considered in the report (45\%). However, the APR assessment suffers from a chronic lack of contributions - only a few banks are authorised to model this asset class internally and most banks are currently in the process of reducing their exposure to correlation trading portfolios (CTPs), i.e. these portfolios are supposed to be in run-down mode (see Table 15: APR statistics and cluster analysis).
20. An additional metric considered as part of the analysis was the diversification benefits observed for VaR, sVaR and IRC in the aggregated portfolios (see Table 16: Diversification benefit statistics). As expected, there is evidence that larger aggregated portfolios exhibited greater diversification benefits than smaller ones. In general, the level of dispersion observed in diversification benefits tends to be lower than that in the corresponding metrics at the level of the individual portfolios.
21. As in the previous exercise, an assessment was also carried out of the variability of the empirical estimates of the expected shortfall (ES) at a $97.5 \%$ confidence level. The results indicate that the dispersion in this metric across risk factors is similar to that found for VaR and P\&L VaR (see Table 24).

## Dispersion in the capital outcome

22. Alongside the variability analysis, the EBA also conducted an assessment regarding possible underestimations of capital requirements (see Table 17: Interquartile dispersion for capital proxy). As the analysis is based on hypothetical portfolios and the capital requirements were defined using a proxy, the results should be interpreted as approximations of potential capital underestimations. The proxy for the implied capital requirements was defined as the sum of VaR and sVaR across all portfolios. For purposes of comparison, the proxy was computed three times. In one case, the VaR and sVaR figures were multiplied by the banks' total multiplication factor and, in the other, by the regulatory minimum of three only, i.e. ignoring the banks' individual addend(s) set by the CAs. Finally, a subset of banks applying the same stress period was also considered for capital dispersion. This metric enables a comparison of banks and an assessment of their variability in this regard.
23. The average variability across the sample as measured by the IQD is significant (around $21 \%$ ), especially for the most complex portfolios in the credit spread asset class. This dispersion slightly decreases when considering more a homogenous capital proxy ( $20 \%$ applying 3 as the multiplier, and $17 \%$ for banks with the same stress period). Moreover, an analysis of the capital proxy pattern across the HPE's trades suggests that the ranges of capital value dispersion are broadly consistent, irrespective of whether the banks' actual multiplication factors are used or not.

## Additional analysis carried out in the 2020 exercise

24. As introduced in the previous exercises, the EBA extended the analysis to other drivers of variation (see Section 5.2.5), such as the size of the bank, the business model of the bank, the level of approval granted by the CAs and the already mentioned stressed period applied in the
sVaR calibration. The size and business model analyses were developed further in comparison with the 2019 report.
25. In a nutshell, based on this additional analysis we can conclude that the size (in terms of RWA for market risk) of the bank has an impact on the figures, since smaller banks tend to produce slightly more dispersed results (see Table 8: Asset class comparison for VaR in terms of size of the banks). On the other hand, when considering the size in terms of the trading book (as a ratio of total assets), the smaller the trading book, the (slightly) smaller the dispersion (on average).
26. The discrimination based upon the business model did not deliver strong conclusions. As in the last exercise, the EBA applied as a discriminant the internal classification of banks, under which many of them are classified as cross-border universal banks (see Table 9: Asset class comparison for VaR within the same business model (cross-border universal bank)). Applying this definition of the business model, a smaller decrease in the IQD was identified due to a more homogenous sample. The business model analysis was further developed by considering the 'Level 3' assets and liabilities in the bank's books as a proxy for a more sophisticated business model linked to more exotic products (see Table 34, Table 35 and Table 36). This further specification did not prove conclusive since it reveals first an increase and then a decrease of dispersion depending on the 'Level 3 ' asset and liabilities ratio in the bank's trading book.
27. The subsamples analysis based upon the level of approval delivered interesting results. A priori it was expected that having banks with different levels of approval would have increased the dispersion of the results of the risk measures. In line with this assumption, the IQD results seem to fluctuate among the subsamples of different approval levels. This is because more homogeneous subsamples tend to produce smaller dispersions, but this positive effect is counterbalanced by the smaller number of firms in the sample. Basically, the benchmark provided and the 25th and 75th quantiles of the distribution tend to be less dispersed with respect to the whole set of banks. This implies that the different level of approval does indeed have an impact on the dispersion of the benchmarking results (see Table 10: Asset class comparison for VaR in terms of the level of approval).
28. Finally, as already mentioned above and in line with what was expected and reported last year, sVaR figures are far less dispersed when the benchmark is computed for a homogeneous subsample of firms that applied a similar time period for the stress window used for calibrating the sVaR (see Table 11: Asset class comparison for sVaR in terms of time window applied).
29. The 2020 Report also features the introduction of PV statistics (see Table 42). The PVs reported have generally low IQDs, and they were useful in distinguishing true outliers and outliers due to mispricing of the portfolios. Further analysis and application of the PV are expected in the future.

### 1.2 CAs' assessments based on supervisory benchmarks

30. CAs shared the outcomes of their assessments at bank level with the EBA (see Figure 16: CAs' own assessments of the levels of MR own funds requirements). The CAs' assessments confirmed
the existence of some areas that require follow-up actions on the part of specific institutions whose internal models were flagged as outliers in this benchmarking exercise.
31. Overall, CAs' assessment of the over- and underestimation of RWA was encouraging in the sense that CAs were aware of and able to explain the causes of most deviations. Although the majority of the issues were identified and actions put in place in order to reduce the unwanted variability of the RWA, the effectiveness of these actions can be evaluated only by CAs via constant monitoring of the benchmarking results.
32. The CAs are expected to pay great attention to the minority of cases in which the over- and underestimations were unexplained, to closely monitor these institutions and to put in place additional efforts to reduce these cognitional gaps in the future exercises.

## $1.3 \quad 2021$ exercise - expected changes

33. The 2019 exercise represented a significant change from the 2016-2018 exercises in terms of the simplification of the portfolios. This simplification had a positive effect in obtaining less dispersed results than with the previous portfolios. Furthermore, it improved the significant data quality issues relating to some portfolios, while focusing on the model risk elements.
34. In the 2020 exercise the data submitted have further improved in quality thanks to the clarification of the legal text description of some instruments, and also to the further practice that the banks have gained from the present exercise. This had a positive effect in terms of dispersion in the data provided. Improvements, in terms of less dispersed results, have also stemmed from the change in the methodology to detect the outliers for the risk measures.
35. For the 2021 exercise, the EBA expects a further improvement in terms of the data quality in the submissions because of the further clarification provided in the 2021 ITS compared to the 2020 ITS. Moreover, the banks participating in the 2021 exercise can benefit from the 2019 benchmarking report that was published at the start of 2020.
36. The analysis run by the EBA for the 2021 exercise is expected to be relatively stable, and the EBA will try to deepen the assessment of the new elements introduced this year, especially the Present Value submission.
37. On a medium-term horizon, the EBA will consider reshaping the instruments and the portfolios in the exercise in a way that still keeps the instruments simple to ensure clarity regarding the instruments. This is because the different interpretations of the instruments have been a significant source of variability. The aim would also be to recombine these instruments in such a way that the different portfolios have meaningful designs when compared with each other. In addition, very importantly, the fundamental review of the trading book (FRTB) is understood to be of particular significance for the market risk benchmarking exercise. In the future, the exercise will require a major redesign to take into consideration the specific features of the FRTB.

## 2. Introduction and legal background

38. European legislators have acknowledged the need to ensure consistency in the calculation of RWA for equivalent portfolios, and the CRR and CRD include a number of mandates for the EBA to deliver technical standards, guidelines and reports aimed at reducing uncertainty and differences in the calculation of capital requirements.
39. In this regard, Article 78 of the CRD requires the EBA to produce a benchmarking study on both credit and market risk to assist CAs in the assessment of internal models. The study should highlight potential divergences among banks or areas in which internal approaches might have the potential to underestimate their own funds requirements that are not attributable to differences in the underlying risk profiles. CAs are to share this evidence within colleges of supervisors as appropriate and take appropriate corrective actions to overcome these drawbacks when deemed necessary. Directive (EU) 2019/878 ${ }^{4}$ of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD V) has not changed this mandate.
40. The EBA has devoted significant efforts to the analysis of the consistency of outcomes in RWA, to understand the causes of possible inconsistencies and to inform the regulatory repair process. The EBA's ongoing work on benchmarking, supervisory consistency and transparency is fundamental to restoring trust in internal models and the ways in which banks calculate asset risks.
41. The use of internal models gives banks the opportunity to model their risks according to their business models and the risks faced by the bank itself. The introduction of a benchmarking exercise does not change this objective; rather, it helps to identify the non-risk-based variability drivers observed across institutions.
42. This MR benchmarking exercise is an MRWA variability assessment performed over a large sample of banks ( 54 banks at the highest level of consolidation in 14 jurisdictions within the EU). The banks participating in this exercise are those that have been granted permission to calculate their own funds requirements using internal models for one or more of the following risk categories:
a) general risk of equity instruments;
b) specific risk of equity instruments;

[^2]c) general risk of debt instruments;
d) specific risk of debt instruments;
e) foreign exchange risk;
f) commodities risk; and
g) correlation trading.
43. Pursuant to Article 362 of the CRR, the general risk of debt instruments should refer to interest rate risk. Similarly, the general risk of equity instruments refers to the change in value of indexes.
44. Banks that have approval only for the general risk of equity or debt instruments (in accordance with Article 363 of the CRR) may use a different definition of general risk (e.g. by including credit spread risk in the interest rate general risk) if they are able to demonstrate that it leads to higher RWA. Separate permission is required for each risk category. Many banks do not have permission for internal models for all risk categories, so the number of contributions for each hypothetical portfolio in this exercise varies across the sample.
45. Banks that have permission to use the internal model for calculating $M R$ own funds requirements for one or more - but not all - of the risk categories in accordance with Article 363(1) of the CRR ('partial use') exclude certain risks or positions from the scope of the internal model approval. In this case, the own funds requirements for the risk categories outside the scope of the internal model are calculated according to the standardised approach.
46. In addition, as set out in Article 369(1)(c) of the CRR, banks should conduct validation exercises on hypothetical portfolios to test that the model is able to account for particular structural features. These portfolios should not be limited to the portfolios defined in this exercise; however, this exercise is a useful starting point for banks to meet this legislative requirement.
47. The assessed MR results, when provided and where applicable, are VaR, sVaR, IRC and APR figures for specific and aggregated trades. Moreover, a preliminary assessment of IMV was performed, primarily to ensure that the participating banks make uniform assumptions when entering the hypothetical trades.
48. In addition to these submissions, banks using an HS approach for VaR were requested to provide one year of P\&L data for each of the individual and aggregated portfolios modelled. The objective of collecting this additional information was to employ the data vector to perform alternative calculations for VaR using, where possible, a consistent 1-year lookback period and controlling, as far as possible, for the different options that banks can apply within regulation.
49. Regulation (EU) 2019/876 ${ }^{5}$ of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending the Capital Requirements Regulation as regards the leverage ratio, the net stable funding ratio, requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities, counterparty credit risk, market risk, exposures to central counterparties, exposures to collective investment undertakings, large exposures, reporting and disclosure requirements (CRR II) will have a significant impact on the market risk benchmarking exercise once it is fully implemented. However, for the time being the CRR framework will be applied for the purpose of the benchmark exercise in accordance with Article 78 of the CRD.

## 3. Main features of the 2020 market risk benchmarking exercise

50. Based on the EBA Benchmarking ITS, the MR benchmarking exercise is carried out following three main steps. First, the EBA defines the hypothetical instruments and portfolios, which are the same for all banks in order to achieve a homogeneous and comparable outcome across the sample. Second, banks are asked to submit the data accordingly. Third, and finally, the EBA processes and analyses the data, providing feedback to CAs. During the process, the EBA supports CAs' work by providing benchmarking tools to assess banks' results and detect anomalies in their submissions.

### 3.1 Definition of the market risk hypothetical portfolios

51. The MR portfolios have been defined as hypothetical portfolios composed of both non-CTPs and CTPs, as set out in Annex $V$ of the Benchmarking ITS. The exercise includes 73 instruments recombined in 59 general portfolios ( 53 individual and 6 aggregated), capitalised under the VaR, sVaR and IRC models, comprising mainly plain vanilla and some complex financial products in all major asset classes: EQ (18 instruments and 10 individual portfolios), IR (19 instruments and 16 individual portfolios), FX (11 instruments and six individual portfolios), CO (four instruments and three individual portfolios) and CS (21 instruments and 18 individual portfolios). The EBA also designed aggregated portfolios, obtained by combining individual ones, to take into account diversification effects. Each aggregated portfolio has a particular composition: the first (portfolio 57) encompasses all asset classes; the second (portfolio 58) is made up of only EQ portfolios; the third (portfolio 59) is made up of only IR portfolios; the fourth (portfolio 60) is made up of only FX portfolios; the fifth (portfolio 61) is made up of only CO portfolios; and the sixth (portfolio 62) is made up of only CS portfolios.
52. In addition, the set of portfolios includes two instruments and four portfolios (three individual and one aggregated) used for correlation trading activities, capitalised under the VaR, sVaR and APR models. These portfolios contain positions in index tranches referencing the iTraxx Europe index on-the-run series. The portfolios are constructed by hedging each index tranche with the iTraxx Europe index on-the-run 5-year series to achieve a zero credit spread value of 1 basis point (CS01) as of the initial valuation date (spread hedged). No further re-hedging is required.
53. A more detailed explanation of the portfolios can be found in the Benchmarking ITS on the EBA website. ${ }^{6}$

### 3.2 Data collection process

54. The data for the supervisory benchmarking exercise were submitted by banks to their respective CAs using the supervisory reporting infrastructure. Banks submitted the specified templates provided in the ITS, where applicable.

### 3.2.1 IMV

55. The reference date for IMV was 26 September 2019, 5.30 p.m. CET. Banks entered all positions on 19 September 2019 ('reset or booking date'), and, once positions had been entered, each instrument aged for the duration of the exercise. Furthermore, banks did not take any action to manage the instruments in any way during the entire exercise period.
56. The IMV figure to be reported by the banks for each hypothetical instrument was defined as the mark to market of the instrument at the booking date plus the profit and loss from the booking until the valuation date and time. Therefore, it was the mark to market of the instrument on 26 September 2019, 5:30 p.m. CET.

### 3.2.2 Risk measures

57. Pursuant to the common instructions provided, banks should calculate the risks of the positions without taking into account the funding costs associated with the portfolios (i.e. no assumptions are admitted with regard to the funding means of the portfolios). Moreover, banks should exclude, as far as possible, counterparty credit risk when valuing the risks of the portfolios.
58. Banks should calculate the regulatory 10-day $99 \%$ VaR on a daily basis. sVaR and IRC may be calculated on a weekly basis. sVaR and IRC should be based on end-of-day prices for each Friday in the time window of the exercise. For the four CTPs (54-56 and 63), APR was also requested.
59. For each portfolio, banks were asked to provide results in the base currency, as indicated in Annex V of the Benchmarking ITS. The choice of base currency for each trade was made to avoid polluting results with cross-dependencies on risk factors.
60. All collected data underwent a preliminary analysis to spot possible misinterpretations of the common instructions set out in the ITS/RTS on benchmarking and outliers, as defined hereafter.

### 3.3 Participating banks

61. A total of 54 banks representing 14 EU countries participated in the exercise (see Table 18 in the annex). All EU banks with MR internal models approved by CAs were asked to submit data at all levels where own funds requirements are calculated. The EBA collected the results only at the highest level of consolidation.
62. CAs are in charge of conducting similar benchmarking investigations for results at a 'solo' level within their own jurisdictions for eligible banks.

### 3.4 Data quality issues

63. The data collection process aims to ensure the reliability and validity of the data obtained. In this regard, it is obvious that an unwanted driver of variability (which would pollute the results) could be misunderstandings vis-à-vis the portfolios and the specific instruments included in them.
64. IMV results reached the EBA in November/December 2019, after which the EBA carried out a preliminary IMV analysis and provided CAs with a tool to help them spot likely anomalies or misunderstandings regarding the interpretation of each portfolio. This was done to enhance the quality of all risk measures so that they would be provided in accordance with a correct interpretation of the portfolios. This step was conducted before the computation of the risk measures by the banks. Where the price of an instrument fell outside a certain range, ${ }^{7}$ more investigation had to be undertaken by the CA, which could - if necessary - ask the banks in its jurisdiction for a repricing and subsequent resubmission. The same process was carried out for the risk measure submission.
65. The issue experienced in the previous exercise linked to the aggregated portfolio figures was fixed. It should be recalled that some banks reported the IMVs and risk measures for the aggregated portfolios without including all relevant components. ${ }^{8}$ The reason was that the 2018 (and previous) ITS required banks to report the value of aggregated portfolios even if not all individual portfolios are modelled for the benchmarking exercise. As a result, the submissions were not comparable with those valued in full. This issue has been addressed in the 2019 exercise, since banks have reported the results for the aggregated portfolios only if the results of all components have been submitted. ${ }^{9}$ The structure of the 2019-2020 exercise, i.e. a plurality of instruments that are recombined in a plurality of individual portfolios, which are themselves

[^3]the components of the aggregated portfolios, produced a similar error, i.e. the absence of some instrument components within some of the individual portfolios. Nonetheless, banks should not provide any (aggregated or individual) portfolios where any instrument is missing in order not to bias the risk measures analysis.
66. In the data analysis, it was clear that errors in the interpretation of some instructions and instruments are present, even though the instruments were simplified from the previous exercises and some of the general instructions remain fairly stable. A complete list of the errors in the submitted data is beyond the scope of this report, but the most common and easily avoided mistakes worth mentioning are as follows:

- Equity asset class: the problems are mainly due to the decision to put in a footnote the fact that the future positions should be multiplied by 100 contracts. Luckily, the errors generated by this drafting decision were easy to detect and fix by resubmission. The instruction in the 2020 ITS was amended such that this error should not be repeated in that exercise.
- Interest rates: good results were obtained, especially where the International Securities Identification Number was available. Minor errors were identified, such as reporting P\&L instead of mark to market, or wrong bookings (i.e. long position instead of short, or vice versa).
- FX: the only problematic instruments were 39 and 40, but the errors are quite easy to fix. Instrument 39 has been wrongly booked in many cases (i.e. short position instead of long). Instrument 40 was by far the most misrepresented: 25 out of 40 submissions were wrong. Luckily the error is quite trivial, i.e. banks reported the P\&L or zero instead of the mark to market of the position. The instructions of the 2020 ITS were amended such that this error should not be repeated in that exercise.
- Credit spread: good results in terms of CV and IQD, with very few mistakes such as evidently wrong bookings (i.e. IMVs 1,000 times the benchmark) or long position instead of short, or vice versa.
- P\&L submission: it has been noted that several banks reported the P\&L even though they were not required to do so, while others did not report it even though this was a requirement. Only banks with historical simulation models have to report the P\&L vectors in order to produce a consistent analysis of the risk measures. Furthermore, even though it was very well specified, some banks reported a 10-day P\&L vector instead of the 1-day P\&L. Although easy to spot, this mistake involved resubmissions of the result, and two banks' submissions were excluded because of this. Moreover, the P\&L series sometimes did not respect the parameters requested in the ITS (e.g. excessively short time series, wrong dates), so again these vectors have to be dropped in the analysis.

67. Although a large number of these mistakes were detected thanks to the EBA data analysis and corrected by resubmission/cleansing of the data from the banks, unnoticed errors in data submission could still be present in the dataset analysed, and this can potentially drive and pollute the results.
68. Ensuring data quality is a fundamental step for this kind of exercise. However, reporting errors might still occur in the running the future exercises, and the process will allow both regulators and participating banks to learn from it.

# 4. Market risk benchmarking framework 

69. The benchmarking exercise aims to assess the variability in banks' MR models and to identify the drivers that account for it. Variability in banks' models can come from three types of drivers.
70. First, variability can stem from banks' modelling choices that are explicitly envisaged in the regulation. For example, when modelling VaR institutions can choose to use a lookback period longer than the minimum (i.e. the previous year), use a weighting scheme for the data series, calculate the 10-day VaR directly or, alternatively, obtain a 1-day VaR and rescale it using the square root of time approximation. Likewise, when modelling IRC, banks can choose from several sources of the probability of default (PD) and have a certain degree of freedom when choosing the transition matrices applied, or when deciding on the liquidity horizon applied to a particular instrument. It should be highlighted that all of these possibilities are, in principle, acceptable under the current regulatory framework (the CRR), provided that they have been agreed on with the CA during the approval process. Therefore, given the wide range of approaches that each institution using internal models can choose to implement, some degree of variability is expected.
71. Second, there are other modelling choices that are not explicitly envisaged in the regulations, which may cause variability. Examples include differences in simulation engines, differences in pricing model assumptions, the modelling of returns, volatility, correlations and other indirect parameter estimates, additional risk factors considered in the models, different approaches to P\&L computation and attribution, and a stochastic framework for the simulated shocks.
72. Finally, another source of potential variability originates from supervisory practices. In particular, the use of regulatory add-ons in the form of both VaR and sVaR multipliers and additional capital charges (e.g. to encompass risk not in VaR issues, any information technology (IT) and organisational weaknesses, independent pricing valuations or detected flaws) and, quite significantly, the application of limits to the diversification benefits applied by banks (i.e. not allowing a single calculation at consolidated level and, instead, requesting an aggregation of the capital results at sub-consolidated and/or subsidiary levels) are likely to increase the observed variability in capital. In most cases, these supervisory actions have been established to address known flaws or model limitations, or to add an additional layer of prudence. Therefore, they typically result in higher capital requirements than would otherwise be the case. However, they can also increase the variation in market own funds requirements between banks, particularly across jurisdictions. Although the effects on capital levels of these supervisory actions can be substantial, a benchmarking portfolio exercise is not suitable for assessing some of these supervisory actions. In particular, any constraints on diversification benefits and direct capital add-ons cannot be properly assessed, since these effects are entirely portfolio-dependent. To assess these effects, it would be necessary to use a much more realistic (hypothetical) portfolio,
comprising thousands of instruments and including partial model approval. Nevertheless, some supervisory actions can be assessed and the effects of regulatory add-ons on the VaR and sVaR multipliers will be analysed as part of this assessment.
73. Possible additional drivers of variation include:

- misunderstandings regarding the positions or risk factors involved, which could not be resolved during the preliminary assessment (see Section 3.2);
- non-uniform market conventions and practices adopted in the hypothetical portfolio booking;
- incompletely implemented models (e.g. because a pricing module is under testing, or an additional risk factor is being taken into consideration);
- missing risk factors not incorporated in the model;
- differences in calibration or data series used in the modelling simulation;
- additional risk factors incorporated in the model;
- alternative model assumptions applied; and
- differences attributable to the methodology used (i.e. Monte Carlo (MC) versus HS or parametric).


### 4.1 Outlier analysis

74. After the data quality assurance process, the EBA performed an 'extreme value' analysis aimed at excluding from the computation of the benchmarks those values for which the IMV and risk measures (RMs: VaR, SVaR, P\&L VaR, ES) were found to lie outside a certain tolerance range, due to misinterpretation of the trade or mistyping of bookings by the banks.
75. The presence of clear outliers in the data used to assess variability is deemed inappropriate, since these data points are likely to weigh heavily on the results, distorting the actual level of variability observed.
76. Extreme IMVs and RMs are defined as values outside the range of two truncated standard deviations ${ }^{10}$ from the median. Since some results exhibited empirical distributions that had fatter tails than expected, outliers were defined as values differing by twice the truncated standard deviation or more from the median.

[^4]77. If a bank's IMV or RM are found to be an extreme value for a particular instrument, then this observation is removed from the computation of the final benchmark statistics. The empirical evidence indicates that excluding the RMs based solely on IMV submissions, as in the previous exercise, implied that some extreme RM submissions are wrongly reflected in the benchmarking computation, while some good observations are removed. Changing this methodology did not influence the benchmarking data point, i.e. the median result. In addition, the overall dispersion of the portfolio was only marginally affected (slightly improved). The significant enhancement is in the communication to the CAs of the significant outliers to be examined with the bank. This approach increased the overall quality of the benchmark data, providing more consistency for the benchmarks of these metrics.
78. The dispersion across the contributions is summarised by the IQD coefficient, which is more robust than the coefficient of variation (CV) for data derived from fat-tailed distributions. The higher the IQD, the more dispersed the data. IQD is defined as:
$$
I Q D=\operatorname{abs}\left[\left(Q_{75 t h}-Q_{25 t h}\right) /\left(Q_{75 t h}+Q_{25 t h}\right)\right]
$$
where $Q_{75 \text { th }}$ and $Q_{25 \text { th }}$ denote the 75th and 25th percentiles respectively.
79. Another metric used in the variability studies is the CV, which is defined as the ratio between the standard deviation ${ }^{11}$ and the mean (in absolute value):
$$
C V=a b s[S t D / M e a n] .
$$
80. The analysis reports both metrics because they jointly allow detection of the highest peaks of variability.

[^5]Table 1: IMV statistics and extreme values
EU Statistics for IMV by instrument

|  |  | Main statistics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Percentiles |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Instr. ID | Min | Max | Ave. | STDev | STDev_trunc ${ }^{1}$ | MAD (median absolute deviation) | Coefficient of variation (STDev/Mean) | Num obs. ${ }^{2}$ | 25th | 50th | 75th | IQD |
| Equity | \% | 3,417,000 | 3,426,000 | 3,420,015 | 2,191 | 3,835 | 475 | 0\% | 35 | 3,419,000 | 3,419,358 | 3,420,907 | 0\% |
|  | 2 | 645,962 | 646,900 | 646,167 | 187 | 865 | 0 | 0\% | 37 | 646,100 | 646,100 | 646,134 | 0\% |
|  | 3 | -628,611 | -619,756 | -623,431 | 1,671 | 4,946 | 598 | 0\% | 35 | -623,736 | -623,565 | -622,624 | \% |
|  | 4 | -221,484 | -216,009 | -219,040 | 846 | 1,732 | 215 | 0\% | 36 | -219,215 | -219,048 | -218,785 | 0\% |
|  | 5 | -2,031,214 | $-2,016,671$ | -2,020,499 | 3,549 | 13,880 | 1,701 | 0\% | 37 | -2,020,991 | -2,020,146 | -2,017,960 | \% |
|  | 6 | -14,879 | -14,547 | -14,645 | 67 | 132 | 25 | 1\% | 33 | -14,672 | -14,633 | -14,610 | 0\% |
|  | 7 | -68,234 | -67,405 | -67,841 | 159 | 255 | 13 | 0\% | 35 | -67,825 | -67,781 | -67,781 | 0\% |
|  | 8 | -105,266 | -103,376 | -104,466 | 508 | 1,084 | 233 | 1\% | 36 | -104,701 | -104,436 | -104,225 | 0\% |
|  | 9 | 49,755 | 56,397 | 52,859 | 1,561 | 2,204 | 1,062 | 3\% | 32 | 51,611 | 52,524 | 53,694 | 2\% |
|  | 10 | -65,545 | -57,401 | -61,764 | 1,835 | 2,161 | 977 | 3\% | 35 | -62,854 | -61,558 | -60,890 | 2\% |
|  | 11 | 6,823 | 8,399 | 7,658 | 389 | 497 | 292 | 5\% | 34 | 7,381 | 7,678 | 7,942 | 4\% |
|  | 12 | 15,432 | 17,788 | 16,698 | 574 | 707 | 420 | 3\% | 36 | 16,300 | 16,688 | 17,112 | $2 \%$ |
|  | 13 | 36,363 | 42,296 | 39,653 | 1,396 | 1,739 | 781 | 4\% | 34 | 38,858 | 39,775 | 41,023 | $3 \%$ |
|  | 14 | -33,000 | -26,748 | -30,048 | 1,355 | 1,774 | 489 | 5\% | 33 | -30,556 | -30,214 | -29,594 | 2\% |
|  | 15 | 1,385 | 2,045 | 1,675 | 153 | 230 | 70 | 9\% | 34 | 1,598 | 1,671 | 1,737 | $4 \%$ |
|  | 16 | 2,622 | 3,642 | 2,996 | 245 | 360 | 104 | 8\% | 33 | 2,844 | 2,936 | 3,051 | $4 \%$ |
|  | 17 | -1,088,500,000 | $-1,075,717,439$ | $-1,080,902,937$ | 2,913,102 | 4,809,483 | 1,060,463 | 0\% | 31 | $-1,081,589,692$ | $-1,080,324,768$ | $-1,079,000,000$ | 0\% |
|  | 18 | 991,598 | 1,098,000 | 1,064,747 | 21,184 | 45,319 | 11,345 | 2\% | 33 | 1,055,473 | 1,066,046 | 1,076,393 | $1 \%$ |
| Interest Rote | 19 | 10,493 | 17,234 | 14,028 | 1,649 | 2,325 | 1,375 | 12\% | 43 | 12,982 | 13,977 | 15,468 | 9\% |
|  | 20 | -85,914 | -74,995 | -81,766 | 1,995 | 3,490 | 932 | 2\% | 42 | -82,782 | -81,918 | -80,917 | 1\% |
|  | 21 | 30,059 | 49,558 | 39,599 | 4,316 | 5,258 | 2,878 | 11\% | 45 | 36,000 | 39,916 | 42,035 | 8\% |
|  | 22 | 7,939 | 14,835 | 10,053 | 1,027 | 2,856 | 423 | 10\% | 48 | 9,464 | 10,135 | 10,484 | 5\% |
|  | 23 | 1,027,972 | 1,149,311 | 1,087,992 | 35,665 | 38,965 | 23,811 | 3\% | 20 | 1,056,236 | 1,100,966 | 1,115,733 | $3 \%$ |
|  | 24 | 7,495,359 | 7,507,654 | 7,503,403 | 2,480 | 22,458 | 1,559 | 0\% | 40 | 7,501,816 | 7,502,537 | 7,504,913 | 0\% |
|  | 25 | -2,229,015 | -2,226,664 | -2,227,145 | 401 | 4,435 | 252 | 0\% | 39 | -2,227,357 | -2,227,000 | -2,226,831 | 0\% |
|  | 26 | 5,625,273 | 5,824,424 | 5,772,696 | 30,324 | 111,579 | 2,929 | 1\% | 31 | 5,774,954 | 5,775,739 | 5,780,383 | 0\% |
|  | 27 | 1,189,650 | 1,194,498 | 1,192,034 | 628 | 1,333 | 176 | 0\% | 39 | 1,191,854 | 1,191,946 | 1,192,237 | 0\% |
|  | 28 | 7,528,168 | 7,547,664 | 7,533,306 | 3,809 | 96,223 | 2,063 | 0\% | 37 | 7,530,241 | 7,531,317 | 7,534,819 | 0\% |
|  | 29 | -6,446,726 | -6,412,948 | -6,442,404 | 5,864 | 49,711 | 1,056 | 0\% | 38 | -6,444,766 | -6,443,146 | -6,442,644 | 0\% |
|  | 30 | -10,854,532 | -10,846,020 | -10,852,298 | 1,850 | 11,800 | 958 | 0\% | 38 | -10,853,646 | -10,852,148 | -10,851,731 | 0\% |
|  | 31 | 7,512,575 | 7,614,553 | 7,592,499 | 35,573 | 131,119 | 2,279 | 1\% | 47 | 7,604,906 | 7,609,741 | 7,610,938 | 0\% |
|  | 32 | 6,019,847 | 6,032,498 | 6,022,967 | 2,695 | 10,452 | 735 | 0\% | 38 | 6,021,515 | 6,021,933 | 6,023,036 | 0\% |
|  | 33 | $-10,385,050$ | -10,327,340 | -10,374,459 | 17,506 | 26,574 | 1,617 | 0\% | 40 | -10,382,541 | -10,380,435 | -10,377,937 | 0\% |
|  | 34 | 4,830,481 | 6,641,906 | 5,624,744 | 276,269 | 996,015 | 40,211 | 5\% | 35 | 5,521,781 | 5,671,625 | 5,712,730 | 2\% |
|  | 35 | 5,275,000 | 5,474,598 | 5,364,573 | 43,871 | 52,480 | 5,807 | 1\% | 36 | 5,358,649 | 5,379,639 | 5,382,932 | 0\% |
|  | 36 | -68,346 | -48,898 | -59,248 | 4,063 | 6,137 | 2,186 | 7\% | 47 | -61,706 | -58,821 | -57,371 | $4 \%$ |
|  | 37 | -18,598 | -12,338 | -15,627 | 1,495 | 1,819 | 803 | 10\% | 45 | -16,592 | -15,735 | -14,230 | 8\% |
| FX | ${ }^{38}$ | -31,282 | 31,000 | -11,390 | 10,687 | 23,160 | 4,972 | 94\% | 40 | -15,655 | -11,665 | -6,450 | 42\% |
|  | 39 | -104,130 | 9,681 | -54,889 | 21,562 | 29,387 | 14,350 | 39\% | 40 | -70,192 | $-48,413$ | $-44,301$ | 23\% |
|  | 40 | 875,872 | 915,418 | 910,251 | 9,113 | 292,080 | 585 | 1\% | 41 | 912,407 | 913,709 | 914,308 | 0\% |
|  | 41 | 34,965 | 39,913 | 37,927 | 1,390 | 2,158 | 1,012 | 4\% | 40 | 36,947 | 37,850 | 38,962 | 3\% |
|  | 42 | 1,124,771 | 1,155,537 | 1,138,758 | 7,608 | 8,506 | 4,776 | 1\% | 40 | 1,133,781 | 1,139,510 | 1,143,731 | 0\% |
|  | 43 | -321,236 | -301,523 | -311,649 | 4,849 | 5,444 | 2,782 | 2\% | 39 | -314,385 | -311,659 | -307,339 | 1\% |
|  | 44 | -133,688 | -122,472 | -127,851 | 3,132 | 4,296 | 2,534 | 2\% | 38 | -130,397 | -127,033 | -125,105 | $2 \%$ |
|  | 45 | 1,154,155 | 1,175,916 | 1,166,270 | 5,253 | 5,529 | 2,941 | 1\% | 40 | 1,163,567 | 1,165,195 | 1,170,171 | 0\% |
|  | 46 | -978,798 | -961,319 | -972,291 | 3,752 | 6,773 | 1,739 | 0\% | 37 | -974,153 | -972,732 | -970,902 | 0\% |
|  | 47 | -57,371 | 113,651 | 34,444 | 47,070 | 47,070 | 15,056 | 137\% | 39 | 6,676 | 19,914 | 86,829 | 86\% |
| Commodities | 48 | 16,284 | 36,359 | 25,156 | 5,441 | 7,069 | 3,837 | 22\% | 20 | 20,352 | 25,320 | 29,131 | 18\% |
|  | 49 | -37,616 | -14,849 | -25,006 | 5,985 | 6,775 | 3,851 | 24\% | 21 | -27,979 | -24,885 | -19,923 | 17\% |
|  | 50 | 133,496 | 187,116 | 161,354 | 11,107 | 14,839 | 6,692 | 7\% | 18 | 154,458 | 160,197 | 167,739 | $4 \%$ |
|  | 51 | -151,178 | -121,546 | -136,509 | 7,269 | 8,336 | 4,245 | 5\% | 17 | -140,078 | -136,458 | -131,665 | 3\% |
| Credit Spread | 51 | -29,855 | -27,426 | -28,933 | 452 | 1,178 | 193 | 2\% | 30 | -29,147 | -28,981 | -28,739 | $1 \%$ |
|  | 53 | 16,694 | 18,795 | 17,917 | 428 | 1,029 | 124 | 2\% | 27 | 17,777 | 17,849 | 18,012 | 1\% |
|  | 54 | 28,172 | 30,365 | 29,710 | 544 | 1,339 | 184 | 2\% | 31 | 29,609 | 29,881 | 29,925 | 1\% |
|  | 55 | 7,077 | 8,590 | 7,777 | 380 | 641 | 231 | 5\% | 27 | 7,365 | 7,858 | 8,050 | 4\% |
|  | 56 | 16,788 | 19,480 | 17,789 | 771 | 1,029 | 266 | 4\% | 27 | 17,402 | 17,541 | 17,828 | 1\% |
|  | 57 | -35,621 | -32,929 | -34,198 | 562 | 721 | 242 | 2\% | 30 | -34,554 | -34,299 | -34,007 | 1\% |
|  | 58 | 31,970 | 33,056 | 32,524 | 208 | 301 | 93 | 1\% | 29 | 32,414 | 32,483 | 32,655 | 0\% |
|  | 59 | -27,146 | -22,893 | -25,056 | 672 | 1,999 | 72 | 3\% | 29 | -25,161 | -25,092 | -24,988 | 0\% |
|  | 60 | 13,476 | 16,947 | 15,593 | 798 | 1,201 | 365 | 5\% | 29 | 15,309 | 15,858 | 15,948 | 2\% |
|  | 61 | -19,147 | -16,305 | -18,132 | 743 | 1,054 | 262 | 4\% | 27 | -18,628 | -18,262 | -17,988 | 2\% |
|  | 62 | 16,349 | 17,937 | 17,102 | 338 | 513 | 124 | 2\% | 29 | 16,939 | 17,075 | 17,116 | 1\% |
|  | ${ }^{63}$ | 29,707 | 30,569 | 30,353 | 169 | 336 | 80 | 1\% | 29 | 30,298 | 30,346 | 30,475 | 0\% |
|  | 64 | 33,202 | 34,569 | 33,984 | 344 | 488 | 238 | 1\% | 26 | 33,744 | 34,039 | 34,268 | $1 \%$ |
|  | 65 | 39,153 | 42,548 | 40,821 | 668 | 896 | 238 | 2\% | 31 | 40,646 | 40,942 | 41,141 | 1\% |
|  | 66 | -40,932 | -39,373 | -40,124 | 344 | 451 | 150 | 1\% | 30 | $-40,297$ | -40,124 | $-40,004$ | 0\% |
|  | 67 | -5,153 | -3,076 | -4,012 | 447 | 701 | 168 | 11\% | 30 | $-4,274$ | -3,975 | -3,830 | 5\% |
|  | 68 | 993,610 | 998,560 | 996,346 | 1,225 | 1,834 | 542 | 0\% | 28 | 995,624 | 996,654 | 997,044 | 0\% |
|  | 69 | 117,004 | 124,788 | 121,059 | 1,998 | 2,363 | 805 | 2\% | 29 | 119,988 | 120,690 | 122,205 | 1\% |
|  | 70 | 1,017,780 | 1,031,106 | 1,025,663 | 3,556 | 4,207 | 1,313 | 0\% | 31 | 1,024,877 | 1,025,790 | 1,027,933 | 0\% |
|  | 71 | 1,025,690 | 1,038,939 | 1,035,543 | 4,790 | 6,300 | 752 | 1\% | 33 | 1,036,897 | 1,037,794 | 1,038,553 | 0\% |
|  | 72 | $-1,010,623$ | -1,006,900 | -1,009,614 | 1,023 | 1,581 | 279 | 0\% | 33 | -1,010,254 | -1,010,013 | -1,009,589 | 0\% |
|  | 73 | 1,087,978 | 1,091,711 | 1,090,479 | 804 | 4,749 | 246 | 0\% | 28 | 1,090,032 | 1,090,487 | 1,090,982 | 0\% |
| Correlation Trading | 74 | 134,965 | 206,607 | 168,525 | 23,867 | 23,867 | 13,370 | 14\% | 8 | 151,763 | 165,128 | 186,423 | 10\% |
|  | 75 | 128,785 | 166,569 | 142,552 | 14,158 | 14,158 | 847 | 10\% | 5 | 138,572 | 139,418 | 139,418 | 0\% |

${ }^{2}$ Refers to the number of banks included in the computation of the statistics

Table 2: Average IMVs' interquartile dispersion by asset class
Average Interquartile dispersion by asset class

|  | Interquartile range <br> 2020 exercise | Interquartile range <br> 2019 exercise | Interquartile range <br> 2018 exercise |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Equity | $1 \%$ | $2 \%$ | $2 \%$ |
| IR | $2 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $8 \%$ |
| FX | $16 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $6 \%$ |
| Commodity | $10 \%$ | $6 \%$ | $8 \%$ |
| Credit spreads | $1 \%$ | $3 \%$ | $6 \%$ |
| CTP | $5 \%$ | $8 \%$ | $103 \%$ |

81. Table 1 and Table 2 depict the results at the level of both each individual instrument and each risk type. As shown, the highest dispersion at the level of the individual instruments is detected for FX instrument 47 (CCSwap) (IQD 86\%). This high dispersion was due to the flawed submission of the instrument by a large number of banks. It should be recalled that for instrument 47, a substantial amount of additional details was provided in the 2020 ITS. The instructions include the definition of the cash balance of CCSwap. In the ITS 2020 the cash balance was 'included', but a plurality of banks submitted, inconsistently with respect to the instructions, this as 'cash balance excluded', claiming this was the industry practice. This caused a clustered submission for this instrument, as shown in Figure 2. In order to avoid this issue, the ITS 2021 updated the clause as 'cash balance excluded', meeting the industry standard and hopefully lowering the dispersion of this instrument.
82. Besides the CCSwap, also the FX Fwd (instruments 38-39 shown IQD above $15 \%$ ( $42 \%$ and $23 \%$ ). The perception with regard to these submissions, besides some trivial errors such as inverted bookings (long instead of short), is that minimal changes in the parameter cause a significant change in the IMVs. It should be noted also that the absolute difference between the $25^{\text {th }}$ and $75^{\text {th }}$ quantile is stable, or decreased for instrument 38 , but also that the absolute value of the instrument is decreased, and tends toward zero. This tends to inflate the IQD index of these instruments. Excluding these instruments gives us an average IQD for the FX asset class of 1\%, which can be interpreted as a very low dispersion.
83. Besides these FX instruments, commodity instruments 48 and 49 present IQDs barely above $15 \%$. The level of dispersion is slightly higher than in the previous exercise. As for the FX product, it should also be noted that the absolute difference between the $25^{\text {th }}$ and $75^{\text {th }}$ quantile is stable, so it seems that the quality of the submission is comparable to that of the previous exercise.
84. Overall, the IQD by asset class for the instrument of the 2020 exercise is significantly lower than in the past exercises for the equity, interest rate and credit spread asset classes. This means that the adjustment to the 2020 instructions, together with the simplification of the instrument
already included in the instructions for the 2019 exercise have achieved the desired outcome of obtaining a generally low IQD of the instruments in the exercise.
85. Comparing the 2020 instruments with the 2019 instruments purely on the basis of the IQD, it would appear that the quality of the data increased.
86. From a more aggregated risk-type perspective, EQ, IR and CS instruments show the lowest dispersion, indicating an improvement versus 2019. This was expected for CDS, where additional details were provided in the 2020 instructions to reduce ambiguities in interpretation with regard to booking the instruments.
87. CTP IMVs show a slightly higher dispersion (5\%), since there are actual differences in market practices and assumptions/conventions between banks (i.e. choice of on-the-run iTraxx Europe series, choice of coupons and tranching assumptions). Furthermore, the high IQD for the FX class is driven mainly by three instruments ( 38,39 and 47). The commodity class shows an aggregated IQD of $10 \%$, which is slightly higher than in the previous exercises.
88. A cluster analysis (see Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 17 and Table 3) was performed to strengthen and deepen the aforementioned descriptive insights. It shows the dispersion of the IMVs by instrument and helps in identifying clusters in the instruments' pricing that could explain the scattering of IMVs for some trades. Despite all our data quality assurance efforts, the results of this analysis suggest that the clusters observable for some instruments are brought about by different feasible interpretations of the instruments.

Table 3: IMV cluster analysis - number of banks by range

2020 IMV cluster analysis by instrument: number of banks by range ( $X=$ ratio with the median)

89. In particular, as shown in Table 3 and Figure 2:

- Instruments 6 and 15-18 (EQ): there are generally few extreme outlier observations, compared with a low IQD (4\%), which does not represent a substantial problem for the CAs.
- Instruments 19, 21, 37 (IR): only a few observations are extreme outliers with an IQD above $8 \%$.
- Instruments 38-39 and 47 (FX): there are many significant outliers with a high IQD, explained by the misinterpretation of instrument 47 (see also data quality issues in Section 3.4 of the report) and the low absolute value of instrument 38.
- Instruments 48-49 (CO): there are only few significant outliers, which inflate the IQD significantly due to the small number of overall observations.
- Instrument 67 (CS): in this sovereign CDS short position the other IMVs are very small and close to zero, which inflates the IQD with respect to the rest of the instruments in the asset class.

90. Some of these extreme outlier banks were classified as a high priority for the CAs (see also Chapter 6), so they were followed with greater attention during the exercise in order to specifically define the reason for the extreme result.
91. Other kinds of difficulties were found for CTPs, principally because of the scarcity of contributions and the complex nature of these trades, along with their spread hedging. However, based on the observed IMV results there is slightly more pricing consistency for the second CTP, instrument 75 , which refers to a long-hedged position on an equity tranche of the iTraxx EU index (attachment 0\%; detachment 3\%). This is due to the more standard market tranching points.
92. One source of variability for these instruments relates to the index hedge practice. Commonly, the index hedge seems to be made at the point of inception of the trade when a CS01 spread hedge tranche is traded. However, a couple of banks did not comply with this market practice. Moreover, variability in the IMV and risk measures results could also occur if the banks calculated different hedge ratios (i.e. the ratio of the change in the mark to market of the tranche to the change in the mark to market of the index for a shift in the credit curve for all underlying names) based on their proprietary pricing models.
93. In the past, some banks erroneously computed the IMV results as a P\&L from the booking date to the valuation date. In order to achieve a uniform interpretation, the EBA issued a question and answer (Q\&A) tool that defined the IMV as the mark to market at the valuation date and
time for each trade. ${ }^{12}$ This has helped in the exercise, and this error seems to be present only in a limited number of cases (few banks reported the P\&L for instrument 40).
94. Some minor misalignments in the IMV have been detected due to the reporting of the 'clean price' (i.e. the price of a trade excluding the accrued interest) instead of the 'dirty price' (i.e. the price of a trade including any interest), which is what was intended for the mark to market valuation. This has been detected especially in the bond price, such as instruments 24-35.
95. In addition, the EBA recommends that banks make better use of the Q\&A tool by submitting questions before the start of the exercise to avoid misinterpretations in the future. Banks are kindly invited to provide, using the Q\&A tool, their best practice and market standard conventions when further specifications of the hypothetical trades are needed.
96. Evidence from a large majority of the banks is that IMV comes from front office systems. This is acknowledged as the best practice for alignment with real market-trading activities.
97. Figure 1 and Figure 2 report the clusters found in the IMV results for a sample of low IQD instruments ( $0 \%$ IQD or close to zero) and high IQD (the highest in the asset class) instruments. All the instruments' IMV distributions are available in the annex in Figure 17.

Figure 1: IMV scatter plots - low-IQD instruments


Figure 2: IMV scatter plots - high-IQD instruments

99. This result is consistent with that reported following last year's MR benchmarking exercise, demonstrating once again that the simplification of the instruments resulted in a decrease in the number of outliers.
100. Given the EBA's experience with past benchmarking exercises, values lying in this range might be considered acceptable on the basis of fine-tuning as successive benchmarking exercises are run. Nevertheless, the aim will be to increase this IMV empirical range coverage in the next exercises.
101. For many hypothetical instruments, the IMV variability is explained by the divergence in terms of both fixings and market practice assumptions by the participating banks. Therefore, the interpretation of the deals and market practices substantially explain the observed variability.

### 4.2 Risk and stressed measures assessment

102. For VaR and sVaR, variability was assessed by using the banks' reported VaR and sVaR over a 2-week period (from 20 January 2020 to 31 January 2020). Banks submitted weekly or daily observations, depending on their models, and the final risk measures by portfolio were obtained by averaging the observations over the 2 weeks.
103. In the sample, 16 out of 50 banks calculated weekly sVaR measures. The remaining two thirds of the participating banks computed daily sVaR measures.
104. In addition, a P\&L VaR measure produced by the EBA using the P\&L data provided by banks via an HS approach was analysed. The relevant banks delivered a yearly 1-day P\&L vector for each of the individual and aggregated portfolios modelled. These were used to compute the P\&L VaR.
105. The additional P\&L information for non-APR portfolios allowed the EBA to compute the alternative measure for VaR previously defined, and to check the variability of the results across banks by calculating VaR using a 1-year lookback period.
106. Additional checks were carried out for the available P\&L vectors, such as the 1-day P\&L versus the 10-day P\&L (either overlapped or not), where applicable. Furthermore, the time series with the wrong time window were dropped. P\&L vectors provided by banks with no HS model were also dropped. A final consistency check across the HS banks entailed computing the ratio between P\&L VaR and the regulatory VaR provided, which can be expected to be close to $1 .{ }^{13}$

[^6]107. Clearly, the P\&L VaR assessment is possible only for banks applying an HS approach, and with at least 185 days of results submitted. Accordingly, banks applying an MC or parametric approach, or another approach other than HS, cannot be subject to this assessment, and have been dropped from the sample (see also Section 3.4, 'Data quality issues').
108. The P\&L VaR was computed as the absolute value of the empirical first percentile of the P\&L vector rescaled to 10 days by applying the square root of time approximation, without applying any data-weighting scheme: ${ }^{14}$
$$
V a R_{99 \%}^{10 d a y}=\sqrt{10} * V a R_{99 \%}^{1 d a y}
$$
109. The P\&L vector is used to assess the degree of P\&L correlation across banks, as well as the level of volatility shown in each bank's vector. This analysis should provide useful insights into the degree of market consensus on the relevant risk factors in terms of both market dynamics and volatility levels. Obviously, this analysis, like most of those discussed here, relies on sufficient data points and portfolios being modelled by banks to ensure robustness and consistency.
110. The IRC analysis cannot be deepened like that for VaR because of the higher level of confidence (99.9\%) and longer capital horizon (1 year) applied in these metrics. Nevertheless, a variability analysis was performed. In the paragraph concerning IRC, particular emphasis is reserved for missing, zero or unrealistically low results, which suggest that key underlying risk factors are not efficiently captured by the IRC internal model.
111. In the sample, 16 out of 34 banks computed weekly IRC measures.
112. It is apparent that more complex risk measures, such as IRC, are computed at a less frequent pace (i.e. weekly basis instead of daily basis).
113. For APR, only a small number of contributions were submitted because of the scarcity of approved internal models on CTPs and because most institutions consider the CTP business to be declining significantly as a result of the recent financial crisis. Therefore, the sample is quite limited.
114. In the sample, five out of eight banks computed weekly APR measures.

[^7]115. The ES, as an alternative risk metric to VaR , has been estimated from the daily P\&L series by averaging the P\&L observations below the 2.5 th percentile converted by the square root of time approximation and taking the absolute value:
$$
E S_{97.5 \%}^{10 d a y}=\sqrt{10} * E S_{97.5 \%}^{1 d a y}=\sqrt{10} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} P \& L_{t_{i}}
$$
where $n=$ number of days describing the 2.5 th quantile rounded to the highest decimal.
116. For the aggregated portfolios, diversification effects were checked with regard to the VaR, sVaR and IRC metrics, regardless of whether they were provided or estimated.
117. For the most inclusive portfolios - i.e. the aggregate portfolios - the implied capital charges were also computed and their variability analysed. Where possible, the idiosyncratic factors that drive variability and the impact of regulatory add-ons (e.g. multipliers) were analysed.
118. It is worth noting that, although the effects on capital levels of these supervisory actions can be substantial, an HPE is not suitable for assessing such differences. This is especially the case for diversification benefits since these effects are entirely portfolio-dependent. More on this is included in the following subsection entitled 'Limitations'.
119. Finally, to make the analysis more comprehensive, CAs were asked to complete a questionnaire about the takeaways from this benchmarking analysis and the actions they plan to take to overcome potential weaknesses in the banks' MR models (see Section 6 of this report). Thanks to the interview process, the EBA had the opportunity to discuss directly some issues raised by CAs when challenging the models in the ongoing assessment process.

### 4.2.1 Limitations

120. The design of the benchmarking portfolio exercise described in the ITS aims to ensure the quality of the data used in the report to be produced by the EBA and, more importantly, to identify the banks and portfolios that need specific attention from the responsible CAs. Nevertheless, any conclusions regarding the total levels of capital derived from the hypothetical data should be treated with due caution. The hypothetical portfolios are very different from real portfolios in terms of size and structure. What is more, the data cannot reflect all actions taken by supervisors.
121. From a methodological perspective, the sVaR metric variability observed could originate either from differences in modelling or from the different data periods used for sVaR computation. Further variability stems from banks' different stress periods because there is no common benchmarking stress period. To allow more specific analysis of this aspect, in the 20192020 benchmarking exercise more information about the stressed VaR time window was requested from banks by expanding the relative template envisaged in Annex VI of the Benchmarking ITS (in this regard, see subsection 5.2.5.d, 'Common stress period considered', below).
122. Another limitation that was tackled in this exercise is to produce a segregated analysis for institutions with partial model approval (e.g. general risk only) in order to split the result for portfolios with specific risk to filter the additional unwarranted dispersion of VaR figures. The benchmark analysis was run by splitting banks with full approval for equity and IR from those with partial approval in order to filter out the variability of the risk measure introduced by the partially approved banks.
123. Banks with partial model approval provided insights into how they approached the benchmarking exercise. It has been found that the differences reported by the banks in respect of the EBA's benchmark measure are almost entirely explained by considering the internal measure of risk, which is not approved for capital purposes but is more complete in terms of risk factor coverage.
124. In summary, the reporting of partial use approval results should be continued for the purpose of the exercise. However, it should be considered within the specific sample in order to assess any bias these partial use approval results could introduce into the results for the rest of the sample observed.

## 5. Overview of the results obtained

### 5.1 Analysis of VaR and sVaR metrics

125. In a departure from the previous exercises, the dataset used to perform the assessment of risk measures for the 2020 exercise was determined on the basis of the actual dispersion of the risk measures analysed. The outcome of the IMV extreme value analysis was used as an early indication of the potential problem to be reported to banks by their CAs. As explained in Section 4.1, banks' data were taken into account only for portfolios for which the RM is between the benchmark ( $50^{\text {th }}$ percentile) +/- two times the truncated standard deviation in the portfolio analysed. The rest was classified as an outlier. As shown in Figure 26, we can see that this methodology is not affected by the issue of excluding RMs that are clearly consistent with the benchmark.
126. To check if submissions (by portfolio) were at least approximately symmetrically distributed around the mean and/or the median, the EBA checked for any significant differences between the mean and median values for the truncated sample. Table 20 in the annex reports the banks' VaR results in relation to the median, aggregated into six buckets, to enable detection of unexpected clusters.
127. As Table 20 and Table 21 clearly show, a relatively high variability of the VaR (above $20 \%$ in IQD) has been found in portfolios 4 and 7 for EQ, 24 and 25 within the IR asset class, and portfolio 33 for CO. The analysis also identifies clusters for portfolios 36, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 52 and 53 (credit spread). With regard to the EQ portfolio 4 (OTM options), the value is very close to zero, and this tends to inflate the IQD. Portfolio 18 features the autocallable instrument, whose exotic nature could increase the VaR. For CO portfolio 33 the high dispersion comes from a VaR of the hedge portfolio that is relatively close to zero. The high dispersion in IR and CS portfolios could be explained by a shared feature: the lack of permission for model-specific IR and the low absolute value of some of the VaR figures that tend to exacerbate the difference in the IQD figures.
128. In contrast to the previous exercise, the VaR values for CTPs (portfolios 54 to 56) are relatively high, except for portfolio 56. The small sample size and scattering of results did not allow a deeper analysis of the CTP portfolios. However, the variability analysis concerning CTPs and the results found are reported since internal models for this risk category are formally authorised and envisaged by the CRR.
129. The cluster analysis presented above is superior to a simple outlier analysis that flags submissions more than a designated number of standard deviations from the mean, as this method cannot easily be used for clustered or strongly asymmetric portfolios.

## Interquartile dispersion

130. Figure 3 and Table 4 summarise the variability of the results, measured via the IQD and coefficient of variation, for the IMV as well as all three VaR measures (i.e. VaR, VaR for HS banks only and VaR calculated from the 1-year P\&L series submitted by HS banks). IQD and CV for IMV, PV, VaR and Stress VaR, divided by risk factors, are reported at the bottom of Figure 3. Table 4 also includes the VaR results for MC simulation banks and the expected shortfall.
131. In terms of risk across different assets classes, the IQDs for VaR for all the asset classes except CS are below 20\%, while the FX and IR portfolios are lower than for the other risk types. Overall, the IQD is generally slightly lower than in the 2019 exercise, where there was an average dispersion of the VaR of $21 \%$, whereas this comes in at only $17 \%$ in the 2020 exercise. This decrease in the IQD of the VaR is likely to have stemmed from both a better understanding of the instruments/portfolio in the exercise compared with the 2019 submission (first submission with the new portfolios), but also as a result of the new methodology applied to exclude outliers in the RM submissions.
132. As expected, the IQD for sVaR is slightly higher than for VaR (see the bottom panels of Figure 3), with an average IQD of $25 \%$ ( $27 \%$ in 2019), while the CS asset class features a higher dispersion once again ( $34 \%$; in 2019 it was 39\%). Higher SVaR dispersion is likely to be due to the differences between banks in their choice of the 1-year stress period used, which is chosen based on each participating bank's actual portfolio. It might therefore be the case that the sVaR is not calculated with respect to the 1-year period that maximises VaR for the given hypothetical portfolio.

Figure 3: Interquartile dispersion and coefficient of variation for IMV and risk metrics by portfolio


Table 4: Interquartile dispersion for IMV and risk metrics by risk factor

## Average Interquartile dispersion by risk factor

|  | IMV | VaR (all <br> sample) | SVaR | P\&L VaR | VaR HS <br> banks | VaR MC <br> banks | Exp <br> shortfall |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Equity | $1 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $27 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $11 \%$ | $11 \%$ |
| IR | $2 \%$ | $13 \%$ | $31 \%$ | $12 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $8 \%$ | $11 \%$ |
| FX | $16 \%$ | $12 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $9 \%$ |
| Commodity | $10 \%$ | $20 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $22 \%$ | $9 \%$ | $21 \%$ |
| Credit spr. | $1 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $34 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $24 \%$ |

133. Table 4 suggests there is evidence that when a homogeneous subset of banks is considered (i.e. HS or MC banks), the VaR results show less dispersion than the total sample (average $16 \%$ vs. 17\%). With regard to the P\&L VaR, it is evident that the dispersion (15\% on average) is slightly lower with respect to both HS VaR and all-sample VaR for all the asset classes. This is consistent with the assumption that fewer differences in the methodology would imply less dispersion among the risk measures.
134. When comparing variability for HS VaR and MC VaR, this year's result tells us that the MC VaR values are less dispersed than those of the HS VaR, as in the 2019 exercise. Nonetheless, the analysis needs to take account of the fact that the sample of MC banks is quite small compared with that of HS banks (i.e. 7 MC banks versus 39 HS banks). Regarding parametric banks, a similar analysis is not informative as the total number of parametric banks is very small (i.e. three banks in the sample).
135. The ratio between sVaR and VaR was also analysed across the sample (see Table 25 in the annex). Some banks have ratios below 1 for many portfolios, while other banks have extremely high ratios for some portfolios. While it is generally expected that the sVaR is greater than the VaR , the clear disparity between these values is usually a natural indication that something is wrong with the data submitted, and the EBA and CAs have to pay attention to these observations.
136. Table 5 shows the distribution of the sVaR-VaR ratio classified into three buckets (i.e. below 1, between 1 and 3, above 3) for each portfolio. It is worth noting that a significant number of portfolios for EQ and IR have a significant proportion of ratios below 1. This indicates that the (bank-level) stress period was not appropriate for these particular hypothetical trades.

Table 5: sVaR-VaR ratio by range (number of banks as a percentage of the total)

Distribution of sVaR / Var ratio over portfolios
( $X=$ ratio with the median)

|  | Port. ID | $x>3$ | $1<x \leq 3$ | $\mathrm{x} \leq 1$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Equity | 1 | 47.1\% | 52.9\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 2 | 83.3\% | 16.7\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 3 | 0.0\% | 88.6\% | 11.4\% |
|  | 4 | 16.1\% | 51.6\% | 32.3\% |
|  | 5 | 87.5\% | 12.5\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 6 | 5.9\% | 82.4\% | 11.8\% |
|  | 7 | 59.3\% | 37.0\% | 3.7\% |
|  | 8 | 3.0\% | 75.8\% | 21.2\% |
|  | 9 | 0.0\% | 94.1\% | 5.9\% |
|  | 10 | 79.4\% | 20.6\% | 0.0\% |
| Interest Rate | 11 | 52.4\% | 47.6\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 12 | 12.8\% | 64.1\% | 23.1\% |
|  | 13 | 0.0\% | 97.7\% | 2.3\% |
|  | 14 | 51.2\% | 46.5\% | 2.3\% |
|  | 15 | 44.4\% | 55.6\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 16 | 0.0\% | 87.5\% | 12.5\% |
|  | 17 | 0.0\% | 86.1\% | 13.9\% |
|  | 18 | 2.9\% | 55.9\% | 41.2\% |
|  | 19 | 2.4\% | 90.5\% | 7.1\% |
|  | 20 | 68.4\% | 23.7\% | 7.9\% |
|  | 21 | 2.6\% | 97.4\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 22 | 53.7\% | 41.5\% | 4.9\% |
|  | 23 | 0.0\% | 100.0\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 24 | 50.0\% | 44.1\% | 5.9\% |
|  | 25 | 67.4\% | 25.6\% | 7.0\% |
|  | 26 | 5.7\% | 77.1\% | 17.1\% |
| FX | 27 | 38.1\% | 61.9\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 28 | 15.0\% | 80.0\% | 5.0\% |
|  | 29 | 82.1\% | 17.9\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 30 | 59.5\% | 40.5\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 31 | 97.0\% | 3.0\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 32 | 96.6\% | 3.4\% | 0.0\% |
| Commodity | 33 | 52.6\% | 42.1\% | 5.3\% |
|  | 34 | 0.0\% | 94.1\% | 5.9\% |
|  | 35 | 75.0\% | 25.0\% | 0.0\% |
| Credit Spread | 36 | 7.4\% | 70.4\% | 22.2\% |
|  | 37 | 72.7\% | 22.7\% | 4.5\% |
|  | 38 | 72.0\% | 28.0\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 39 | 60.9\% | 34.8\% | 4.3\% |
|  | 40 | 77.3\% | 22.7\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 41 | 61.5\% | 38.5\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 42 | 39.1\% | 60.9\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 43 | 64.3\% | 35.7\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 44 | 51.9\% | 48.1\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 45 | 62.5\% | 37.5\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 46 | 42.9\% | 57.1\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 47 | 73.1\% | 23.1\% | 3.8\% |
|  | 48 | 63.0\% | 37.0\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 49 | 41.7\% | 54.2\% | 4.2\% |
|  | 50 | 3.7\% | 77.8\% | 18.5\% |
|  | 51 | 42.9\% | 57.1\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 52 | 34.8\% | 60.9\% | 4.3\% |
|  | 53 | 33.3\% | 66.7\% | 0.0\% |
| CTP | 54 | 75.0\% | 25.0\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 55 | 40.0\% | 60.0\% | 0.0\% |
|  | 56 | 0.0\% | 100.0\% | 0.0\% |
| ALL-IN no-CTP | 57 | 100.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| Equity Cumulative | 58 | 95.7\% | 4.3\% | 0.0\% |
| IR Cumulative | 59 | 3.2\% | 83.9\% | 12.9\% |
| FX Cumulative | 60 | 97.1\% | 2.9\% | 0.0\% |
| Commodity Cumulative | 61 | 0.0\% | 100.0\% | 0.0\% |
| CS Cumulative | 62 | 66.7\% | 33.3\% | 0.0\% |
| CTP Cumulative | 63 | 0.0\% | 100.0\% | 0.0\% |

### 5.2 A closer look at the VaR and sVaR results

137. Figure 4 and Figure 5 give an overview of the VaR and sVaR results for portfolios 1 to 56, i.e. they do not include the aggregated portfolios, where fewer observations were available for the reasons explained above (see Section 3.4).
138. Broken down by portfolio, the figures show the average VaR and sVaR over the 10-day submission period for each bank, normalised by the median ${ }^{15}$ of the given portfolio. ${ }^{16}$
139. Comparing Figure 4 and Figure 5, it looks as if the dispersion is higher for sVaR than for VaR (sVaR 27\% IQD versus 18\% VaR IQD on average). Differences in dispersion between VaR and sVaR seem steady but are more marked for the credit spread portfolios, in which sVaR shows a higher level of dispersion than in the other asset classes (approximately 34\%). This is due to the higher complexity of some of these products compared to other asset classes and to the different banks' choices regarding the stress period.
140. FX and IR are the asset classes with the lowest levels of dispersion for VaR (12\% and 13\%), while for sVaR it was the CO asset class (17\%).
[^8]Figure 4: VaR submissions normalised by the median of each portfolio


VaR: all portfolios (exc. aggregated)
(ratio with the median below $50 \%$ )


Figure 5: sVaR submissions normalised by the median of each portfolio

141. Table 21 and Table 22 in the annex report all $\operatorname{VaR}$ and $s V a R$ statistics along with EU benchmarks for all HPE portfolios.

### 5.2.1 Comparison of $s V a R-V a R$ ratios

142. Banks were assessed in relation to the full sample not only by their VaR and sVaR values, but also by their sVaR-VaR ratios. In general, it should be expected that sVaR would be at least as high as VaR, as sVaR is calibrated to a 1-year period of significant stress. This is verified in $92 \%$ of cases. However, since the stress period is calibrated on a bank-by-bank basis using the banks' actual portfolios, for the hypothetical portfolios underlying the HPE the sVaR-VaR ratio could in some instances conceivably be smaller than 1.
143. Figure 6 shows the ratio of the average sVaR to the average VaR for each bank. The sVaRVaR ratio varies significantly across the portfolios. Excluding outliers, the average sVaR-VaR
ratio per portfolio varies between 0.75 and 8.15 , and has an average ratio of $2.87 .{ }^{17}$ The portfolios with the lowest levels of dispersion for the sVaR-VaR ratio (excluding outliers) are portfolios 1, 5 (EQ) and 31 (FX).

Figure 6: sVaR-VaR ratio for the average VaR and sVaR by portfolio
SVaR/VaR: all portfolios (exc. aggregated)
(ratio with the median)


SVaR/VaR: all portfolios (exc. aggregated)
(ratio with the median below 1.0)

144. A few banks have a high sVaR-VaR ratio for portfolios in certain asset classes only. This suggests that this asset class dominates the banks' real trading portfolios and, for that reason, drives the calibration of the sVaR window.

[^9] Table 20.
145. In line with the higher dispersion observed for the sVaR for this asset class, in terms of the ratio the (average) dispersion for credit spread portfolios is also higher than the dispersion for the other asset classes.

### 5.2.2 Drivers of variation

146. Based on the qualitative information provided by banks (Figure 7 to Figure 11), the most common methodological approach used by banks to model MR is HS (72\%). Although the majority of banks use the same methodological approach, the dispersion of VaR remains significant because other modelling choices play a key role in producing variability of the risk measures (e.g. differences in time scaling and/or weighting scheme choices, absolute versus relative returns for different asset classes).

Figure 7: Qualitative data: VaR methodological approaches


Figure 8: VaR submissions normalised by the median of each portfolio (by methodological approach)


VaR: all portfolios (exc. aggregated)
(ratio with the median below 50\% - HS banks in orange

147. With regard to the regulatory 10-day VaR computation, by far the preferred method is rescaling the 1-day VaR to the 10-day VaR using the square root of time approximation.

Figure 9: Qualitative data: VaR time-scaling techniques

148. Concerning the historical lookback period used to calibrate banks' VaR models, more than half of the banks use the minimum period of one year. Only a minority (5 out of 53) of the banks use a period greater than two years.

Figure 10: Qualitative data - length of VaR lookback period

149. As for the possible use of a data-weighting scheme, the great majority of banks' models use unweighted data in the regulatory VaR computation (43 out of 53 respondents, or $81 \%$ ).

Figure 11: Qualitative data - VaR weighting choices

150. Finally, with regard to supervisory actions on regulatory add-ons, $77 \%$ of the banks in the sample have a total multiplication factor greater than the minimum of 3, which includes the addend resulting from the number of over-shootings (Table 1 in Article 366 of the CRR) and any supervisory extra charge(s). The average total multiplication factor in this sample is equal to 3.5 , with a maximum of 5.02. As a result, quite a number of banks either have to correct for excessive over-shootings or are subject to supervisory measures. In addition, some banks have been assigned other kinds of added penalties that encompass risk 'not in VaR' and additional charges for IRC and APR. This was apparent from the additional and related information provided by some CAs about their supervised banks, and from discussions with some banks during the interviews.
151. These responses suggest that the observed variation may be due to a number of different drivers. The EBA chooses to present the analysis using the following broad headings:

- supervisory actions;
- modelling differences; and
- other drivers of variation.


### 5.2.3 Supervisory actions

152. Supervisory actions can take different forms and are therefore difficult to capture fully in the analysis. However, the effects of some types of supervisory charges can be approximated. The effect of a higher VaR or sVaR multiplier imposed by a CA because of model weaknesses, for example, can be studied using the following proxy:

$$
\text { Capital proxy }=m_{v a R} * V a R+m_{s V a R} * s V a R
$$

where $m_{v a R}$ and $m_{S V a R}$ are the total regulatory multipliers given by 3 plus any add-on resulting from excessive backtesting exceptions and other prudential extra charges imposed by the regulator (where appropriate).
153. Including the multipliers in the analysis did not significantly change the results in terms of variability across the sample; that is, the positioning across the sample changed, but, on average, the extent of the dispersion did not.
154. Other supervisory measures, such as capital add-ons, cannot be easily captured. They are normally calculated at an aggregate level on the basis of the banks' actual portfolios and, therefore, cannot readily be computed for the hypothetical portfolios used for benchmarking. Moreover, it tends to be the case that these add-ons are intended to capture difficulties in modelling risks associated with more exotic trades not represented well in the HPE.

### 5.2.4 Modelling differences

155. As recalled in Chapter 4, the CRR permits banks to tailor their VaR models to their specific requirements by making different modelling choices. To test the impact of different modelling choices in a controlled manner, four portfolios were selected based on low IQD. Obviously, the average sample size in this analysis is limited.
156. The portfolios - portfolios 10, 11, 31 and 39 - cover the main asset classes (i.e. EQ, IR, FX and CS ) and were chosen due to the low variability of the submissions received for them. Six subsets of banks were defined within (and hence controlling for) the sample of banks using historical simulation, distinguishing the following modelling choices:

- 1-day ( 25 banks) scaled versus 10-day (13 banks) overlapping returns ${ }^{18}$;
- the length of the historical lookback period (1 year versus $>1$ year) ${ }^{19}$; and
- keeping constant the 1-day and the unweighted modelling choices, and varying the length of the lookback period (1 year versus $>1$ year). ${ }^{20}$

157. As shown in Table 6 and Table 7, there seems to be evidence that the modelling choices matter in terms of dispersion and the conservativeness of the VaR. For instance, for the EQ portfolio the 10-day calibration and 'more than 1 year' calibration produce less dispersed and more conservative results.
158. For the IR portfolio the 1-day and 1-year calibrations produce less dispersed results, but the 10-day and 1-year calibrations produce more conservative results.

[^10]159. Secularly in IR, for the FX and the CS portfolios the 10-day calibration and 'more than 1 year' calibration produce less dispersed results, but in terms of conservativeness the 1-day calibration and 'more than 1 year' calibration produce more conservative results.
160. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 6 and Table 7 illustrate the effect of increasing the lookback period (1-year compared to 'more than 1 year') when we keep the other factors (1-day \& unweighted shocks) the same. We see the 'more than 1 year' calibration tending to produce less dispersed results and the least conservative results for the EQ, FX and CS portfolios.
161. These results cannot be directly matched to the previous year's results because of the difference in the instruments selected. It is also clear that these results depend on the portfolios' selection for this analysis. Therefore, based solely on this analysis, it is difficult to support the idea that one specific model choice will lead to consistently more conservative and less dispersed risk measures.

Table 6: Coefficient of variation for regulatory VaR (controlling for HS) by modelling choice (\%)
Coefficient of Variation for regulatory VaR (controlling for HS)

| Port. | 1-day | 10-day | 1 y | >1y | 1d, 1y, unw | 1d, >1y, unw |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| EQ 10 | 8.9\% | 2.8\% | 8.6\% | 6.2\% | 10.9\% | 7.9\% |
| IR 11 | 5.7\% | 6.0\% | 4.0\% | 6.2\% | 3.9\% | 5.2\% |
| FX 31 | 8.8\% | 8.5\% | 12.3\% | 7.9\% | 11.9\% | 6.6\% |
| CS 39 | 19.3\% | 10.9\% | 13.7\% | 13.1\% | 17.2\% | 13.1\% |
| mean | 10.7\%! | 7.0\% | 9.7\% | 8.3\% | 11.0\% | 8.2\% |

Table 7: Average regulatory VaR by modelling choice

|  | Average VaR subsamples |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1-day | 10-day | $1 y$ | $>1 y$ | 1d, 1y, unw | 1d, >1y, unw |
| EQ 10 | 285,958 | 286,422 | 282,319 | 289,636 | 280,451 | 293,274 |
| IR 11 | 70,531 | 73,395 | 73,697 | 69,747 | 73,296 | 68,275 |
| FX 31 | 299,411 | 274,009 | 289,438 | 293,663 | 296,647 | 303,361 |
| CS 39 | 10,482 | 9,859 | 9,181 | 11,155 | 9,002 | 11,878 |

### 5.2.5 Other drivers of variation

162. In addition to the drivers of variation discussed in the preceding two subsections, there may be other drivers of variation.

In subsection 5.2.4 'Modelling differences', for instance, only results obtained with HS VaR were discussed, although the methodological aspects considered are expected to be important for other model types (e.g. MC simulation) as well.
164. Another driver of variation is the risks not captured in a model. Due to the simplification of the exercise compared to past exercises (2016-2018), the majority of the most exotic instruments were deleted, so most of the possible risk factors not in the models are no longer present in the exercise. Moreover, banks that are not able to model specific trades are allowed by the Benchmarking RTS not to submit the risk measure. This is shown, for example, in instrument 23 (IR 'Cap and Floor’ on 10-year note), where only 19 observations (across 54 banks) are available. Nonetheless, for this non-vanilla product the IQD is only $18 \%$ for the VaR, which means that the submitting banks presented some consistent risk measures. As a result, it is likely that few risks not in VaR were present.
165. The use of proxies probably leads to spurious variability in some of the hypothetical portfolios characterised by less liquid risk factors, for example some credit spreads. This consideration also applies to the sVaR.
166. As in the previous exercise, the EBA also presents analysis of aspects not considered in the past (2016-2018). Four additional drivers of variation will therefore be tested in the following areas: (a) size of the bank, (b) business model, (c) level of approval of model (e.g. general interest risk versus general and specific interest risk approval, or general equity risk versus general and specific equity risk approval) and (d) time window selected for the calibration of the stressed VaR. Compared to the previous exercise (2019), the EBA also tested different definitions of size and business models.
a. Size of the bank
167. The size of the bank could have some impact on the internal model. Larger banks are expected to invest more in internal modelling, and this could have an impact on the quality of the model and the results submitted. The same can be said of banks that invest more in market activities in terms of their whole bank activity. The composition of the bank's trading portfolio could also have some influence on the design and performance of the internal model. Nonetheless, size is not a uniquely definable variable.
168. For the scope of the analysis, the size of the banks was selected based on banks' common reporting results concerning the RWA for market risk. The market risk RWA was preferred in selecting the size because a bigger bank in terms of total RWA can have a smaller market risk trading book in relative terms. The market risk RWA variable was therefore preferred. It should be noted that market risk RWA also incorporates the standardised measure, but classifying the bank by the internal model market risk RWA did not change the composition of the sample substantially.
169. The banks were divided into three subsamples: large (above the 75th quantile), medium (between the 75th and 25th quantiles) and small (lower than the 25th quantile). Detailed VaR tables are presented in the annex (see Table 27, Table 28 and Table 29).
170. Table 8 summarises the effect of the size of the bank. For EQ, IR and commodity it seems that dispersion is somewhat proportional to the size of the banks. FX dispersion seems to be less affected by the size, while CS exhibits some proportionality between size and dispersion, even if medium and large banks are generally aligned. This implies that the banks' size does matter and that variability in size increases the dispersion of the general results submitted.
171. Further analysis of this aspect can be carried out in terms of the factors selected to define the size. If we run the same analysis using the size of the trading book ${ }^{21}$ instead of the size of the bank (defined by RWA for market risk), we can see that dispersion varies again across different asset class and different sizes of banks. The results are reported in Table 30, Table 31 and Table 32. Looking solely at the trading book size, we obtain different results. The average IQD grows with the size of the trading book. The average IQD is $11 \%$ for small TB banks, $14 \%$ for medium TB and 15\% for large TB banks.
172. The results concerning the impact of size on variability are mixed, and analysis of the impact of size on the risk measure results merits further investigation in future exercises.

Table 8: Asset class comparison for VaR in terms of banks' size

|  | VaR - Avg. Interquartile Range |  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | All Banks | Small Banks | Medium Banks | Large Banks |
| Equity | $18 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $10 \%$ |
| Interest Rate | $13 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $12 \%$ | $10 \%$ |
| FX | $12 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $11 \%$ | $8 \%$ |
| Commodities | $20 \%$ | $21 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $13 \%$ |
| Credit Spread | $23 \%$ | $16 \%$ | $21 \%$ | $20 \%$ |
| CTP | $40 \%$ | $0 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $19 \%$ |
| All-in | $13 \%$ | $7 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $10 \%$ |

## b. Business model

173. The business model of the banks in the sample was selected based on a previous analysis run by the EBA (EBA - LCR Report ${ }^{22}$ ). In the sample of 54 banks, 27 were classified as crossborder universal banks, which is by far the most numerous business model in the sample. The

[^11]remaining banks were either not classified or had different business models (e.g. local universal banks), but they were too few to use as a subsample for this kind of analysis. So the cross-border universal bank business model was selected.
174. Specific VaR results for banks classified as cross-border universal banks are shown in Table 30 of the annex. Table 9 summarises the impact of the business model on different asset classes. It is clear that the business model selected is so predominant in the sample that it does not allow for proper discrimination among the whole sample; therefore, the dispersion of the banks belonging to the same business model is very close to the dispersion of the whole sample for the banks. Judging from the results, there is some weak evidence that the business model has some effect in increasing the dispersion of the VaR submission.
175. Further analysis of the business model can be carried out in terms of factors selected to define the business model. If we run the analysis based on the amount of 'Level 3 assets and liabilities' in relation to the size of the trading book ${ }^{23}$ (FINREP data), the results are reported in Table 34, Table 35 and Table 36. The average IQD is $11 \%$ for the low level of Level 3 A\&L banks, $15 \%$ for the medium level and 11\% for the high level of Level 3 A\&L banks. Therefore, it seems that a more exotic composition of the bank's trading book does not affect the variability of the results. Further analysis of this aspect is expected to be carried out in the future exercise.

Table 9: Asset class comparison for VaR within the same business model (cross-border universal bank)

|  | VaR - Avg. Interquartile Range |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | All Banks | Cross-border Universal bank |
| Equity | $18 \%$ | $14 \%$ |
| Interest Rate | $13 \%$ | $12 \%$ |
| FX | $12 \%$ | $11 \%$ |
| Commodities | $20 \%$ | $18 \%$ |
| Credit Spread | $23 \%$ | $20 \%$ |
| CTP | $40 \%$ | $19 \%$ |
| All-in | $13 \%$ | $11 \%$ |

c. Level of approval
176. Banks can have different levels of approval for equity and interest rate risks. To be more specific, banks can apply to obtain approval for the general equity or interest rate risk or they can apply for approval of the specific equity or interest rate risk as well. See also the discussion in Section 4.2 on this point. In general, having approval for both the general and the specific parts of the equity and interest rate risks allows banks to fully model the instruments in the

[^12]equity and credit spread sections of the exercise. Nonetheless, banks with only general approval are required to report these instruments as well, but this has been known to generate additional dispersion in the risk measures submitted. For this reason, in this exercise the EBA filtered all the results submitted and produced IQD statistics for the banks belonging to the sample of banks with different levels of approval.
177. Among the banks that submitted results for interest rate risk, 30 banks in the report have general and specific approval (see Table 31) and 17 banks have only general approval (see Table 32). Among the banks that submitted results for equity asset risk, 29 banks in the report have general and specific approval (see Table 33) and 11 banks have only general approval (see Table 34).
178. Table 10 summarises the result of the analysis when the filter for the level of approval is applied. It is clear that the presence of banks with different levels of approval tends to slightly bias the benchmarking results.
179. Looking at Table 10 we see that the EQ asset class IQD is smaller when considering only the subsample of firms with the full level of approval with respect to the full sample. The CS asset class also decreases slightly since almost no banks without specific IR approval submitted any CS results. Finally, for the IR asset class splitting the sample between banks with general and specific approval and banks with only general approval produces some marginal changes in the benchmark for this asset class, confirming that the submissions from banks with partial approval tends to increase the IQD of the submissions.

Table 10: Asset class comparison for VaR in terms of level of approval

|  | VaR - Avg. Interquartile Range |  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | All Banks | IR Gen + Specific | IR Gen only | Eq Gen + Specific |
| Equity | $18 \%$ |  |  | $15 \%$ |
| Interest Rate | $13 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $17 \%$ |  |
| Credit Spread | $23 \%$ | $21 \%$ |  |  |

## d. Common stress period considered

180. The stress window applied by the participating banks has always been understood as one of the main sources of the greater dispersion of the sVaR compared to the VaR, but this hypothesis was tested only from the 2019 exercise onwards due to a lack of information regarding the time window applied by the banks to calibrate the sVaR. This information was collected for the 2020 exercise as well and applied to test the impact of the stress time window selected to calibrate the sVaR.
181. Generally speaking, in their time window for the sVaR the banks select periods that include either 2008-2009 or 2011 in order to calibrate their sVaR, with a preference for 2008-2009. Because of the higher number of banks selecting 2008-2009, the EBA filtered the sample of the banks that applied a 2008-2009 time window for sVaR calibration, obtaining a subsample of 30 banks. The benchmark and the related statistics for this subsample of banks are available in Table 35 in the annex, and they are easily comparable with the full sample sVaR statistics in Table 22.
182. Table 11 summarises this stress period filtering analysis. It seems clear that the different time window selected for the bank actually has a significant impact on sVaR statistics. This means that the subsample with the same stress period generally - with the exception of the FX asset class - exhibits smaller dispersion results for sVaR than the whole sample.

Table 11: Asset class comparison for sVaR in terms of time window applied

|  | SVaR - Avg. Interquartile |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | All Banks | Stressed Period |
| Equity | $27 \%$ | $20 \%$ |
| Interest Rate | $31 \%$ | $20 \%$ |
| FX | $19 \%$ | $18 \%$ |
| Commodities | $17 \%$ | $16 \%$ |
| Credit Spread | $34 \%$ | $26 \%$ |
| CTP | $31 \%$ | $13 \%$ |
| All-in | $15 \%$ | $10 \%$ |

### 5.2.6 Portfolio comparison

183. Selective comparison of VaR results across portfolios can be informative in instances where the riskiness of those portfolios may be ranked in a model-independent way. For example, all else being equal, it is expected that a more diversified and hedged portfolio would lead to a lower VaR than a more concentrated and unhedged portfolio.
184. This hypothesis can be tested with several portfolios in the 2020 exercises. Use of the following portfolios is suggested:

- portfolio 16 , which is composed of instruments 24 (long 5 million German bond - 10 years) and 25 (short 2 million German bond - 5 years);
- portfolio 17, which is composed of instruments 24 (long 5 million German bond - 10 years), 25 (short 2 million German bond - 5 years) and 26 (long 5 million German bond -10 years), so it is equal to portfolio 16 plus instrument 26.

185. Both of these portfolios comprise sovereign bond instruments, yet portfolio 16 is concentrated on only one issuer and is partially hedged (long and short positions). Portfolio 17 adds a second issuer to this portfolio without any hedge. Against this backdrop and in view of the specific portfolio definitions, we would expect the following result:

$$
200 \% \times \operatorname{VaR}_{\text {Portfolio } 16}<V a R_{\text {Portfolio } 17}
$$

186. Table 12 reports when this hypothesis holds true.

Table 12: Portfolio comparison for VaR, sVaR and IRC

|  | $\operatorname{VaR}(P 17)>\operatorname{VaR}(P 16)$ | $S \operatorname{VaR}(P 17)>S \operatorname{VaR}(P 16)$ | $I R C(P 17)>I R C(P 16)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Num of banks | $\mathbf{3 9}$ out of $\mathbf{4 0}$ | $\mathbf{3 9}$ out of $\mathbf{4 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 9}$ out of $\mathbf{3 0}$ |


|  | $\operatorname{VaR}(P 17)>1.5^{*} \operatorname{VaR}(P 16)$ | $S V a R(P 17)>1.5^{*} s \operatorname{VaR}(P 16)$ | $I R C(P 17)>1.5^{*} I R C(P 16)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Num of banks | $\mathbf{3 6}$ out of $\mathbf{4 0}$ | $\mathbf{3 8}$ out of $\mathbf{4 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 9}$ out of $\mathbf{3 0}$ |


|  | $\operatorname{VaR}(P 17)>1.8^{*} \operatorname{VaR}(P 16)$ | $S V a R(P 17)>1.8^{*} s \operatorname{VaR}(P 16)$ | $I R C(P 17)>1.8^{*} I R C(P 16)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Num of banks | $\mathbf{3 3}$ out of $\mathbf{4 0}$ | $\mathbf{3 2}$ out of $\mathbf{4 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 9}$ out of $\mathbf{3 0}$ |


|  | $\operatorname{VaR}(P 17)>2 * \operatorname{VaR}(P 16)$ | $S \operatorname{VaR}(P 17)>2 * S \operatorname{VaR}(P 16)$ | $I R C(P 17)>2 * I R C(P 16)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Num of banks | $\mathbf{3 2}$ out of $\mathbf{4 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 3}$ out of $\mathbf{4 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 9}$ out of $\mathbf{3 0}$ |

187. The comparison between the two portfolios with respect to regulatory VaR shows that only 8 out of 40 banks do not meet the initial expectation. The same comparison based on sVaR yields 17 banks that are not in line with this expectation. With regard to the IRC model, one bank does not meet the a priori expectation.

### 5.3 Analysis of IRC

188. Banks with an approved IRC model constitute a subsample of those with an approved VaR model; only banks using internal models for specific risk of debt instruments are permitted to use IRC models (Article 372 of the CRR).
189. The full set of submissions for IRC results for each trade, after the data-cleaning process has been run as previously described, is reported in Table 13.
190. In the context of the HP exercise, only a subset of banks made submissions for IRC, and a number of those banks submitted very low figures. This suggests that important risk factors (in the context of the HPE) have not been modelled. While the submission of low figures may be linked to risk factors not modelled, this should not be taken to mean that banks with higher IRC figures included all risk factors from a given portfolio in their model.
191. The number of submissions is limited for some of the all-in portfolios. Statistical inferences for these portfolios are thus not appropriate. A prerequisite for consideration of banks' submissions for the all-in portfolios is that a bank needs to be able to model all the corresponding underlying portfolios.
192. As in the case of VaR, a selective comparison of IRC results across portfolios can be informative in instances where the riskiness of those portfolios may be ranked in a modelindependent way. As shown in subsection 5.2.6, the expected diversification relationship holds true for all but one of the banks that submitted such results.
193. It is recommended that CAs assess the extent to which these missing risk factors are important in the context of banks' overall risk, and whether or not they need to be added to the model.
194. CAs should devote particular attention to portfolios $46,49,50$ and 51 . IRC shows a higher level of dispersion (above $70 \%$ ) for portfolios $46,49,50$ and 51 than the dispersion observed in other credit spread portfolios, especially the simplest ones.
195. As is the case for VaR and sVaR, banks can choose from a range of permitted modelling approaches for IRC. For example, banks need to choose:

- a source of credit risk estimates such as PD and loss given default (LGD);
- the number of systemic factors used to model the co-movement among obligors in their portfolios;
- the size and granularity of credit spread shocks to apply to positions with an obligor following a rating transition; and
- the liquidity horizons to assign to positions with a particular obligor.

196. The responses to the qualitative questionnaire relating to the IRC methodological aspects suggest that the use of market LGD predominates among respondents (Figure 12), with 17 out
of 34 banks using market convention as the source of LGD. A minority of banks - 6 out of $34-$ use their own IRB models as the source of LGD. The rest - 11 banks - use various other sources to obtain the LGD.
197. The PDs are provided by rating agencies in $56 \%$ of cases, by the IRB in $28 \%$, by other sources in $9 \%$ and in only $3 \%$ by market-implied PD. The transition matrices are mostly taken from rating agencies ( 23 respondents out of 31 ), while just two banks use their IRB and one uses 'market implied transition matrices'. The rest use various other sources.

Figure 12: Qualitative data: source of LGD for IRC modelling

198. Moreover, a majority of respondents stated that they use more than two systemic modelling factors at the overall IRC model level (Figure 13).
199. The liquidity horizon applied at the portfolio level for the IRC model is predominantly between nine and 12 months ( 22 respondents out of 32 ).

Figure 13: Qualitative data - number of modelling factors for IRC

200. Hence, in the context of IRC the modelling practices across the sample of banks participating in the benchmarking exercise seem to be consistent.

Table 13: IRC statistics and cluster analysis
EU Statistics for IRC

|  |  | Main statistics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Percentiles |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Port. ID | Min | max | Ave. | STDev | STDev_trunc ${ }^{1}$ | MAD (median absolute deviation) | $\begin{gathered} \text { Coefficient of } \\ \text { variation } \\ \text { (STDev/Mean) } \end{gathered}$ | Num obs. ${ }^{2}$ | 25th | 50th | 75th | IQD |
|  | 15 | 35,769 | 344,836 | 198,948 | 92,915 | 92,915 | 66,938 | 47\% | 13 | 149,091 | 216,282 | 226,799 | 21\% |
|  | 16 | 27,779 | 951,381 | 226,188 | 219,328 | 410,064 | 75,384 | 97\% | 29 | 109,612 | 165,545 | 229,973 | 35\% |
|  | 17 | 129,037 | 4,071,968 | 2,148,215 | 1,239,568 | 1,169,824 | 1,105,677 | 58\% | 31 | 811,494 | 2,309,141 | 2,992,084 | 57\% |
| Interest Rate | 18 | 612,311 | 6,292,933 | 3,219,631 | 1,723,287 | 1,612,903 | 1,728,850 | 54\% | 31 | 1,566,097 | 3,465,620 | 5,194,470 | 54\% |
|  | 23 | 74,840 | 2,477,710 | 625,388 | 571,203 | 1,106,207 | 195,488 | 91\% | 30 | 249,600 | 537,304 | 788,744 | 52\% |
|  | 24 | 64,540 | 5,554,470 | 3,039,303 | 1,715,658 | 1,649,747 | 1,475,735 | 56\% | 30 | 1,211,585 | 3,081,731 | 4,464,333 | 57\% |
|  | 26 | 712,043 | 7,061,213 | 3,691,880 | 1,981,578 | 1,933,605 | 1,749,894 | 54\% | 30 | 1,902,298 | 3,675,535 | 5,402,085 | 48\% |
|  | 36 | 7,935 | 393,638 | 119,048 | 105,974 | 152,386 | 51,474 | 89\% | 28 | 38,929 | 104,451 | 138,020 | 56\% |
|  | 37 | 16,446 | 89,600 | 54,043 | 20,282 | 20,310 | 13,245 | 38\% | 28 | 37,706 | 51,572 | 71,639 | 31\% |
|  | 38 | 775 | 101,864 | 47,432 | 26,981 | 29,790 | 18,841 | 57\% | 29 | 27,212 | 48,253 | 64,584 | $41 \%$ |
|  | 39 | 8,630 | 442,474 | 169,886 | 145,493 | 164,735 | 72,647 | 86\% | 28 | 56,454 | 128,399 | 294,898 | 68\% |
|  | 40 | 181 | 103,481 | 53,309 | 27,840 | 27,596 | 18,344 | 52\% | 30 | 35,404 | 51,027 | 74,969 | 36\% |
|  | 41 | 426,429 | 961,146 | 694,017 | 140,756 | 187,882 | 96,251 | 20\% | 28 | 621,191 | 660,636 | 802,147 | 13\% |
|  | 42 | 14,700 | 309,018 | 126,931 | 56,595 | 238,639 | 17,749 | 45\% | 28 | 118,370 | 137,498 | 141,725 | 9\% |
|  | 43 | 351,300 | 1,031,117 | 645,880 | 198,880 | 229,540 | 128,489 | 31\% | 28 | 494,231 | 637,896 | 748,032 | 20\% |
| Credit Spread | 44 | 482 | 173,743 | 80,788 | 40,610 | 59,029 | 26,065 | 50\% | 29 | 57,932 | 83,847 | 105,438 | 29\% |
| Creait Spread | 45 | 9 | 181,858 | 59,303 | 48,159 | 79,621 | 30,841 | 81\% | 30 | 25,170 | 57,437 | 81,317 | 53\% |
|  | 46 | 635 | 185,697 | 31,791 | 50,232 | 100,863 | 7,777 | 158\% | 32 | 2,266 | 11,567 | 31,692 | 87\% |
|  | 47 | 14,300 | 280,988 | 121,765 | 77,773 | 88,723 | 57,643 | 64\% | 29 | 50,520 | 114,122 | 165,041 | 53\% |
|  | 48 | 2,299 | 84,526 | 26,661 | 26,414 | 40,884 | 7,099 | 99\% | 30 | 8,815 | 13,047 | 37,443 | 62\% |
|  | 49 | 8,630 | 467,773 | 168,366 | 155,855 | 174,644 | 56,304 | 93\% | 28 | 50,045 | 120,517 | 311,621 | 72\% |
|  | 50 | 266 | 364,595 | 114,445 | 102,922 | 151,076 | 75,396 | 90\% | 30 | 12,373 | 120,396 | 221,212 | 89\% |
|  | 51 | 1,713 | 440,574 | 163,920 | 140,139 | 171,584 | 96,332 | 86\% | 27 | 30,662 | 159,415 | 285,262 | $81 \%$ |
|  | 52 | 22,679 | 848,557 | 310,515 | 209,375 | 324,998 | 156,633 | 67\% | 26 | 164,976 | 335,191 | 457,920 | 47\% |
|  | 53 | 57,069 | 848,293 | 376,529 | 225,158 | 317,745 | 185,058 | 60\% | 26 | 180,628 | 412,481 | 550,745 | 51\% |
| ALl-IN no-CTP *** | 57 | 704,984 | 7,421,949 | 3,651,135 | 2,057,466 | 1,994,064 | 1,649,381 | 56\% | ${ }^{21}$ | 2,022,024 | 3,690,778 | 5,288,237 | 45\% |
| CS Cumulative ** | 62 | 299,193 | 1,092,695 | 716,836 | 192,987 | 402,216 | 93,015 | 27\% | 26 | 638,452 | 735,835 | 833,974 | 13\% |

[^13]*For the agregated portfolios (57 to 63) banks that reported at least a mising portfolio IMV among the ones composing the aggregate are not included
in the computation of the benchmarks for that particular aggregate portfolio.
201. Table 13 shows that the average variability of IRC is higher than that observed for VaR. This table presents a summary of the descriptive statistics concerning the IRC values submitted, along with the median, first and third quartiles used to select out-of-range values to be discussed with the banks during the interviews. EBA received on average 29 submissions for IRC in relation to the IR and CS hypothetical trades.
202. In this exercise, the EBA also provided a disaggregated analysis of sources of LGD and numbers of modelling factors. It is possible to split the sample between market convention and non-market convention (IRB and other sources) and the number of modelling factors (1-2 vs. more than 2). In Table 14 below, the average interquartile is reported. The full set of results is also reported in Table 43, Table 44, Table 45 and Table 46.
203. The IQD dispersion of the subsample is very stable for the CS portfolios among different model choices. Non-market convention and 1-2 modelling factors seem to produce the less dispersed results for IR portfolios.

Table 14: Coefficient of variation for regulatory IRC by modelling choice (\%)

|  | VaR - Avg. Interquartile Range |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | All Banks | Source of LGDss |  | No. modelling factors |  |
|  |  | Market <br> Convention | Non-market <br> Convention | 1 -2 factors | $>2$ factors |
| Interest Rate |  | $52 \%$ | $34 \%$ | $33 \%$ | $55 \%$ |
| Credit Spread | $50 \%$ | $47 \%$ | $46 \%$ | $45 \%$ | $46 \%$ |
| All-in | $29 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $17 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $24 \%$ |

### 5.4 Analysis of APR

204. In their responses to the qualitative questionnaire relating to the APR methodological aspects, 6 out of 8 respondents stated that they use more than 2 modelling factors at the overall CTP model level.
205. With regard to the source of LGD estimates at the overall CTP model level, most respondents use market LGD, while a minority of banks use the LGD underlying other sources. No banks reported using IRB sources.
206. As in the case of IRC, the rating agencies are the principal source for PD estimates and transition matrices; only one bank uses its own IRB model for these data. The liquidity horizon applied at the portfolio level for the CTP model is predominantly between nine and 12 months.
207. It should be highlighted that all of these options are, in principle, acceptable under the current regulatory framework and that it is up to banks and CAs to agree on the most appropriate ones to be applied by each bank during the validation process, with particular reference to the banks' individual trading portfolios and trading activities. Thus, given the wide
range of approaches that institutions using an internal model can choose to implement, some degree of variability among the resulting capital requirements is expected.
208. At the same time, these differences in implementation are clearly not the only factors behind variability. There are other modelling choices that are not explicitly envisaged in the regulations such as differences in simulation engines and data sources, differences in the methods used to compute risk factors when data are not directly observable (e.g. all indirect parameters such as volatilities and correlations), the absence of some of the risk factors considered and differences in approximations when repricing positions.
209. The majority of banks with an approved APR model used a one-factor Gaussian copula model, in which the potential loss is estimated by averaging a number of worst-case scenarios corresponding to a 1-year development in the market along with market parameter simulations (i.e. credit spreads, recovery rates, default correlations, CDS/index basis) and transition matrices for rating migrations.
210. The average variability of the APR charge is $45 \%$ when computed by averaging the IQD of each CTP. This variability is due to the assumptions and modelling choices made by banks, but it is difficult to arrive at any takeaway because of the very small number of contributions (Table 15). This is also the reason why no further meaningful analysis, for example with respect to VaR, is possible. Table 15 should therefore be used for reference only, since the sample size cannot be considered statistically robust.

Table 15: APR statistics and cluster analysis


### 5.5 P\&L analysis

211. The P\&L analysis is complementary to the outcome of the assessment of variability based on VaR modelling. For each individual portfolio, the P\&L vectors provided by banks using HS were compared, and a benchmark analysis is provided in the annex (see Table 23).
212. A graphic exemplification of low and high IQD portfolios is represented below in Figure 14 and Figure 15. Even though the P\&L vectors available are much longer, only 3 months (1 November 2019 to 1 February 2020) are reported to simplify the representation. Additional
examples of low and high IQD portfolios can be found in the annex in Figure 24 and Figure 25. It is clear that P\&L vector series that perform better tend to be closer to the benchmark. On the other hand the low absolute value of the P\&L, as per the risk measures, tends to provide misleading information if we consider the IQD figures alone.

Figure 14: P\&L chart example of low IQD

Portfolio 10: 3 months daily P\&L
(orange: daily median)


Figure 15: P\&L chart example of high IQD

213. Another useful check for the P\&L results submitted was a comparison of the ratio between the P\&L VaR computed by the EBA (see Section 4.2 and Table 26) and the regulatory VaR submitted by the participating banks. A significant deviation of this ratio from 1 indicates an incoherent submission from the bank (see Table 26 in the annex). Moreover, it allows the tightness or the width of the realised P\&L distribution for each bank to be checked at each hypothetical trade position. This can be done by referring to the standard deviation of the P\&L series.
214. Another metric computed by the EBA from the P\&L series provided by HS banks is the empirical ES (see Table 24 in the annex). The empirical ES results have approximately the same level of dispersion as the P\&L VaR (see Table 4 in Section 5.1).

### 5.6 Diversification benefit

215. An additional metric considered as part of the analysis was the diversification benefit observed for VaR, sVaR and IRC in the aggregated portfolios.
216. The diversification benefit of a given metric (e.g. VaR) is computed as the absolute benefit, i.e. the difference between the sum of the single results for each individual position and the result for the aggregated portfolio, divided by the sum of the single results from each individual portfolio. Table 16 summarises the results of the analysis.
217. As expected, there is evidence that larger aggregated portfolios exhibited greater diversification benefits than smaller ones. The diversification benefit for all-in portfolio 57 (allin no-CTP portfolio), for instance, clearly exceeds the benefit for the other risk types, whose allin portfolios are based on fewer individual instruments. With regard to the dispersion shown by the diversification benefits, it is possible to observe a significantly higher IQD for some portfolios than for others, and - in some cases - a quite comparable dispersion across VaR, sVaR and IRC (e.g. interest rate and commodity risk categories).

Table 16: Diversification benefit statistics
Diversification benefit statistics
Diversification benefit =(Sum of single portfolios VaR - Aggregated Port. VaR)/Sum of single portfolios VaR
VaR

|  |  | Other statistics |  |  | Percentiles |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Port. | Ave. | STDev | Num obs. ${ }^{3}$ | 25th | 50th | 75th | Interquartile dispersion |
| ALL-IN no-CTP | 57 | 81\% | 2\% | 12 | 80\% | 82\% | 83\% | 1\% |
| Equity Cumulative | 58 | 77\% | 5\% | 28 | 74\% | 76\% | 79\% | 3\% |
| IR Cumulative | 59 | 46\% | 7\% | 38 | 41\% | 46\% | 51\% | 12\% |
| FX Cumulative | 60 | 44\% | 9\% | 35 | 41\% | 45\% | 49\% | 8\% |
| Commodity Cumulative | 61 | $3 \%$ | 2\% | 17 | 2\% | $3 \%$ | 5\% | 46\% |
| Credit spread Cumulative | 62 | 33\% | 10\% | 26 | 28\% | 33\% | 41\% | 18\% |

sVaR

|  |  | Other statistics |  |  | Percentiles |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Port. | Ave. | STDev | Num obs. ${ }^{3}$ | 25th | 50th | 75th | Interquartile dispersion |
| ALL-IN no-CTP | 57 | 75\% | 5\% | 12 | 69\% | 75\% | 78\% | 7\% |
| Equity Cumulative | 58 | 73\% | 8\% | 28 | 68\% | 73\% | 77\% | 6\% |
| IR Cumulative | 59 | 48\% | 14\% | 38 | 38\% | 52\% | 58\% | 21\% |
| FX Cumulative | 60 | 34\% | 11\% | 35 | 29\% | 35\% | 37\% | 12\% |
| Commodity Cumulative | 61 | 2\% | 1\% | 11 | 1\% | 3\% | 3\% | 48\% |
| Credit spread Cumulative | 62 | 9\% | 4\% | 19 | 5\% | 8\% | 11\% | 40\% |

IRC

|  |  | Other statistics |  |  | Percentiles |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Port. | Ave. | STDev | Num obs. ${ }^{3}$ | 25th | 50th | 75th | Interquartile dispersion |
| Credit spread (36 to 53)** | 27 | 37\% | 18\% | 28 | 30\% | 44\% | 50\% | 24\% |

### 5.7 Dispersion in capital outcome

218. As a final means of comparison, for each individual position a variable equating to the sum of the regulatory VaR and sVaR was computed. This variable was used in two ways: using the banks' total multiplication factor, and using only the regulatory multiplication factor, i.e. ignoring the banks' individual addend(s) set by the CAs. The results were averaged across a given risk type, thus arriving at a proxy for the implied capital outcome.
219. In addition, the exercise also attempted to isolate the effect of the time windows selected as the stress period. Therefore the same statistics were reported for banks applying the 2008-9 stress period.

Table 17: Interquartile dispersion for capital proxy

## Interquartile dispersion for capital proxy

|  | Capital proxy <br> (banks own <br> mult) | Capital proxy <br> (fixed mult, $=3$ ) | Capital proxy <br> Stressed period <br> (fixed mult, $=3$ ) |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Equity | $23 \%$ | $20 \%$ | $18 \%$ |
| IR | $20 \%$ | $21 \%$ | $17 \%$ |
| FX | $16 \%$ | $14 \%$ | $14 \%$ |
| Commodity | $19 \%$ | $15 \%$ | $13 \%$ |
| Credit spreads | $28 \%$ | $28 \%$ | $21 \%$ |
| CTP | $31 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $12 \%$ |

220. Table 17 suggests that variability is slightly exacerbated by regulatory add-ons. In any case, the ranges of capital value dispersion remain broadly aligned whether or not the banks' actual multiplication factors are used. Moreover, filtering for banks with the same stress window seems to have a further impact in decreasing the variability. Nonetheless we need to take into consideration that the sample of banks decreases in number when analysing the subsample of banks with the same stress period, which - other things being equal - tends to increase the IQD.

### 5.8 Present value

221. The 2020 exercise sees the introduction of the PV as a statistic to be provided by the banks. The full set of statistics is provided in Table 42.
222. The average IQD of the PV among the single portfolios is 4\%. This low IQD would be even lower, at 2\%, if 3 portfolios with a relatively high IQD (Portfolios 24, 32 and 33) were excluded. By asset class the IQD is distributed as follows: EQ (1\%), IR (3\%), FX (4\%) CO (38\%) and CS (1\%). The high IQD of the CO asset class is driven by Portfolio 33 (IQD 100\%), where the low PV of the portfolio and the $75^{\text {th }}$ quantile being close to zero naturally produce a high IQD measure despite the absolute difference in the PV being very limited.
223. PV measures are useful to CAs to verify the RM values. The ratio of RM over PV helps the CAs to quickly verify if the RM outlier comes from a simple mispricing of the portfolio or if it is indeed a true outlier with respect to the RM benchmark. Further analysis of these aspects is expected to be carried on in future exercises.

## 6. Competent authorities' assessment

224. For each participating institution, the CAs provided individual assessments of any potential underestimation of the capital requirement as required by Article 78(4) of the CRD and Articles 9 and 10 of the draft RTS on supervisory benchmarking. This chapter highlights some key information derived from these assessments.
225. The EBA designed a questionnaire regarding this assessment, which asked CAs to provide detailed information concerning the level of priority, based on both judgemental and qualitative/quantitative examination results, the overall assessment concerning the MR capital requirements of the internal models and, finally, the CAs' ongoing monitoring activities.
226. A total of 47 questionnaires from 14 jurisdictions, provided by the CAs, have been considered in this assessment of the MR benchmarking exercise.
227. Regarding the level of priority of the assessments, four banks (8.5\%) are reported to be high priority for intervention by CAs. CAs gave high priority to those banks that were outliers in the analysis, are particularly significant for the jurisdiction, have a history of incorrect submission or were identified as potential candidates for the interview process. The criteria for selecting banks as high priority were substantially based on firms' results in terms of the capital requirement proxy (below the 25th percentile or above the 75 th percentile) alongside other aspects such as the relative importance of the bank in the jurisdiction and recent changes in the methodology for computing the risk measures.
228. Figure 16 reports the CAs' own overall assessments of the levels of own funds requirements. When it comes to benchmark deviations, justified or not, 32 banks were reported by CAs as under- or overestimating MR own funds requirements, of which 29 provided justifications for this. Obviously, 'not justified' implies that further and targeted CA investigation is required. Finally, 15 banks had consistent results (i.e. no benchmark deviations).
229. CAs' assessments acknowledge three cases out of 47 of unjustified under- or overestimation of internal model market capital requirements that require further in-depth analysis. Obviously, CAs - and the joint supervisory teams where applicable - pay great attention to the potential underestimation cases, both across the portfolio and across the risk categories.

Figure 16: CAs' own assessments of the levels of MR own funds requirements 2019

230. The main factors and reasons that may explain possible underestimations are as follows: benchmarking portfolios that do not represent the actual composition of the real trading portfolios of the institutions (8/32); missing risk factors not incorporated in the models (9/32); differences in calibration or data used in modelling estimation and/or simulation (10/32); proxies applied (10/32); and differences attributable to the methodology used (13/32). These explanations, and very often a combination of these explanations, were offered by a large majority of the applicable respondents.
231. Two banks were identified as possibly underestimating, without justification, during the banks' internal assessment process run by the CAs. Both cases were classified ad 'low priority' by the CA, and were not considered as extreme outliers by the EBA. CAs are currently undertaking some monitoring activities (both ongoing and on-site) of the internal models to check all the issues related to these banks.
232. To be more specific, for one bank, the CAs assessed that the underestimation, despite not being fully justified, was focused on a few specific portfolios. In addition, the CAs had additional examinations in place that provided further reassurance of the quality of the internal model results for the bank.
233. For the second subject, the inability to fully justify the underestimation was only partial. In this specific case, the CA nonetheless received a fairly robust explanation of the reason linked to the underestimation. Moreover, there are already substantial model changes due to be applied before the end of this year as requested by the CA. This should improve the quality of the bank's risk measures.
234. The bank identified as possibly overestimating, without justification, is also classified as 'low priority' by the CA. Differences in calibration or data used in modelling estimation and/or
simulation were also identified by the CA, which was nonetheless unable to fully explain and investigate the misalignment.
235. Overall, CAs planned some action in respect of 14 banks, such as:
a. reviewing the banks' internal VaR and IRC models;
b. supervisory extra charge;
c. stringent conditions on any extension of the internal model approach;
d. further internal model investigation at peer level.
236. Currently, six banks have a due date for making improvements to their MR internal models as already requested by CAs.

## 7. Conclusion

237. This report has presented an analysis of the observed variability across results provided by EU banks that have been granted permission to adopt internal models for MR own funds requirements.
238. It must be recalled and emphasised that, as the quantitative analysis is based on hypothetical portfolios, this report focuses solely on potential variations and not on actual variations. The analysis shows the extent of the variability in these hypothetical portfolios, but that cannot automatically lead to conclusions regarding real under- or overestimations for the MR capital charge.
239. However, the analysis might help in determining possible supervisory activities to address uniformity and harmonisation across the Member States, and in promoting in-depth future cross investigations of this matter.
240. The objective of the benchmarking exercise was not to reach a final judgement on the key drivers of variation and the calculation of the implied capital charges, but to provide supervisors with insights into how to increase comparability and reduce the variability between banks that is attributable to non-risk-driven behaviours.
241. In particular, the report provides inputs for CAs on areas that may require their further investigation, such as IMV variability for some credit spread products. Supervisors should pay attention to the materiality of risk factors not in VaR and, in particular, not encompassed in the IRC models.
242. Moreover, the conclusions reached in regular supervisory model monitoring activities will take into account the outcome of the supervisory benchmarking exercises to achieve greater alignment between CAs' targeted internal model reviews and the EU's benchmarking analysis.
243. Overall, this exercise exhibits a reduced IMV variability. Some errors in data submission are still present, even though this was the second submission with these portfolios. The variability of risk measures is lower than in the previous exercise, but the positive effect of the different methodology to exclude outliers among the risk measures has to be included in this observation. The variability of the VaR aggregated portfolios is limited: the 'all-in portfolio' IQD is 7\%. Aggregated by asset class, the portfolio IQD of the others is $13 \%$ on average, and never above $20 \%$, except for CTP. Further improvement in variability should be achieved in future exercises thanks to the clarification provided in the 2021 ITS. The new analysis carried out in the 2019 exercise - the considerations of level of approval, size of the banks, business model adopted and stress period - is interesting and was repeated and extended in the 2020 exercise. No interviews were run in this exercise because CAs privileged different methods to monitor the deviation from the benchmark of the banks flagged as outliers.
244. Finally, this report provides a framework that can be considered useful for the purpose of future benchmarking exercises under Article 78 of the CRD. Therefore, the type of analysis conducted (i.e. the statistical tools provided to CAs, the graphs and tables created, the methodology defined, etc.) offers a clear direction for future investigations of and activities relating to these issues.

## 8. Annex

Table 18: Banks participating in the 2019 EBA MR benchmarking exercise

| Country | Bank name |
| :---: | :---: |
| AT | Erste Group Bank AG |
| AT | Raiffeisen Bank International AG |
| BE | Belfius Bank |
| BE | Dexia |
| BE | KBC Groep |
| DE | COMMERZBANK Aktiengesellschaft |
| DE | DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale |
| DE | Deutsche Bank AG |
| DE | DZ BANK AG Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank, Frankfurt am Main |
| DE | Landesbank Baden-Württemberg |
| DE | Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen Girozentrale |
| DE | Norddeutsche Landesbank -Girozentrale- |
| DK | Danske Bank A/S |
| DK | Nykredit Realkredit A/S |
| ES | Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. |
| ES | Banco Santander, S.A. |
| ES | BFA Tenedora de Acciones, S.A. |
| ES | CaixaBank, S.A. |
| FI | Nordea Bank Abp |
| FR | BNP Paribas |
| FR | Groupe BPCE |
| FR | Groupe Crédit Agricole |
| FR | HSBC France |
| FR | Société générale S.A. |
| GB | Barclays Plc |
| GB | Citigroup Global Markets Europe Limited |
| GB | Credit Suisse Investments (UK) |
| GB | Goldman Sachs Group UK Limited |
| GB | HSBC Holdings Plc |
| GB | ICBC Standard Bank Plc (was Standard Bank Plc) |
| GB | J P Morgan Capital Holdings Limited |
| GB | Lloyds Banking Group Plc |
| GB | Merrill Lynch UK Holdings Ltd |
| GB | Mitsubishi UFJ Securities International PLC |
| GB | Morgan Stanley International Ltd |
| GB | Nomura Europe Holdings PLC |
| GB | Standard Chartered Plc |
| GB | The Royal Bank of Scotland Group Public Limited Company |
| GR | Alpha Bank, S.A. |
| GR | Eurobank Ergasias, S.A. |
| GR | National Bank of Greece, S.A. |
| IE | Bank of America Merrill Lynch International Designated Activity Company |
| IE | Barclays Bank Ireland plc |
| IT | Banco BPM SpA |
| IT | Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. |
| IT | UniCredit S.p.A. |
| NL | ABN AMRO Bank N.V. |
| NL | Coöperatieve Rabobank U.A. |
| NL | ING Groep N.V. |
| NL | NIBC Holding N.V. |
| NL | RBS Holdings N.V. |
| PT | Banco Comercial Português, SA |
| SE | Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken - group |
| SE | Swedbank - group |


| Country | AT | BE | DE | DK | ES | FI | FR | GB | GR | IE | IT | NL | PT | SE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| N.banks | 2 | 3 | 7 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 14 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 2 |

## Instruments

|  | EQUITY |
| :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Long EURO STOXX 50 index |
| 2 | Long 10000 BAYER (ticker: BAYN GR) shares. |
| 3 | Short future BAYER (ticker: BAYN GR) (1 contract = 100 shares). |
| 4 | Short future, PEUGEOT PSA |
| 5 | Short future, ALLIANZ |
| 6 | Short future BARCLAYS |
| 7 | Short future DEUTSCHE BANK |
| 8 | Short future CRÉDIT AGRICOLE |
| 9 | Long call option. Underlying BAYER |
| 10 | Short call option. Underlying BAYER |
| 11 | Long call option. Underlying PFIZER |
| 12 | Long put option. Underlying PFIZER |
| 13 | Long call option. Underlying BAYER |
| 14 | Short call option. Underlying BAYER |
| 15 | Long call option. Underlying AVIVA |
| 16 | Long put option. Underlying AVIVA |
| 17 | Short future NIKKEI 225 |
| 18 | Autocallable equity product |
|  | IR |
| 19 | 5-year IRS EUR - receive fixed rate and pay floating rate |
| 20 | Two-year EUR swaption on 5-year interest rate swap |
| 21 | 5-year IRS USD. Receive fixed rate and pay floating rate |
| 22 | 2-year IRS GBP. Receive fixed rate and pay floating rate |
| 23 | Long position on 'cap and floor' 10-year UBS AG (ticker: UBSG VX) notes |
| 24 | Long GERMANY GOVT EUR 5 MLN (ISIN DE0001135085) |
| 25 | Short GERMANY GOVT EUR 2 MLN (ISIN DE0001102358)) |
| 26 | Long ITALY GOVT EUR 5 MLN (ISIN ITO005246134) |
| 27 | Long ITALY GOVT EUR 1 MLN (ISIN IT0004953417) |
| 28 | Long SPAIN GOVT EUR 5 MLN (ISIN ESO0000124C5) |
| 29 | Short FRANCE GOVT EUR 5 MLN (ISIN FR0011317783) |
| 30 | Short GERMANY GOVT EUR 10 MLN (ISIN DE0001102390) |
| 31 | Long UNITED KINGDOM GOVT GBP 5 MLN (ISIN GB0002404191) |
| 32 | Long PORTUGAL GOVT EUR 5 MLN (ISIN PTOTETOE0012) |
| 33 | Short UNITED STATES GOVT USD 10 MLN (ISIN US9128283P31) |
| 34 | Long BRAZIL GOVT 5 MLN USD (ISIN US105756BT66) |
| 35 | Long MEXICO GOVT 5 MLN USD (ISIN US91086QBC15) |
| 36 | 10-year IRS EURO - receive floating rate and pay fixed rate |
| 37 | 5-year IRS EURO - receive floating rate and pay fixed rate |

## FX

6-month USD/EUR forward contract 6-month EUR/GBP forward contract Long 1 MLN USD cash. Long call option. EUR 10 MLN . Long call option. EUR 10 MLN. Short call option. EUR 10 MLN Short call option. EUR 10 MLN. Long put option. EUR 10 MLN. Short put option. EUR 10 MLN 5-year mark to market (MtM) cross-currency EUR/USD swap

COMMODITIES
Long 3,500,000 6-month ATM London Gold Forwards Short 3,500,000 12-month ATM London Gold Forwards contracts
Long 30 contracts of 6-month WTI crude oil call option
Short 30 contracts of 6-month WTI crude oil put option

## CREDIT SPREAD

Long (i.e. buy protection) USD 1 MLN CDS on PORTUGAL
Long (i.e. buy protection) USD 1 MLN CDS on ITALY
Short (i.e. sell protection) USD 1 MLN CDS on SPAIN
Long (i.e. buy protection) USD 1 MLN CDS on MEXICO
Long (i.e. buy protection) USD 1 MLN CDS on BRAZIL
Long (i.e. buy protection) USD 1 MLN CDS on UK
Short (i.e. sell protection) EUR 1 MLN CDS on AXA (Ticker CS FP)
Long (i.e. buy protection) EUR 1 MLN CDS on AXA (Ticker CS FP)
Short (i.e. sell protection) EUR 1 MLN CDS on Aviva (Ticker AV LN)
Long (i.e. buy protection) EUR 1 MLN CDS on Aviva (Ticker AV LN)
Short (i.e. sell protection) EUR 1 MLN CDS on Vodafone (Ticker VOD LN)
Short (i.e. sell protection) EUR 1 MLN CDS on ENI SpA (Ticker ENI IM)
Short (i.e. sell protection) USD 1 MLN CDS on Eli Lilly (Ticker LLY US)
Short (i.e. sell protection) EUR 1 MLN CDS on Unilever (Ticker UNA NA)
Long (i.e. buy protection) EUR 1 MLN CDS on Total SA (Ticker FP FP)
Long (i.e. buy protection) EUR 1 MLN CDS on Volkswagen Group (Ticker VOW GR)
Long position on TURKEY govt. notes USD 1 MLN (ISIN US900123CF53)
Long (i.e. buy protection) USD 1 MLN CDS on TURKEY. Effective date as booking date
Long position on AXA notes EUR 1 MLN (ISIN FR0011524248)
Long position on Volkswagen Group notes EUR 1 MLN (ISIN XS1586555861)
Short position Volkswagen Group notes EUR 1 MLN (ISIN XS1586555606)
Long position on Total SA notes EUR 1 MLN (ISIN XS0830194501)

## CTP

Short position in spread-hedged super senior tranche of iTraxx Europe index on-the-run series
Long (i.e. buy protection) USD 1 MLN first to default basket swap on \{Brazil, Mexico and Turkey\}

## Individual Combination of instruments: Portfolio

1
2
3
4
5
6

1-1000 instruments
3-1000 instruments; 4-1000 instruments; 5-1000 instruments
13-100 instruments; $10-100$ instruments
15-100 instruments; 16-100 instruments
17-1000 instruments
9-500 instruments; 10-500 instruments
18-1 instrument
11-1000 instruments; $12-1000$ instruments
2-1 instruments; 14-100 instruments
6-1000 instruments; 7-1000 instruments; 8-1000 instruments
19-1 instrument
20-1 instrument
21-1 instrument
22-1 instrument
23-1 instrument
24-1 instrument; 25-1 instrument
24-1 instrument; 25-1 instrument; 26-1 instrument
$24-1$ instrument ; 25-1 instrument ; 26-1 instrument ; 27-1 instrument ; 281 instrument; 29-1 instrument; 30-1 instrument
19-1 instrument; 36-1 instrument
19-1 instrument; 37-1 instrument
36-1 instrument; 37-1 instrument
19-1 instrument; 20-1 instrument
31-1 instrument
33-1 instrument; 34-1 instrument; 35-1 instrument
21-1 instrument; 33-1 instrument
26-1 instrument; 27-1 instrument; 28-1 instrument;32-1 instrument
38-1 instrument; 39-1 instrument
40-1 instrument; 41-1 instrument
41-1 instrument; 42-1 instrument; 43-1 instrument
44-1 instrument; 45-1 instrument
46-1 instrument
47-1 instrument
48-1 instrument; 49-1 instrument
50-1 instrument; 51-1 instrument
48-1 instrument; 51-1 instrument
52-1 instrument; 53-1 instrument; 54-1 instrument
55-1 instrument; 56-1 instrument
58-1 instrument; 59-1 instrument
54-1 instrument; 55-1 instrument
60-1 instrument; 61-1 instrument
62-1 instrument ; 63-1 instrument ; 65-1 instrument ; 66-1 instrument ; 671 instrument
68-1 instrument; 69-1 instrument
70-1 instrument; 71-1 instrument; 73-1 instrument

| 44 | 71-1 instrument; 72-1 instrument |
| :---: | :---: |
| 45 | 70-1 instrument; 59-1 instrument |
| 46 | 66-1 instrument; 73-1 instrument |
| 47 | 64-1 instrument |
| 48 | 71-1 instrument; 72-1 instrument; 67-1 instrument |
| 49 | 57-1 instrument; 54-1 instrument |
| 50 | 53-1 instrument; 27-1 instrument |
| 51 | 55-5 instruments; 35-1 instrument |
| 52 | 56-5 instruments; 34-1 instrument |
| 53 | 55-5 instruments; 35-1 instrument; 56-5 instruments; 34-1 instrument |
| 54 | 74-1 instrument |
| 55 | 75-1 instrument |
| 56 | 75-5 instruments; 68-5 instruments; 34-1 instrument; 35-1 instrument |
| Aggregated portfolio | Combination of individual portfolios: |
| 57 ALL-IN noCTP | $1,2,6,7,9,11,12,18,21,27,28,30,31,32,33,34,38,41,43$ |
| 58 EQUITY <br> Cumulative | 1, 2, 6, 7, 9 |
| $59 \text { IR }$ <br> Cumulative | 11, 12, 18, 21 |
| 60 FX <br> Cumulative | 27, 28, 30, 31, 32 |

For a detailed description of the portfolios, please refer to the EBA website: https://eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/supervisory-benchmarking-exercises/its-package-for-2020-benchmarking-exercise

Please refer also to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/2070 of 14 September 2016, laying down ITS in accordance with Article 78(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg impl/2016/2070/2018-06-07

Table 20: VaR cluster analysis - number of banks by range

2020 VaR cluster analysis: number of banks by range ( $X=$ ratio with the median)


Table 21: VaR statistics

EU Statistics for VaR

|  |  | Main statistics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Percentiles |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Port. ID | Min | Max | Ave. | STDev | STDev_trunc ${ }^{1}$ | MAD (median absolute deviation) | Coefficient of variation (STDev/Mean) | Num obs. ${ }^{2}$ | 25th | 50th | 75th | IQD |
| Equity | 1 | 2,081,748 | 3,206,116 | 2,608,947 | 341,602 | 318,014 | 314,043 | 13\% | 39 | 2,242,440 | 2,606,789 | 2,901,742 | 13\% |
|  | 2 | 1,909,923 | 2,845,713 | 2,340,147 | 269,993 | 269,993 | 242,972 | 12\% | 36 | 2,102,021 | 2,316,907 | 2,592,041 | 10\% |
|  | 3 | 10,670 | 28,701 | 20,005 | 4,348 | 4,625 | 3,163 | 22\% | 35 | 16,842 | 19,832 | 23,213 | 16\% |
|  | 4 | 143 | 1,716 | 778 | 436 | 694 | 293 | 56\% | 34 | 403 | 706 | 1,093 | 46\% |
|  | 5 | 727,947,916 | 973,360,882 | 833,624,332 | 76,476,535 | 87,576,932 | 65,605,088 | 9\% | 34 | 763,573,830 | 853,996,540 | 902,262,743 | $8 \%$ |
|  | 6 | 17,854 | 46,308 | 33,762 | 8,490 | 8,816 | 5,194 | 25\% | 36 | 26,812 | 35,126 | 40,554 | 20\% |
|  | 7 | 3,862 | 27,986 | 11,624 | 4,787 | 13,949 | 2,173 | 41\% | 29 | 9,066 | 11,039 | 13,280 | 19\% |
|  | 8 | 44,948 | 133,753 | 93,421 | 25,718 | 27,972 | 20,403 | 28\% | 34 | 66,744 | 98,925 | 115,331 | 27\% |
|  | 9 | 36,574 | 89,738 | 63,447 | 12,957 | 15,078 | 6,372 | 20\% | 35 | 55,754 | 61,151 | 71,503 | 12\% |
|  | 10 | 158,743 | 331,241 | 279,554 | 29,367 | 430,168 | 8,320 | 11\% | 34 | 268,796 | 283,265 | 289,486 | 4\% |
| Intersest Rate | 11 | 64,021 | 78,221 | 70,590 | 4,246 | 4,681 | 3,626 | 6\% | 46 | 67,286 | 70,167 | 73,717 | 5\% |
|  | 12 | 27,936 | 54,016 | 40,616 | 7,052 | 8,676 | 5,246 | 17\% | 42 | 34,800 | 41,382 | 45,291 | 13\% |
|  | 13 | 118,767 | 178,574 | 150,055 | 14,830 | 15,804 | 11,217 | 10\% | 47 | 139,357 | 148,407 | 162,089 | $8 \%$ |
|  | 14 | 22,285 | 32,700 | 27,490 | 2,327 | 3,072 | 1,270 | 9\% | 46 | 26,122 | 27,836 | 28,766 | 5\% |
|  | 15 | 10,103 | 31,178 | 16,070 | 5,408 | 8,310 | 1,529 | 34\% | 19 | 11,728 | 15,841 | 16,770 | 18\% |
|  | 16 | 90,921 | 119,751 | 103,156 | 6,149 | 9,157 | 4,318 | 6\% | 42 | 98,856 | 102,776 | 108,445 | 5\% |
|  | 17 | 138,867 | 362,697 | 242,310 | 50,044 | 62,050 | 17,979 | 21\% | 39 | 220,496 | 252,258 | 264,847 | $9 \%$ |
|  | 18 | 71,227 | 472,329 | 289,111 | 108,927 | 111,534 | 63,382 | 38\% | 40 | 230,004 | 294,245 | 358,870 | 22\% |
|  | 19 | 126,580 | 167,912 | 147,262 | 10,887 | 11,283 | 7,883 | 7\% | 47 | 139,014 | 147,805 | 155,139 | 5\% |
|  | 20 | 3,105 | 6,996 | 4,458 | 1,025 | 1,551 | 549 | 23\% | 45 | 3,605 | 4,059 | 5,336 | 19\% |
|  | 21 | 243,192 | 323,341 | 287,613 | 22,162 | 23,481 | 18,812 | 8\% | 47 | 271,289 | 281,550 | 309,019 | 7\% |
|  | 22 | 35,509 | 63,601 | 49,492 | 6,293 | 8,446 | 4,325 | 13\% | 43 | 45,947 | 49,057 | 54,904 | $9 \%$ |
|  | 23 | 141,780 | 202,388 | 168,919 | 17,562 | 17,711 | 15,896 | 10\% | 45 | 152,435 | 167,115 | 181,074 | 9\% |
|  | 24 | 42,451 | 403,906 | 199,694 | 103,402 | 116,207 | 74,429 | 52\% | 35 | 116,765 | 190,979 | 267,160 | 39\% |
|  | 25 | 12,685 | 109,079 | 45,932 | 23,169 | 39,057 | 8,027 | 50\% | 46 | 29,856 | 40,586 | 55,976 | 30\% |
|  | 26 | 166,144 | 547,837 | 378,079 | 95,439 | 110,112 | 40,080 | 25\% | 38 | 341,636 | 375,364 | 423,004 | 11\% |
| FX | 27 | 388,925 | 588,161 | 481,330 | 52,978 | 52,870 | 37,969 | 11\% | ${ }^{43}$ | 438,613 | 485,157 | 517,961 | $8 \%$ |
|  | 28 | 3,899 | 22,595 | 11,546 | 3,249 | 6,533 | 1,977 | 28\% | 40 | 9,779 | 11,776 | 13,440 | 16\% |
|  | 29 | 61,605 | 148,573 | 99,881 | 25,114 | 27,148 | 19,563 | 25\% | 40 | 78,816 | 107,102 | 118,428 | 20\% |
|  | 30 | 256,067 | 370,393 | 312,223 | 31,076 | 33,781 | 17,495 | 10\% | 40 | 289,822 | 311,241 | 335,889 | 7\% |
|  | 31 | 242,625 | 338,540 | 290,670 | 26,101 | 29,821 | 20,763 | 9\% | 37 | 271,237 | 292,615 | 301,669 | 5\% |
|  | 32 | 14,221 | 188,211 | 40,418 | 54,798 | 88,682 | 1,558 | 136\% | 34 | 16,511 | 18,449 | 21,249 | 13\% |
| Commodity | ${ }^{33}$ | 520 | 14,224 | 7,656 | 4,099 | 4,099 | 2,657 | 54\% | 20 | 5,062 | 6,735 | 10,450 | 35\% |
|  | 34 | 220,882 | 328,788 | 271,849 | 29,810 | 45,917 | 9,561 | 11\% | 18 | 251,717 | 261,413 | 296,736 | 8\% |
|  | 35 | 211,155 | 378,924 | 290,252 | 53,514 | 69,228 | 34,519 | 18\% | 18 | 231,625 | 299,099 | 327,839 | 179 |
| Credit Spread | ${ }^{36}$ | 9,872 | 22,562 | 17,295 | 4,113 | 4,113 | 4,110 | 24\% | 29 | 13,004 | 17,114 | 21,215 | 24\% |
|  | 37 | 11,990 | 23,048 | 17,451 | 3,696 | 4,133 | 3,531 | 21\% | 25 | 14,490 | 18,361 | 20,097 | 16\% |
|  | 38 | 1,534 | 4,542 | 3,193 | 851 | 906 | 495 | 27\% | 26 | 2,678 | 3,163 | 3,884 | 18\% |
|  | 39 | 6,926 | 13,379 | 10,102 | 1,705 | 1,800 | 984 | 17\% | 26 | 9,231 | 10,264 | 10,780 | 8\% |
|  | 40 | 3,003 | 6,529 | 4,527 | 916 | 1,018 | 736 | 20\% | 26 | 3,662 | 4,572 | 5,274 | 18\% |
|  | 41 | 2,707 | 11,644 | 7,101 | 1,954 | 3,777 | 1,043 | 28\% | 26 | 5,973 | 7,531 | 8,173 | 16\% |
|  | 42 | 9,704 | 40,738 | 20,713 | 8,365 | 11,364 | 2,996 | 40\% | 25 | 16,235 | 19,615 | 20,962 | 138 |
|  | 43 | 9,222 | 46,279 | 16,029 | 7,780 | 18,829 | 2,703 | 49\% | 29 | 11,676 | 14,130 | 16,812 | 18\% |
|  | 44 | 4,784 | ${ }^{8,696}$ | 6,544 | 1,115 | 1,279 | 641 | 17\% | 30 | 5,750 | 6,586 | 7,102 | 11\% |
|  | 45 | 1,595 | 10,255 | 5,530 | 2,508 | 7,880 | 1,551 | 45\% | 26 | 3,699 | 5,588 | 8,089 | 37\% |
|  | 46 | 2,733 | 13,939 | 6,558 | 2,681 | 7,181 | 1,327 | 41\% | 30 | 4,501 | 5,814 | 8,130 | 29\% |
|  | 47 | 1,340 | 5,477 | 2,764 | 1,328 | 2,047 | 857 | 48\% | 27 | 1,651 | 2,536 | 3,867 | 40\% |
|  | 48 | 5,668 | 12,492 | 9,262 | 2,041 | 2,140 | 1,282 | 22\% | 29 | 7,527 | 9,708 | 10,648 | 17\% |
|  | 49 | 2,421 | 8,746 | 4,815 | 1,952 | 2,688 | 847 | 41\% | 27 | 3,392 | 3,887 | 7,110 | 35\% |
|  | 50 | 11,671 | 37,596 | 19,887 | 7,119 | 9,784 | 4,645 | 36\% | 28 | 13,952 | 18,859 | 26,435 | 31\% |
|  | 51 | 32,646 | 88,892 | 58,624 | 16,126 | 19,812 | 12,872 | 28\% | 25 | 48,893 | 59,015 | 70,684 | 18\% |
|  | 52 | 38,414 | 310,499 | 118,464 | 73,115 | 106,320 | 28,284 | 62\% | 23 | 78,799 | 109,268 | 136,370 | 27\% |
|  | 53 | 58,488 | 338,088 | 161,500 | 80,641 | 91,920 | 58,912 | 50\% | 25 | 95,937 | 162,668 | 209,469 | 37\% |
| Correlation Trading | 54 | 962 | 4,997 | 2,965 | 1,435 | 1,435 | 1,036 | 48\% | 8 | 1,921 | 2,896 | 4,064 | $36 \%$ |
|  | 55 | 4,934 | 35,669 | 16,948 | 12,966 | 12,966 | 11,565 | 77\% | 5 | 4,934 | 16,499 | 22,705 | 64\% |
|  | 56 | 186,900 | 420,339 | 335,047 | 100,282 | 100,282 | 54,814 | 30\% | 5 | 282,132 | 365,525 | 420,339 | 20\% |
| ALL-N no-CTP *** | 57 | 1,201,785 | 1,694,730 | 1,427,651 | 138,424 | 138,424 | 89,148 | 10\% | 19 | 1,340,236 | 1,463,148 | 1,529,765 | 7\% |
| Equity Cumulative ** | 58 | 950,141 | 1,475,154 | 1,235,267 | 147,518 | 212,755 | 135,767 | 12\% | 26 | 1,104,267 | 1,243,587 | 1,377,009 | 11\% |
| IR Cumulative ** | 59 | 177,258 | 564,481 | 373,854 | 93,933 | 103,159 | 59,255 | 25\% | 36 | 307,411 | 379,424 | 422,208 | $16 \%$ |
| Ex Cumulative ** ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 60 | 448,969 | 850,417 | 646,661 | 102,007 | 112,596 | 77,173 | 16\% | 36 | 556,959 | 653,993 | 713,638 | 12\% |
| Commodity Cumulative ** | 61 | 222,801 | 331,312 | 271,902 | 31,318 | 77,529 | 13,504 | 12\% | 17 | 250,975 | 257,987 | 296,621 | 8\% |
| CS Cumulative ** CTP Cumulative ** | 62 63 | 10,392 169,967 | 29,923 428,613 | 16,988 321,758 | 5,214 107,606 | 7,606 107,606 | 1,649 48,702 | $31 \%$ $33 \%$ | 25 5 | 14,134 250,386 | 15,698 379911 | 19,745 379911 | 17\% |
| CTP Cumulative ** | 63 | 169,967 | 428,613 | 321,758 | 107,606 | 107,606 | 48,702 | 33\% | 5 | 250,386 | 379,911 | 379,911 | 21\% |

STDev trunc is the standard deviation computed excluding values below the 5 th and above the 95 th percentile
${ }^{2}$ Refers to the number of banks included in the computation of the statistics
in the computation of the benchmarks for that particular aggregate portfolio.

Table 22: sVaR statistics
EU Statistics for SVaR

|  |  | Main statistics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Percentiles |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Port. Io | Min | Max | Ave. | STDev | STDev_trunc ${ }^{1}$ | MAD (median absolute deviation) | Coefficient of variation (STDev/Mean) | Num obs. ${ }^{2}$ | 25th | 50th | 75th | IQD |
| Equity | 1 | 5,678,137 | 8,967,891 | 7,558,986 | 825,925 | 1,222,894 | 677,109 | 11\% | 35 | 6,947,230 | 7,350,416 | 8,313,255 | 9\% |
|  | 2 | 3,365,859 | 16,815,691 | 10,290,739 | 3,807,079 | 3,568,669 | 3,079,803 | 37\% | 38 | 8,041,047 | 9,923,012 | 13,473,337 | 25\% |
|  | 3 | 13,465 | 47,205 | 29,337 | 10,078 | 9,853 | 8,600 | 34\% | 37 | 20,809 | 31,355 | 37,438 | 29\% |
|  | 4 | 209 | 2,624 | 1,041 | 694 | 1,105 | 358 | 67\% | 32 | 497 | 815 | 1,668 | 54\% |
|  | 5 | 1,107,869,600 | 3,923,350,542 | 2,660,753,955 | 613,716,006 | 775,025,106 | 367,685,862 | 23\% | 33 | 2,378,851,170 | 2,555,504,235 | 3,065,253,770 | 13\% |
|  | 5 | 12,479 | 97,502 | 51,458 | 21,315 | 22,612 | 15,665 | 41\% | 35 | 35,493 | 53,285 | 66,808 | $31 \%$ |
|  | 7 | 16,562 | 112,863 | 50,195 | 30,695 | 37,031 | 17,952 | 61\% | 30 | 27,189 | 41,222 | 71,123 | 45\% |
|  | 8 | 56,840 | 206,730 | 125,153 | 43,810 | 42,832 | 35,662 | 35\% | 36 | 90,606 | 125,258 | 164,454 | 29\% |
|  | , | 51,570 | 188,135 | 113,668 | 34,195 | 36,955 | 22,790 | 30\% | 37 | 91,600 | 121,201 | 140,212 | 21\% |
|  | 10 | 361,618 | 2,611,019 | 977,560 | 385,707 | 2,116,268 | 131,420 | 40\% | 35 | 820,534 | 1,018,607 | 1,132,628 | 16\% |
| Interest Rate | 11 | 72,330 | 295,110 | 193,541 | 66,251 | 73,645 | 43,387 | 34\% | 46 | 149,362 | 205,441 | 246,599 | 25\% |
|  | 12 | 11,089 | 154,369 | 76,387 | 38,135 | 38,015 | 31,525 | 50\% | 45 | 44,111 | 79,686 | 103,057 | 40\% |
|  | 13 | 138,108 | 464,215 | 309,616 | 89,147 | 87,994 | 63,605 | 29\% | 49 | 242,695 | 309,168 | 377,092 | 22\% |
|  | 14 | 26,432 | 136,400 | 78,963 | 28,849 | 28,315 | 24,249 | 37\% | 49 | 56,281 | 80,747 | 102,100 | 29\% |
|  | 15 | 12,523 | 149,760 | 62,053 | 40,949 | 45,576 | 29,416 | 66\% | 20 | 28,193 | 62,709 | 98,664 | 56\% |
|  | 16 | 80,009 | 276,954 | 186,889 | 54,932 | 60,109 | 44,690 | 29\% | 44 | 151,031 | 193,890 | 219,922 | 199 |
|  | 17 | 103,511 | 569,977 | 349,777 | 114,356 | 149,864 | 81,109 | 33\% | 38 | 243,025 | 368,887 | 419,228 | 279 |
|  | 18 | 80,636 | 496,968 | 299,059 | 90,649 | 311,311 | 62,415 | 30\% | 36 | 228,258 | 325,705 | 348,233 | 21\% |
|  | 19 | 112,007 | 450,642 | 285,059 | 86,163 | 93,088 | 50,250 | 30\% | 47 | 224,958 | 293,322 | 349,151 | 22\% |
|  | 20 | 38 | 58,358 | 14,072 | 11,088 | 24,429 | 5,685 | 79\% | 45 | 8,018 | 14,728 | 18,858 | 40\% |
|  | 21 | 273,699 | 857,951 | 618,078 | 151,110 | 195,030 | 77,887 | 24\% | 43 | 545,080 | 637,169 | 711,042 | 13\% |
|  | 22 | 32,078 | 246,445 | 151,503 | 61,918 | 61,918 | 55,037 | 41\% | 44 | 98,117 | 155,659 | 209,666 | 36\% |
|  | 23 | 179,416 | 394,565 | 281,140 | 59,366 | 79,031 | 41,883 | 21\% | 40 | 235,634 | 283,767 | 322,728 | 16\% |
|  | 24 | 98,329 | 1,218,012 | 558,114 | 330,098 | 371,681 | 270,914 | 59\% | 35 | 257,926 | 536,764 | 844,886 | 53\% |
|  | 25 | 28,622 | 335,649 | 153,877 | 75,868 | 90,831 | 47,905 | 49\% | 46 | 85,993 | 164,733 | 199,388 | 40\% |
|  | 26 | 49,630 | 1,887,597 | 599,740 | 333,028 | 635,362 | 153,930 | 56\% | 38 | 367,426 | 629,736 | 702,494 | 31\% |
| FX | 27 | 744,107 | 1,993,455 | 1,405,922 | 356,012 | 337,831 | 306,255 | 25\% | 45 | 1,169,136 | 1,369,184 | 1,689,576 | 18\% |
|  | 28 | 6,145 | 42,261 | 25,878 | 10,140 | 12,052 | 8,636 | 39\% | 40 | 16,749 | 29,340 | 33,382 | $33 \%$ |
|  | 29 | 205,155 | 531,072 | 387,483 | 87,614 | 97,745 | 47,633 | 23\% | 40 | 343,143 | 394,746 | 443,121 | 13\% |
|  | 30 | 586,520 | 1,362,190 | 940,107 | 218,806 | 215,575 | 196,039 | 23\% | 41 | 744,213 | 951,282 | 1,123,236 | 20\% |
|  | 31 | 820,087 | 1,455,293 | 1,109,905 | 176,723 | 223,123 | 154,401 | 16\% | 38 | 942,746 | 1,059,293 | 1,277,546 | 15\% |
|  | 32 | 25,576 | 774,349 | 187,538 | 176,592 | 322,196 | 17,255 | 94\% | 33 | 112,875 | 138,100 | 148,264 | 14\% |
| Commodity | 33 | 1,679 | 44,302 | 20,861 | 12,105 | 12,105 | 6,990 | 58\% | 20 | 13,771 | 20,366 | 27,357 | 33\% |
|  | 34 | 207,446 | 683,834 | 434,357 | 112,921 | 124,657 | 47,815 | 26\% | 18 | 396,164 | 437,489 | 491,795 | 11\% |
|  | 35 | 714,869 | 1,287,124 | 1,059,750 | 166,900 | 255,782 | 84,117 | 16\% | 17 | 1,018,879 | 1,066,925 | 1,154,506 | 6\% |
| Credit Spread | ${ }^{36}$ | 7,618 | 68,350 | 23,335 | 13,065 | 51,463 | 5,340 | 56\% | 28 | 15,473 | 22,234 | 25,915 | 25\% |
|  | 37 | 19,766 | 181,375 | 69,239 | 43,565 | 67,517 | 13,474 | 63\% | 25 | 41,286 | 52,649 | 82,188 | $33 \%$ |
|  | ${ }^{38}$ | 3,937 | 26,788 | 14,443 | 6,939 | 7,506 | 6,606 | 48\% | 27 | 7,448 | 16,332 | 19,981 | 46\% |
|  | 39 | 8,128 | 78,963 | 33,816 | 20,336 | 28,144 | 10,770 | 60\% | 26 | 19,919 | 31,997 | 43,284 | 37\% |
|  | 40 | 6,467 | 38,000 | 17,891 | 8,664 | 11,155 | 4,166 | 48\% | 24 | 11,345 | 16,599 | 23,881 | 36\% |
|  | 41 | 9,393 | 56,432 | 30,197 | 15,210 | 21,202 | 14,331 | 50\% | 29 | 16,111 | 38,463 | 43,062 | 46\% |
|  | 42 | 24,182 | 115,078 | 57,803 | 28,967 | 37,529 | 11,471 | 50\% | 25 | 39,210 | 49,192 | 84,781 | $37 \%$ |
|  | 43 | 13,879 | 107,130 | 58,663 | 25,386 | 37,384 | 18,958 | 43\% | 28 | 36,878 | 65,329 | 73,948 | $33 \%$ |
|  | 44 | 6,685 | 41,719 | 22,193 | 8,928 | 11,802 | 4,893 | 40\% | 29 | 14,977 | 22,059 | 25,230 | 26\% |
|  | 45 | 7,170 | 52,774 | 21,453 | 10,864 | 17,387 | 6,050 | 51\% | 27 | 12,816 | 21,033 | 28,388 | $38 \%$ |
|  | 46 | 7,332 | 37,861 | 18,321 | 7,319 | 14,842 | 3,966 | 40\% | 28 | 13,506 | 18,881 | 21,591 | 23\% |
|  | 47 | 1,597 | 24,650 | 10,548 | 5,149 | 10,254 | 1,518 | 49\% | 27 | 7,663 | 9,200 | 13,016 | 26\% |
|  | 48 | 12,764 | 54,105 | 30,981 | 11,810 | 12,127 | 8,603 | 38\% | 30 | 21,591 | 30,908 | 39,116 | 29\% |
|  | 49 | 6,310 | 24,485 | 12,806 | 5,928 | 13,150 | 3,717 | 46\% | 25 | 8,028 | 13,452 | 16,583 | 35\% |
|  | 50 | 11,931 | 63,989 | 30,018 | 11,427 | 19,870 | 4,030 | 38\% | 29 | 24,267 | 29,355 | 32,503 | 15\% |
|  | 51 | 59,574 | 391,206 | 182,037 | 72,250 | 114,131 | 51,882 | 40\% | 24 | 129,378 | 188,252 | 243,403 | $31 \%$ |
|  | 52 | 89,769 | 824,581 | 403,784 | 228,173 | 223,718 | 204,086 | 57\% | 27 | 166,510 | 404,573 | 588,499 | 56\% |
|  | 53 | 132,176 | 760,896 | 455,063 | 206,657 | 213,134 | 177,967 | 45\% | 26 | 294,170 | 469,230 | 670,692 | 39\% |
| Correlation Trading | 54 | 1,924 | 17,752 | 10,304 | 4,712 | 4,712 | 1,782 | 46\% | 8 | 8,278 | 9,937 | 13,163 | 23\% |
|  | 55 | 15,010 | 106,641 | 45,488 | 37,416 | 37,416 | 29,270 | 82\% | 5 | 15,010 | 44,280 | 46,496 | 51\% |
|  | 56 | 496,338 | 1,136,259 | 862,573 | 274,317 | 274,317 | 293,949 | 32\% | 5 | 753,735 | 790,287 | 1,136,244 | 20\% |
| All-IN no-CTP ** | 57 | 5,088,498 | 7,790,838 | 6,607,473 | 915,874 | 1,261,282 | 382,186 | 14\% | 19 | 5,390,844 | 6,782,089 | 7,368,934 | $16 \%$ |
| Equity Cumulative ** | 58 | 3,313,371 | 6,578,703 | 5,551,200 | 683,142 | 1,395,225 | 285,170 | 12\% | 25 | 5,356,707 | 5,502,078 | 5,914,045 | 5\% |
| 1 R Cumulative ** | 59 | 80,515 | 828,190 | 495,223 | 164,111 | 335,126 | 100,743 | 33\% | 33 | 400,218 | 557,634 | 568,104 | 17\% |
| EX Cumulative ** | 60 | 1,788,964 | 3,198,304 | 2,553,955 | 414,855 | 437,887 | 299,837 | 16\% | 35 | 2,260,903 | 2,588,491 | 2,911,955 | 13\% |
| Commodity Cumulative "* | 61 | 224,277 | 691,123 | 455,764 | 111,912 | 148,203 | 43,718 | 25\% | 18 | 394,089 | 436,287 | 500,715 | 12\% |
| CS Cumulative** | 62 63 63 | 20,895 712,279 | 105,251 1059 | 62,629 958587 | 26,107 164110 | 35,387 268135 | 19,237 14,518 | 42\% | 24 | 45,174 871976 | r $\begin{array}{r}65,592 \\ 1030,672\end{array}$ | 84,678 | 30\% |
| CTP Cumulative ** | 63 | 713,279 | 1,059,709 | 958,587 | 164,110 | 268,135 | 14,518 | 17\% | 4 | 871,976 | 1,030,672 | 1,045,198 |  |

STDev trunc is the standard deviation computed excluding values below the 5 th and above the 95 th percentile
${ }^{2}$ Refers to the number of banks included in the computation of the statistics
in the computation of the benchmarks for that particular aggregate portfolio.

Table 23: P\&L VaR statistics

EU Statistics for PnL VaR

|  |  | Main statistics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Percentiles |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Port. ID | Min | max | Ave. | STDev | STDev_trunc ${ }^{1}$ | MAD (median absolute deviation) | Coefficient of variation (STDev/Mean) | Num obs. ${ }^{2}$ | 25th | 50th | 75th | IQD |
| Equity | 1 | 2,467,031 | 3,153,890 | 2,873,542 | 241,103 | 253,394 | 154,530 | 8\% | 26 | 2,656,370 | 2,933,206 | 3,076,940 | 7\% |
|  | 2 | 1,916,537 | 2,757,794 | 2,368,940 | 269,925 | 252,418 | 259,429 | 11\% | 26 | 2,143,949 | 2,276,603 | 2,612,667 | 10\% |
|  | 3 | 16,746 | 31,041 | 22,556 | 3,388 | 4,623 | 2,123 | 15\% | 23 | 20,150 | 21,870 | 24,945 | 11\% |
|  | 4 | 228 | 1,605 | 868 | 364 | 475 | 198 | 42\% | 24 | 674 | 923 | 1,054 | $22 \%$ |
|  | 5 | 714,345,457 | 932,267,279 | 835,194,075 | 50,943,075 | 232,167,841 | 26,775,655 | 6\% | 24 | 801,024,646 | 830,468,159 | 863,448,069 | 4\% |
|  | 5 | 14,860 | 43,133 | 33,342 | 7,470 | 10,671 | 5,267 | 22\% | 23 | 26,307 | 34,485 | 39,532 | 20\% |
|  | 7 | 4,677 | 26,922 | 12,768 | 5,849 | 7,728 | 4,253 | 46\% | 21 | 9,205 | 12,267 | 16,292 | 28\% |
|  | 8 | 8,841 | 86,953 | 46,423 | 17,624 | 27,345 | 5,577 | 38\% | 25 | 36,237 | 44,418 | 51,551 | 17\% |
|  | 9 | 45,763 | 75,779 | 57,651 | 6,341 | 12,590 | 4,213 | 11\% | 23 | 53,388 | 57,569 | 62,686 | 8\% |
|  | 10 | 245,142 | 313,797 | 276,301 | 20,001 | 24,461 | 7,520 | 7\% | 23 | 262,472 | 269,069 | 290,784 | 5\% |
| Interest Rate | 11 | 60,916 | 85,037 | 69,696 | 5,278 | 8,180 | 2,670 | 8\% | 35 | 66,757 | 69,956 | 72,323 | $4 \%$ |
|  | 12 | 38,896 | 70,077 | 51,965 | 7,751 | 9,942 | 5,162 | 15\% | 32 | 45,971 | 53,711 | 55,699 | 10\% |
|  | 13 | 130,548 | 169,536 | 150,868 | 10,960 | 13,025 | 7,403 | 7\% | 33 | 145,813 | 153,224 | 159,228 | $4 \%$ |
|  | 14 | 20,621 | 34,979 | 28,399 | 3,747 | 4,293 | 2,341 | 13\% | 35 | 26,248 | 28,121 | 31,177 | 9\% |
|  | 15 | 4,313 | 27,774 | 17,758 | 6,115 | 6,115 | 3,491 | 34\% | 16 | 14,115 | 16,232 | 22,107 | 22\% |
|  | 16 | 84,037 | 117,079 | 102,661 | 7,663 | 25,249 | 5,484 | 8\% | 34 | 96,603 | 104,146 | 107,034 | 5\% |
|  | 17 | 141,808 | 351,193 | 247,376 | 39,280 | 61,509 | 19,720 | 16\% | 28 | 223,250 | 242,515 | 264,960 | 9\% |
|  | 18 | 74,318 | 482,554 | 283,882 | 109,660 | 121,226 | 56,509 | 39\% | 29 | 217,213 | 278,248 | 325,231 | 20\% |
|  | 19 | 128,571 | 169,153 | 146,832 | 9,012 | 11,205 | 4,523 | 6\% | 34 | 143,235 | 147,495 | 151,366 | $3 \%$ |
|  | 20 | 3,466 | 5,836 | 4,530 | 694 | 1,053 | 591 | 15\% | 33 | 3,900 | 4,477 | 5,072 | 13\% |
|  | 21 | 259,738 | 347,952 | 295,811 | 18,513 | 76,457 | 11,573 | 6\% | 34 | 283,327 | 298,570 | 306,474 | 4\% |
|  | 22 | 30,770 | 59,233 | 42,103 | 6,142 | 11,226 | 3,891 | 15\% | 31 | 37,966 | 41,196 | 45,454 | $9 \%$ |
|  | 23 | 125,805 | 219,579 | 176,515 | 19,260 | 35,843 | 10,265 | 11\% | 33 | 168,462 | 178,229 | 185,800 | 5\% |
|  | 24 | 88,133 | 598,951 | 242,546 | 135,115 | 305,327 | 64,196 | 56\% | 26 | 146,176 | 250,980 | 297,012 | 34\% |
|  | 25 | 12,640 | ${ }^{124,546}$ | 47,164 | 25,287 | 62,487 | 7,870 | 54\% | 32 | ${ }^{31,767}$ | 39,988 | 59,686 | $31 \%$ |
|  | 26 | 164,930 | 541,470 | 367,191 | 80,331 | 102,217 | 30,934 | 22\% | 27 | 330,116 | 368,614 | 404,289 | 10\% |
| FX | 27 | 397,391 | 592,434 | 484,713 | 49,127 | 55,515 | 28,941 | 10\% | 33 | 442,880 | 485,460 | 501,759 | 6\% |
|  | 28 | 7,471 | 20,775 | 12,137 | 2,839 | 8,101 | 1,290 | 23\% | 29 | 10,480 | 11,834 | 12,986 | 11\% |
|  | 29 | 62,721 | 125,356 | 92,878 | 14,570 | 16,889 | 12,011 | 16\% | 30 | 81,245 | 95,536 | 104,338 | 12\% |
|  | 30 | 243,614 | 379,274 | 311,962 | 36,100 | 37,896 | 12,222 | 12\% | 31 | 291,211 | 303,538 | 331,764 | 7\% |
|  | 31 | 220,667 | 298,214 | 261,469 | 21,349 | 29,267 | 14,336 | 8\% | 30 | 239,665 | 267,922 | 278,230 | 7\% |
|  | 32 | 13,844 | 43,140 | 18,799 | 5,893 | 94,385 | 1,447 | 31\% | 26 | 15,735 | 18,090 | 20,496 | 13\% |
| Commodity | 33 | 582 | 16,588 | 7,805 | 4,481 | 4,481 | 3,193 | 57\% | 16 | 4,787 | 7,724 | 11,143 | 40\% |
|  | 34 | 217,307 | 329,759 | 275,545 | 30,330 | 36,438 | 8,062 | 11\% | 13 | 265,232 | 275,465 | 285,277 | 4\% |
|  | 35 | 225,389 | 433,671 | 321,014 | 58,600 | 58,600 | 37,719 | 18\% | 14 | 285,391 | 331,344 | 354,868 | 11\% |
| Credit Spread | ${ }^{36}$ | 9,658 | 23,893 | 15,933 | 4,044 | 3,902 | 3,382 | 25\% | 24 | 12,390 | 16,291 | 18,730 | 20\% |
|  | 37 | 11,381 | 22,724 | 16,012 | 3,835 | 5,530 | 2,165 | 24\% | 18 | 12,886 | 15,328 | 20,161 | 22\% |
|  | ${ }^{38}$ | 1,744 | 5,531 | 2,996 | 948 | 3,109 | 435 | 32\% | 22 | 2,312 | 2,770 | 3,697 | 23\% |
|  | 39 | 6,581 | 13,395 | 9,457 | 2,066 | 2,993 | 751 | 22\% | 21 | 7,776 | 9,853 | 10,211 | 14\% |
|  | 40 | 1,897 | 5,809 | 3,910 | 1,257 | 2,306 | 989 | 32\% | 22 | 2,875 | 3,980 | 5,221 | 29\% |
|  | 41 | 3,185 | 9,253 | 6,344 | 1,407 | 4,134 | 838 | 22\% | 23 | 5,619 | 6,471 | 7,318 | 13\% |
|  | 42 | 2,813 | 38,599 | 21,903 | 10,038 | 11,065 | 3,747 | 46\% | 20 | 15,356 | 19,175 | 32,302 | 36\% |
|  | 43 | 7,234 | 29,646 | 12,944 | 5,000 | 27,956 | 1,837 | 39\% | 22 | 10,688 | 11,360 | 14,258 | 14\% |
|  | 44 | 4,348 | 8,266 | 6,152 | 1,173 | 1,358 | 659 | 19\% | 23 | 4,728 | 6,170 | 7,053 | 20\% |
|  | 45 | 1,350 | 10,151 | 4,593 | 2,457 | 11,589 | 1,162 | 54\% | 20 | 3,061 | 4,642 | 5,555 | 29\% |
|  | 46 | 3,048 | 9,642 | 5,132 | 1,620 | 4,884 | 585 | 32\% | 23 | 4,423 | 4,887 | 5,436 | 10\% |
|  | 47 | 297 | 5,221 | 2,407 | 1,062 | 1,624 | 574 | 44\% | 22 | 1,761 | 2,433 | 2,909 | 25\% |
|  | 48 | 3,697 | 10,472 | 7,632 | 2,133 | 2,258 | 1,735 | 28\% | 24 | 6,011 | 7,830 | 9,822 | 24\% |
|  | 49 | 2,372 | 7,004 | 4,011 | 1,450 | 2,967 | 452 | 36\% | 20 | 3,070 | 3,614 | 4,615 | 20\% |
|  | 50 | 9,534 | 27,257 | 18,533 | 5,444 | 7,587 | 4,081 | 29\% | 23 | 14,875 | 19,726 | 23,945 | 23\% |
|  | 51 | 44,111 | 81,622 | 60,868 | 11,212 | 20,143 | 7,709 | 18\% | 19 | 51,974 | 65,173 | 69,925 | 15\% |
|  | 52 | 37,988 | 281,408 | 104,343 | 64,791 | 105,274 | 28,932 | 62\% | 19 | 57,537 | 95,102 | 135,459 | 40\% |
|  | 53 | 47,452 | 260,787 | 129,277 | 66,201 | 109,734 | 35,642 | 51\% | 19 | 77,970 | 124,057 | 168,971 | 37\% |
| Correlation Troding | 54 | 745 | 7,030 | 3,633 | 2,134 | 2,134 | 1,000 | 59\% | 6 | 2,952 | 3,060 | 4,952 | 25\% |
|  | 55 | 5,061 | 34,167 | 16,180 | 14,010 | 14,010 | 7,685 | 87\% | 4 | 5,061 | 12,746 | 27,299 | 69\% |
|  | 56 | 116,360 | 290,852 | 173,354 | 82,289 | 82,289 | 26,742 | 48\% | 4 | 116,360 | 143,102 | 230,348 | 33\% |
| All-N no-CTP ** | 57 58 58 | 1,250,931 | 1,657,107 | 1,464,248 | 117,760 | 117,760 | 53,352 | 8\% | 16 | 1,409,650 | 1,468,713 | 1,509,931 | $3 \%$ |
| Equity Cumulative ** | 58 | 1,066,653 | 1,854,907 | 1,280,247 | 225,584 | 272,121 | 195,335 | 18\% | 20 | 1,080,959 | 1,319,755 | 1,361,676 | 11\% |
| 18 Cumulative "* | 59 | 218,499 | 603,529 | 382,609 | 95,471 | 124,998 | 36,694 | 25\% | 28 | 327,666 | 361,415 | 460,132 | 17\% |
| FX Cumulative ** | 60 | 526,214 | 813,673 | 646,808 | 92,636 | 91,381 | 78,075 | 14\% | 30 | 561,507 | 639,002 | 744,773 | 14\% |
| Commodity Cumulative "* | 61 | 194,386 | 330,752 | 271,287 | 37,747 | 117,613 | 11,269 | 14\% | 13 | 263,496 | 270,980 | 285,334 | 4\% |
| cs Cumulative ** | 62 <br> 63 | 9,010 105724 | 28,315 262034 | 15,063 156908 | 5,914 7,708 | 8,862 77,708 | 1,2004 24,214 | 39\% | 18 | 11,299 105724 | 12,964 | 15,032 208,093 | 14\% |
| CTP Cumulative ** | 63 | 105,724 | 262,034 | 156,908 | 73,708 | 73,708 | 24,214 | 47\% | 4 | 105,724 | 129,938 | 208,093 | 33\% |

STDev trunc is the standard deviation computed excluding values below the 5 th and above the 95 th percentile
Refers to the number of banks included in the computation of the statistics
in the computation of the benchmarks for that particular aggregate portfolio.

Table 24: Empirical expected shortfall statistics

EU Statistics for empirical expected shortfall

|  |  | Main statistics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Percentiles |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Port. ID | Min | Max | Ave. | STDev | STDev_trunc ${ }^{1}$ | MAD (median absolute deviation) | Coefficient of variation (STDev/Mean) | Num obs. ${ }^{2}$ | 25th | 50th | 75th | IQD |
| Equity | 1 | 2,619,931 | 2,878,661 | 2,763,472 | 63,368 | 83,970 | 24,337 | 2\% | 25 | 2,738,919 | 2,757,343 | 2,797,446 | 1\% |
|  | 2 | 2,008,067 | 2,672,534 | 2,284,172 | 184,607 | 184,607 | 159,673 | 8\% | 24 | 2,147,314 | 2,312,797 | 2,390,978 | 5\% |
|  | 3 | 17,179 | 27,999 | 21,695 | 2,773 | 3,215 | 1,781 | 13\% | 24 | 19,623 | 21,822 | 23,189 | 8\% |
|  | 4 | 229 | 2,128 | 974 | 544 | 633 | 207 | 56\% | 24 | 680 | 937 | 1,044 | 21\% |
|  | 5 | 753,067,235 | 908,405,677 | 826,277,992 | 38,806,877 | 229,297,553 | 17,683,948 | 5\% | 23 | 812,279,399 | 825,968,588 | 846,576,893 | 2\% |
|  | 6 | 17,751 | 44,153 | 34,419 | 7,728 | 10,197 | 6,036 | 23\% | 23 | 29,498 | 35,860 | 41,896 | 17\% |
|  | 7 | 4,590 | 25,395 | 12,443 | 5,863 | 8,165 | 3,663 | 47\% | 21 | 8,677 | 12,107 | 15,182 | 27\% |
|  | 8 | 8,804 | 86,042 | 47,237 | 16,392 | 24,709 | 5,666 | 35\% | 25 | 39,077 | 43,006 | 51,964 | 14\% |
|  | 9 | 44,363 | 90,151 | 69,530 | 9,704 | 12,158 | 5,141 | 14\% | 25 | 63,142 | 68,234 | 73,679 | 8\% |
|  | 10 | 246,544 | 299,919 | 276,849 | 14,739 | 15,864 | 7,722 | 5\% | 23 | 269,013 | 275,847 | 291,943 | 4\% |
| Interest Rate | 11 | 60,647 | 82,716 | 69,012 | 5,186 | 7,131 | 2,544 | 8\% | 35 | 66,292 | 68,946 | 71,969 | $4 \%$ |
|  | 12 | 35,303 | 63,728 | 49,303 | 6,130 | 8,356 | 2,820 | 12\% | 32 | 46,846 | 50,900 | 52,737 | 6\% |
|  | 13 | 130,613 | 170,021 | 146,939 | 8,594 | 11,076 | 5,035 | 6\% | 33 | 142,721 | 149,434 | 151,639 | $3 \%$ |
|  | 14 | 25,035 | 34,436 | 30,295 | 2,096 | 3,420 | 1,253 | 7\% | 31 | 29,017 | 30,727 | 31,762 | 5\% |
|  | 15 | 4,954 | 28,172 | 17,715 | 6,201 | 6,201 | 2,984 | 35\% | 16 | 13,874 | 16,014 | 22,485 | 24\% |
|  | 16 | 86,535 | 123,566 | 101,343 | 8,781 | 30,738 | 5,721 | 9\% | 34 | 95,442 | 102,644 | 106,885 | 6\% |
|  | 17 | 112,652 | 350,135 | 248,346 | 50,415 | 65,335 | 17,695 | 20\% | 28 | 226,392 | 239,819 | 281,113 | 11\% |
|  | 18 | 86,958 | 511,707 | 297,595 | 111,185 | 128,962 | 42,875 | 37\% | 28 | 244,797 | 274,174 | 361,576 | 19\% |
|  | 19 | 131,698 | 161,928 | 147,365 | 8,433 | 9,780 | 3,380 | 6\% | 34 | 143,611 | 148,847 | 151,062 | 3\% |
|  | 20 | 3,619 | 6,346 | 4,567 | 703 | 989 | 374 | 15\% | 33 | 4,131 | 4,479 | 4,924 | $9 \%$ |
|  | 21 | 241,076 | 332,411 | 288,016 | 17,840 | 74,379 | 10,096 | 6\% | 34 | 274,795 | 293,771 | 299,141 | 4\% |
|  | 22 | 28,528 | 62,077 | 43,317 | 7,328 | 10,100 | 3,242 | 17\% | 32 | 38,132 | 42,629 | 47,502 | 11\% |
|  | 23 | 129,474 | 219,104 | 178,316 | 18,421 | 39,796 | 8,435 | 10\% | 32 | 169,585 | 181,317 | 184,322 | 4\% |
|  | 24 | 84,898 | 595,359 | 245,400 | 145,247 | 305,902 | 66,457 | 59\% | 26 | 141,545 | 213,862 | 337,191 | $41 \%$ |
|  | 25 | 12,028 | 118,895 | 48,196 | 24,162 | 57,672 | 9,442 | 50\% | 32 | 35,143 | 42,902 | 51,639 | 19\% |
|  | 26 | 229,949 | 559,367 | 385,962 | 81,257 | 102,273 | 20,747 | 21\% | 26 | 347,598 | 363,910 | 405,952 | 8\% |
| FX | 27 | 423,429 | 561,519 | 479,061 | 42,047 | 45,344 | 33,831 | 9\% | 33 | 442,564 | 477,173 | 506,613 | 7\% |
|  | 28 | 7,585 | 20,025 | 11,967 | 2,994 | 7,415 | 1,207 | 21\% | 29 | 10,398 | 11,653 | 12,883 | 11\% |
|  | 29 | 65,147 | 130,022 | 93,812 | 16,998 | 20,343 | 15,410 | 18\% | 30 | 78,998 | 96,198 | 109,465 | 16\% |
|  | 30 | 281,772 | 341,495 | 305,698 | 16,033 | 24,558 | 8,946 | 5\% | 27 | 293,947 | 302,874 | 314,883 | $3 \%$ |
|  | 31 | 216,999 | 329,290 | 269,466 | 25,721 | 29,535 | 11,736 | 10\% | 29 | 256,262 | 275,476 | 281,688 | 5\% |
|  | 32 | 14,081 | 42,748 | 19,532 | 6,825 | 91,179 | 2,206 | 35\% | 26 | 15,589 | 19,395 | 21,124 | 15\% |
| Commodity | ${ }^{33}$ | 558 | 13,565 | 7,564 | 4,234 | 6,226 | 3,159 | 56\% | 15 | 4,709 | 8,942 | 11,460 | $42 \%$ |
|  | 34 | 209,780 | 317,121 | 269,028 | 34,188 | 34,188 | 28,917 | 13\% | 14 | 234,057 | 276,621 | 286,064 | 10\% |
|  | 35 | 255,746 | 396,379 | 328,796 | 43,340 | 43,340 | 38,525 | 13\% | 14 | 292,990 | 338,921 | 358,166 | 10\% |
| Credit Spread | ${ }^{36}$ | 10,725 | 24,437 | 15,947 | 3,675 | 4,600 | 2,180 | 23\% | 23 | 12,575 | 16,840 | 17,819 | 17\% |
|  | 37 | 10,825 | 25,934 | 17,003 | 4,773 | 5,441 | 2,900 | 28\% | 21 | 13,151 | 15,138 | 20,374 | 22\% |
|  | 38 | 1,855 | 4,767 | 3,003 | 846 | 3,078 | 525 | 28\% | 22 | 2,295 | 2,896 | 3,633 | 23\% |
|  | 39 | 6,424 | 13,405 | 9,378 | 2,055 | 2,780 | 1,428 | 22\% | 21 | 7,407 | 9,503 | 10,262 | 16\% |
|  | 40 | 1,921 | 6,213 | 4,091 | 1,271 | 2,400 | 1,151 | 31\% | 22 | 2,846 | 4,243 | 5,147 | 29\% |
|  | 41 | 3,421 | 9,538 | 6,232 | 1,446 | 3,929 | 747 | 23\% | 23 | 5,466 | 6,409 | 7,138 | 13\% |
|  | 42 | 3,064 | 39,370 | 21,533 | 9,866 | 12,938 | 5,230 | 46\% | 20 | 14,770 | 19,186 | 31,453 | $36 \%$ |
|  | 43 | 6,654 | 30,462 | 13,078 | 4,897 | 26,298 | 1,901 | 37\% | 22 | 10,602 | 12,345 | 14,050 | 14\% |
|  | 44 | 3,743 | 7,922 | 5,923 | 1,258 | 1,258 | 921 | 21\% | 25 | 4,867 | 6,119 | 6,810 | 17\% |
|  | 45 | -140 | 8,970 | 4,390 | 2,421 | 12,064 | 1,562 | 55\% | 21 | 3,038 | 4,177 | 5,957 | $32 \%$ |
|  | 46 | 3,063 | 9,638 | 5,159 | 1,569 | 4,542 | 524 | 30\% | 23 | 4,322 | 4,780 | 5,345 | 11\% |
|  | 47 | 267 | 4,949 | 2,308 | 1,027 | 1,431 | 546 | 45\% | 22 | 1,675 | 2,380 | 2,420 | 18\% |
|  | 48 | 3,760 | 11,277 | 7,656 | 2,069 | 2,235 | 1,478 | 27\% | 24 | 6,378 | 7,854 | 9,106 | 18\% |
|  | 49 | 2,652 | 7,847 | 3,985 | 1,561 | 2,438 | 389 | 39\% | 20 | 2,993 | 3,218 | 4,987 | 25\% |
|  | 50 | 9,787 | 30,891 | 19,257 | 6,529 | 8,865 | 5,563 | 34\% | 23 | 14,559 | 18,132 | 25,915 | 28\% |
|  | 51 | 18,710 | 92,016 | 58,044 | 14,600 | 24,328 | 9,235 | 25\% | 20 | 51,038 | 63,522 | 66,193 | 13\% |
|  | 52 | 38,846 | 303,631 | 117,071 | 77,991 | 109,437 | 42,943 | 67\% | 20 | 59,457 | 94,446 | 170,318 | 48\% |
|  | 53 | 48,794 | 304,585 | 133,908 | 74,541 | 121,212 | 32,379 | 56\% | 19 | 75,477 | 117,943 | 199,363 | 45\% |
| Correlation Trading | 54 | 775 | 7,062 | 3,699 | 2,106 | 2,106 | 912 | 57\% | 6 | 3,045 | 3,220 | 4,869 | 23\% |
|  | 55 | 4,675 | 30,478 | 15,303 | 12,822 | 12,822 | 8,355 | 84\% | 4 | 4,675 | 13,030 | 25,932 | 69\% |
|  | 56 | 112,788 | 285,648 | 164,396 | 82,370 | 82,370 | 16,786 | 50\% | 4 | 112,788 | 129,574 | 216,004 | 31\% |
| All-IN no-CTP ** | 57 | 1,204,464 | 1,615,859 | 1,368,068 | 99,080 | 148,138 | 67,179 | 7\% | 14 | 1,302,661 | 1,383,323 | 1,426,597 | $5 \%$ |
| Equity Cumulative ** | 58 | 1,025,346 | 1,633,596 | 1,270,385 | 184,847 | 245,667 | 114,826 | 15\% | 19 | 1,131,253 | 1,288,067 | 1,396,794 | 11\% |
| IR Cumulative ** | 59 | 216,763 | 535,299 | 361,649 | 83,762 | 136,981 | 22,767 | 23\% | 25 | 314,651 | 335,420 | 370,983 | 8\% |
| EX Cumulative ** | 60 | 505,649 | 758,971 | 620,473 | 72,926 | 95,289 | 39,017 | 12\% | 25 | 581,481 | 614,531 | 651,845 | 6\% |
| Commodity Cumulative ** | 61 | 210,246 | 318,606 | 271,293 | 34,324 | 116,159 | 24,016 | 13\% | 13 | 254,357 | 260,703 | 286,297 | 6\% |
| CS Cumulative ** | 62 <br> 63 | 7,943 103,09 | 30,337 259012 | 14,954 ${ }^{149484}$ | $\begin{array}{r}6,176 \\ \hline 74,366\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r}9,828 \\ \hline 74366\end{array}$ | 1,658 14,948 | 41\% | 18 | 11,770 | 13,295 117,957 | 14,877 | 12\% |
| CTP Cumulative ** | 63 | 103,009 | 259,012 | 149,484 | 74,366 | 74,366 | 14,948 | 50\% | 4 | 103,009 | 117,957 | 195,959 | 31\% |

STDev trunc is the standard deviation computed excluding values below the 5 th and above the 95 th percentile
${ }^{2}$ Refers to the number of banks included in the computation of the statistics
in the computation of the benchmarks for that particular aggregate portfolio.

Table 25: sVaR/VaR statistics

EU Statistics for sVaR/VaR

|  |  | Main statistics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Percentiles |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Port. ID | Min | Max | Ave. | STDev | STDev_trunc ${ }^{1}$ | MAD (median absolute deviation) | Coefficient of variation (STDev/Mean) | Num obs. ${ }^{2}$ | 25th | 50th | 75th | IQD |
| Equity | 1 | 2.17 | 3.61 | 2.95 | 0.31 |  |  | 11\% | 31 | 2.73 | 2.94 | 3.18 | 8\% |
|  | 2 | 1.26 | 7.60 | 4.48 | 1.56 |  |  | 35\% | 33 | 3.85 | 4.46 | 5.37 | 16\% |
|  | 3 | 0.70 | 2.20 | 1.47 | 0.42 |  |  | 28\% | 34 | 1.13 | 1.43 | 1.78 | $22 \%$ |
|  | 4 | 0.30 | 4.45 | 1.65 | 1.21 |  |  | 73\% | 30 | 0.75 | 1.18 | 2.10 | 47\% |
|  | 5 | 1.47 | 4.21 | 3.24 | 0.56 |  |  | 17\% | 31 | 3.15 | 3.37 | 3.54 | 6\% |
|  | 6 | 0.54 | 3.16 | 1.58 | 0.60 |  |  | 38\% | 32 | 1.32 | 1.50 | 1.76 | 14\% |
|  | 7 | 0.92 | 14.99 | 4.63 | 3.52 |  |  | 76\% | 26 | 2.44 | 3.29 | 5.36 | 37\% |
|  | 8 | 0.59 | 3.56 | 1.38 | 0.59 |  |  | 42\% | 32 | 0.98 | 1.31 | 1.60 | 24\% |
|  | 9 | 0.70 | 2.66 | 1.81 | 0.52 |  |  | 29\% | 32 | 1.49 | 1.79 | 2.18 | 19\% |
|  | 10 | 1.26 | 4.76 | 3.32 | 0.91 |  |  | 27\% | 33 | 3.06 | 3.48 | 3.93 | 12\% |
| Interest Rate | 11 | 0.96 | 4.19 | 2.77 | 0.96 |  |  | 35\% | 38 | 2.07 | 3.17 | 3.43 | 25\% |
|  | 12 | 0.40 | 4.02 | 1.83 | 0.92 |  |  | 50\% | 36 | 1.04 | 1.81 | 2.34 | 39\% |
|  | 13 | 0.98 | 2.82 | 2.14 | 0.54 |  |  | 25\% | 40 | 1.80 | 2.23 | 2.57 | 18\% |
|  | 14 | 0.92 | 4.30 | 2.98 | 0.99 |  |  | 33\% | 39 | 2.20 | 3.22 | 3.89 | 28\% |
|  | 15 | 1.24 | 10.60 | 3.62 | 2.41 |  |  | 67\% | 18 | 2.15 | 2.42 | 4.32 | 34\% |
|  | 16 | 0.81 | 2.82 | 1.83 | 0.53 |  |  | 29\% | 37 | 1.50 | 1.94 | 2.19 | 19\% |
|  | 17 | 0.57 | 2.47 | 1.49 | 0.50 |  |  | 34\% | 34 | 1.03 | 1.51 | 1.70 | 25\% |
|  | 18 | 0.32 | 2.96 | 1.20 | 0.61 |  |  | 51\% | 32 | 0.81 | 1.05 | 1.46 | 28\% |
|  | 19 | 0.76 | 3.12 | 1.98 | 0.59 |  |  | 30\% | 38 | 1.56 | 2.05 | 2.36 | 20\% |
|  | 20 | 0.02 | 16.19 | 3.83 | 2.77 |  |  | 72\% | 35 | 2.42 | 3.75 | 4.46 | 30\% |
|  | 21 | 1.06 | 3.10 | 2.24 | 0.46 |  |  | 21\% | 35 | 2.05 | 2.30 | 2.54 | 11\% |
|  | 22 | 0.73 | 5.32 | 3.12 | 1.34 |  |  | 43\% | 38 | 1.98 | 3.36 | 4.37 | 38\% |
|  | 23 | 1.07 | 2.32 | 1.70 | 0.32 |  |  | 19\% | 32 | 1.44 | 1.72 | 1.94 | 15\% |
|  | 24 | 0.33 | 8.14 | 3.02 | 1.51 |  |  | 50\% | 31 | 2.32 | 2.92 | 3.56 | 21\% |
|  | 25 | 0.87 | 9.12 | 3.94 | 1.92 |  |  | 49\% | 40 | 2.62 | 3.87 | 5.20 | 33\% |
|  | 26 | 0.13 | 5.25 | 1.71 | 1.03 |  |  | 60\% | 34 | 1.07 | 1.47 | 1.93 | 29\% |
| fx | 27 | 1.49 | 4.95 | 2.95 | 0.89 |  |  | 30\% | 38 | 2.36 | 2.64 | 3.58 | 20\% |
|  | 28 | 0.76 | 3.80 | 2.24 | 0.73 |  |  | 32\% | 38 | 1.80 | 2.24 | 2.57 | 18\% |
|  | 29 | 1.81 | 7.83 | 4.19 | 1.55 |  |  | 37\% | 35 | 3.38 | 3.84 | 4.50 | 14\% |
|  | 30 | 1.68 | 4.33 | 3.11 | 0.68 |  |  | 22\% | 34 | 2.56 | 3.19 | 3.64 | 17\% |
|  | 31 | 2.99 | 4.85 | 3.94 | 0.51 |  |  | 13\% | 30 | 3.52 | 3.95 | 4.31 | 10\% |
|  | 32 | 1.32 | 18.66 | 7.23 | 2.85 |  |  | 39\% | 28 | 6.19 | 6.83 | 8.15 | 14\% |
| Commodity | ${ }^{33}$ | 0.58 | 5.59 | 2.98 | 1.15 |  |  | 39\% | 18 | 2.69 | 3.06 | 3.46 | 13\% |
|  | 34 | 0.80 | 2.08 | 1.66 | 0.30 |  |  | 18\% | 16 | 1.56 | 1.74 | 1.84 | $8 \%$ |
|  | 35 | 2.33 | 5.82 | 3.87 | 1.02 |  |  | 26\% | 15 | 3.13 | 3.64 | 4.41 | 17\% |
| Credit Spread | ${ }^{36}$ | 0.36 | 4.55 | 1.45 | 0.93 |  |  | 64\% | 27 | 0.99 | 1.10 | 1.67 | 5\% |
|  | 37 | 0.92 | 9.02 | 4.02 | 1.98 |  |  | 49\% | 22 | 2.87 | 3.45 | 4.38 | 21\% |
|  | ${ }^{38}$ | 1.26 | 8.21 | 4.47 | 1.91 |  |  | 43\% | 24 | 2.81 | 4.23 | 6.20 | 38\% |
|  | 39 | 0.74 | 8.01 | 3.53 | 2.02 |  |  | 57\% | 23 | 1.69 | 3.20 | 4.30 | 44\% |
|  | 40 | 1.36 | 7.87 | 4.03 | 1.73 |  |  | 43\% | 21 | 3.07 | 3.63 | 4.47 | 19\% |
|  | 41 | 1.28 | 12.72 | 4.21 | 2.50 |  |  | 59\% | 26 | 2.10 | 3.49 | 5.10 | 42\% |
|  | 42 | 1.11 | 7.54 | 3.07 | 1.80 |  |  | 58\% | 22 | 1.62 | 2.40 | 4.04 | 43\% |
|  | 43 | 1.50 | 8.37 | 4.10 | 1.95 |  |  | 48\% | 27 | 2.70 | 3.35 | 5.10 | 31\% |
|  | 44 | 1.33 | 6.92 | 3.46 | 1.47 |  |  | 42\% | 25 | 2.38 | 3.00 | 4.51 | $31 \%$ |
|  | 45 | 1.29 | 11.50 | 4.47 | 2.70 |  |  | 60\% | 24 | 2.24 | 3.78 | 6.00 | 46\% |
|  | 46 | 1.25 | 5.46 | 3.10 | 1.24 |  |  | 40\% | 27 | 1.97 | 2.98 | 4.16 | 36\% |
|  | 47 | 0.70 | 7.95 | 4.18 | 1.88 |  |  | 45\% | 25 | 2.98 | 4.18 | 5.56 | 30\% |
|  | 48 | 1.49 | 5.31 | 3.40 | 0.96 |  |  | 28\% | 26 | 2.79 | 3.28 | 4.15 | 20\% |
|  | 49 | 0.80 | 7.22 | 3.06 | 1.70 |  |  | 56\% | 24 | 1.95 | 2.42 | 4.05 | 35\% |
|  | 50 | 0.81 | 3.16 | 1.58 | 0.60 |  |  | 38\% | 26 | 1.15 | 1.51 | 1.92 | 25\% |
|  | 51 | 1.48 | 4.81 | 2.90 | 0.96 |  |  | 33\% | 20 | 2.10 | 2.76 | 3.84 | 29\% |
|  | 52 | 0.86 | 7.86 | 3.41 | 2.24 |  |  | 66\% | 22 | 1.74 | 2.59 | 4.75 | 46\% |
|  | 53 | 0.98 | 6.75 | 3.05 | 1.63 |  |  | 53\% | 23 | 2.07 | 2.31 | 3.17 | 21\% |
| Correlation Troding | 54 | 1.38 | 8.40 | 3.93 | 2.07 |  |  | 53\% | 8 | 2.79 | 3.64 | 4.47 | 23\% |
|  | 55 | 2.05 | 3.04 | 2.76 | 0.38 |  |  | 14\% | 5 | 2.68 | 2.99 | 3.04 | 6\% |
|  | 56 | 2.06 | 2.80 | 2.59 | 0.27 |  |  | 10\% | 5 | 2.66 | 2.70 | 2.70 | 1\% |
| All-IN no-CTP *** | 57 | 3.45 | ${ }^{6.13}$ | 4.67 | 0.79 |  |  | 17\% | 19 | 4.16 | 4.64 | 5.09 | 10\% |
| Equity Cumulative ** | 58 | 2.66 | 6.60 | 4.58 | 0.95 |  |  | 21\% | 22 | 4.01 | 4.54 | 4.70 | 8\% |
| 1 C cumulative ** | 59 | 0.29 | 3.05 | 1.36 | 0.57 |  |  | 42\% | 29 | 1.05 | 1.27 | 1.53 | 19\% |
| FXCumulative ** | 60 | 2.36 | 6.15 | 4.03 | 0.78 |  |  | 19\% | 31 | 3.54 | 3.83 | 4.39 | 11\% |
| Commodity Cumulative ** | 61 | 1.25 | 2.09 | 1.73 | 0.22 |  |  | 13\% | 16 | 1.64 | 1.75 | 1.82 | 5\% |
| CS Cumulative ** | 62 | 1.92 | 6.51 | 3.76 | 1.33 |  |  | 35\% | 24 | 2.40 | 3.73 | 4.83 | 34\% |
| CTP Cumulative *- | 63 | 2.47 | 2.85 | 2.69 | 0.14 |  |  | 5\% | 4 | 2.65 | 2.71 | 2.75 | 2\% |

STDev trunc is the standard deviation computed excluding values below the 5 th and above the 95th percentile
Refers to the number of banks included in the computation of the statistic
in the computation of the benchmarks for that particular aggregate portfolio.

Table 26: P\&L VaR/VaR statistics
EU Statistics for P\&L VaR/VaR

|  |  | Main statistics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Percentiles |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Port. ID | Min | Max | Ave. | STDev | STDev_trunc ${ }^{1}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { MAD (median } \\ \text { absolute } \\ \text { deviation) } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Coefficient of variation (STDev/Mean) | Num obs. ${ }^{2}$ | 25th | 50th | 75th |
| Equity | 1 | 0.71 | 1.20 | 0.98 | 0.10 |  |  | 10\% | 26 | 0.96 | 1.00 | 1.03 |
|  | 2 | 0.81 | 1.25 | 1.00 | 0.09 |  |  | 9\% | 24 | 0.96 | 1.02 | 1.03 |
|  | 3 | 0.56 | 1.87 | 0.96 | 0.24 |  |  | 25\% | 25 | 0.83 | 0.95 | 1.05 |
|  | 4 | 0.00 | 1.60 | 0.92 | 0.39 |  |  | 42\% | 26 | 0.60 | 1.05 | 1.18 |
|  | 5 | 0.82 | 129.02 | 10.84 | 33.34 |  |  | 308\% | 25 | 0.96 | 1.04 | 1.07 |
|  | 6 | 0.57 | 1.31 | 1.02 | 0.18 |  |  | 18\% | 24 | 0.98 | 1.03 | 1.15 |
|  | 7 | 0.58 | 2.44 | 0.98 | 0.38 |  |  | 39\% | 21 | 0.79 | 0.89 | 1.09 |
|  | 8 | 0.54 | 7.01 | 2.30 | 1.30 |  |  | 56\% | 24 | 1.58 | 2.33 | 2.82 |
|  | 9 | -419.20 | 1.51 | $-15.69$ | 82.37 |  |  | -525\% | 24 | 0.94 | 1.05 | 1.26 |
|  | 10 | 0.82 | 11.39 | 1.43 | 2.03 |  |  | 142\% | 25 | 0.99 | 1.02 | 1.05 |
| Interest Rate | 11 | 0.34 | 1.21 | 0.99 | 0.14 |  |  | 15\% | 31 | 1.00 | 1.01 | 1.06 |
|  | 12 | 0.60 | 1.02 | 0.81 | 0.09 |  |  | 11\% | 27 | 0.75 | 0.82 | 0.86 |
|  | 13 | 0.32 | 1.34 | 0.98 | 0.17 |  |  | 17\% | 31 | 0.97 | 1.02 | 1.06 |
|  | 14 | 0.32 | 1.38 | 0.95 | 0.18 |  |  | 19\% | 31 | 0.87 | 0.98 | 1.02 |
|  | 15 | 0.60 | 1.30 | 0.94 | 0.20 |  |  | 21\% | 14 | 0.77 | 0.93 | 1.07 |
|  | 16 | 0.84 | 1.09 | 1.00 | 0.06 |  |  | 6\% | 28 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.04 |
|  | 17 | 0.63 | 1.45 | 1.02 | 0.17 |  |  | 17\% | 27 | 0.98 | 1.01 | 1.10 |
|  | 18 | 0.86 | 1.65 | 1.12 | 0.22 |  |  | 20\% | 26 | 1.00 | 1.05 | 1.16 |
|  | 19 | 0.74 | 1.19 | 1.00 | 0.10 |  |  | 10\% | 32 | 0.96 | 1.00 | 1.03 |
|  | 20 | 0.32 | 1.27 | 1.01 | 0.18 |  |  | 17\% | 31 | 0.99 | 1.04 | 1.09 |
|  | 21 | 0.34 | 1.11 | 0.96 | 0.13 |  |  | 13\% | 31 | 0.95 | 1.00 | 1.01 |
|  | 22 | 0.74 | 1.60 | 1.20 | 0.18 |  |  | 15\% | 29 | 1.14 | 1.18 | 1.30 |
|  | 23 | 0.44 | 1.31 | 0.96 | 0.16 |  |  | 17\% | 32 | 0.83 | 1.00 | 1.06 |
|  | 24 | 0.31 | 1.20 | 0.90 | 0.27 |  |  | 30\% | 23 | 0.93 | 1.00 | 1.06 |
|  | 25 | 0.18 | 1.53 | 0.94 | 0.29 |  |  | 31\% | 31 | 0.85 | 1.00 | 1.05 |
|  | 26 | 0.69 | 1.50 | 1.02 | 0.15 |  |  | 14\% | 26 | 0.96 | 1.01 | 1.09 |
| fx | ${ }^{27}$ | 0.33 | 1.21 | 0.98 | 0.16 |  |  | 17\% | 31 | 0.92 | 1.02 | 1.08 |
|  | 28 | 0.35 | 1.27 | 0.93 | 0.19 |  |  | 21\% | 29 | 0.77 | 1.00 | 1.08 |
|  | 29 | 0.35 | 2.17 | 1.13 | 0.31 |  |  | 27\% | 28 | 1.00 | 1.07 | 1.25 |
|  | 30 | 0.32 | 1.16 | 0.98 | 0.15 |  |  | 15\% | 29 | 0.97 | 0.99 | 1.02 |
|  | 31 | 0.92 | 1.30 | 1.12 | 0.11 |  |  | 10\% | 26 | 1.05 | 1.11 | 1.21 |
|  | 32 | 0.33 | 1.33 | 0.98 | 0.19 |  |  | 19\% | 28 | 0.91 | 1.03 | 1.05 |
| Commodity | ${ }^{33}$ | 0.58 | 1.92 | 1.10 | 0.32 |  |  | 30\% | 14 | 0.93 | 1.08 | 1.21 |
|  | 34 | 0.88 | 1.20 | 1.01 | 0.11 |  |  | 10\% | 13 | 0.90 | 1.00 | 1.10 |
|  | 35 | 0.60 | 1.03 | 0.92 | 0.14 |  |  | 15\% | 13 | 0.89 | 0.99 | 1.02 |
| Credit Spread | ${ }^{36}$ | 0.33 | 1.60 | 1.12 | 0.25 |  |  | 23\% | 24 | 1.04 | 1.08 | 1.28 |
|  | 37 | 0.32 | 1.23 | 1.00 | 0.18 |  |  | 18\% | 20 | 0.97 | 1.00 | 1.06 |
|  | 38 | 0.32 | 2.56 | 1.19 | 0.48 |  |  | 40\% | 20 | 0.98 | 1.02 | 1.37 |
|  | 39 | 0.32 | 1.41 | 1.03 | 0.22 |  |  | 22\% | 21 | 1.00 | 1.02 | 1.11 |
|  | 40 | 0.32 | 2.55 | 1.21 | 0.48 |  |  | 40\% | 21 | 1.00 | 1.02 | 1.39 |
|  | 41 | 0.32 | 1.56 | 1.03 | 0.21 |  |  | 21\% | 21 | 0.97 | 1.01 | 1.08 |
|  | 42 | 0.33 | 6.87 | 1.19 | 1.32 |  |  | 111\% | 20 | 0.72 | 1.01 | 1.04 |
|  | 43 | 0.32 | 1.58 | 1.10 | 0.26 |  |  | 24\% | 23 | 1.01 | 1.05 | 1.23 |
|  | 44 | 0.33 | 1.89 | 1.12 | 0.33 |  |  | 29\% | 25 | 0.97 | 1.09 | 1.13 |
|  | 45 | -16.07 | 2.63 | 0.42 | 3.62 |  |  | 870\% | 21 | 0.98 | 1.08 | 1.34 |
|  | 46 | 0.32 | 2.23 | 1.08 | 0.36 |  |  | 33\% | 24 | 0.96 | 1.03 | 1.12 |
|  | 47 | 0.32 | 5.82 | 1.34 | 1.12 |  |  | 84\% | 20 | 0.95 | 1.01 | 1.04 |
|  | 48 | 0.33 | 2.37 | 1.11 | 0.40 |  |  | 36\% | 23 | 0.98 | 1.02 | 1.06 |
|  | 49 | 0.33 | 2.24 | 1.21 | 0.44 |  |  | 36\% | 21 | 1.00 | 1.08 | 1.47 |
|  | 50 | 0.32 | 1.35 | 1.05 | 0.20 |  |  | 19\% | 23 | 0.99 | 1.05 | 1.18 |
|  | 51 | 0.33 | 1.70 | 0.97 | 0.29 |  |  | 30\% | 20 | 0.81 | 1.03 | 1.11 |
|  | 52 | 0.33 | 1.54 | 1.05 | 0.28 |  |  | 27\% | 19 | 0.96 | 1.10 | 1.12 |
|  | 53 | 0.33 | 1.30 | 1.05 | 0.22 |  |  | 21\% | 20 | 0.98 | 1.06 | 1.23 |
| Correlation Troding | 54 | 0.71 | 1.29 | 0.95 | 0.19 |  |  | 20\% | 6 | 0.83 | 0.88 | 1.06 |
|  | 55 | 0.97 | 1.11 | 1.03 | 0.06 |  |  | 6\% | 4 | 0.97 | 1.01 | 1.06 |
|  | 56 | 0.97 | 3.61 | 2.32 | 1.29 |  |  | 55\% | 4 | 1.07 | 2.36 | 3.61 |
| ALL-IN no-CTP ** | 57 | 0.73 | 1.12 | 0.99 | 0.11 |  |  | 11\% | 15 | 0.98 | 1.03 | 1.05 |
| Equity Cumulative ** | 58 | 0.23 | 1.29 | 0.95 | 0.25 |  |  | 27\% | 18 | 0.91 | 1.04 | 1.09 |
| IR Cumulative ** | 59 | 0.88 | 1.64 | 1.11 | 0.17 |  |  | 15\% | 23 | 1.01 | 1.05 | 1.15 |
| FX Cumulative ** | 60 | 0.66 | 1.32 | 1.02 | 0.15 |  |  | 15\% | 26 | 0.95 | 1.04 | 1.09 |
| Commodity Cumulative ** | 61 | 0.88 | 1.21 | 1.01 | 0.11 |  |  | 11\% | 12 | 0.90 | 1.00 | 1.09 |
| cs Cumulative ** | 62 | 0.78 | 2.11 | 1.19 | 0.30 |  |  | 25\% | 18 | 1.01 | 1.07 | 1.25 |
| CTP Cumulative ** | 63 | 0.96 | 3.59 | 2.31 | 1.28 |  |  | 56\% | 4 | 1.07 | 2.35 | 3.59 |

Refers to the number of banks included in the computation of the statistic
*For the aggregated porffolios (57 to 63), banks that reported at least a missing portfolio IMV among the ones composing the aggregate are not included
in the computation of the benchmarks for that particular aggregate porffolio.

Figure 17: IMV scatter plots (all)

IMV(level) - instrument 1


IMV(level) - instrument 3


IMV(level) - instrument 5


IMV(level) - instrument 2


IMV(level) - instrument 4


IMV(level) - instrument 6


IMV(level) - instrument 7


IMV(level) - instrument 9


IMV(level) - instrument 11


IMV(level) - instrument 8


IMV(level) - instrument 10


IMV(level) - instrument 12


IMV(level) - instrument 13


IMV(level) - instrument 15


IMV(level) - instrument 17


IMV(level) - instrument 14


IMV(level) - instrument 16


IMV(level) - instrument 18


IMV(level) - instrument 19


IMV(level) - instrument 21


IMV(level) - instrument 23


IMV(level) - instrument 20


IMV(level) - instrument 22


IMV(level) - instrument 24


IMV(level) - instrument 25


IMV(level) - instrument 27


IMV(level) - instrument 29


IMV(level) - instrument 26


IMV(level) - instrument 28


IMV(level) - instrument 30


IMV(level) - instrument 31


IMV(level) - instrument 33


IMV(level) - instrument 35


IMV(level) - instrument 32


IMV(level) - instrument 34


IMV(level) - instrument 36


IMV(level) - instrument 37


IMV(level) - instrument 39


IMV(level) - instrument 41


IMV(level) - instrument 38


IMV(level) - instrument 40


IMV(level) - instrument 42


IMV(level) - instrument 43


IMV(level) - instrument 45


IMV(level) - instrument 47


IMV(level) - instrument 46


IMV(level) - instrument 48


IMV(level) - instrument 49


IMV(level) - instrument 51


IMV(level) - instrument 53


IMV(level) - instrument 50


IMV(level) - instrument 52


IMV(level) - instrument 54


IMV(level) - instrument 55


IMV(level) - instrument 57


IMV(level) - instrument 59


IMV(level) - instrument 56


IMV(level) - instrument 58


IMV(level) - instrument 60


IMV(level) - instrument 61


IMV(level) - instrument 63


IMV(level) - instrument 65


IMV(level) - instrument 62


IMV(level) - instrument 64


IMV(level) - instrument 66


IMV(level) - instrument 67


IMV(level) - instrument 69


IMV(level) - instrument 71


IMV(level) - instrument 68


IMV(level) - instrument 70


IMV(level) - instrument 72


IMV(level) - instrument 73


IMV(level) - instrument 75


IMV(level) - instrument 74


Figure 18: VaR submissions normalised by the median of each portfolio (by asset class)

VaR: All portfolios
(ratio with the median)


## VaR: Aggregated portfolios

(ratio with the median)


VaR: Commodity portfolios
(ratio with the median)


VaR: Credit Spread portfolios
(ratio with the median)


## VaR: CTP portfolios

(ratio with the median)


VaR: Equity portfolios
(ratio with the median)


## VaR: FX portfolios

(ratio with the median)


## VaR: Interest Rate portfolios

(ratio with the median)


Figure 19: sVaR submissions normalised by the median of each portfolio (by asset class)

## SVaR: All portfolios

(ratio with the median)


- Equity - InterestRate FX © Commodity - CreditSpread © CTP All-in


## SVaR: Aggregated portfolios

(ratio with the median)


SVaR: Commodity portfolios
(ratio with the median)


SVaR: Credit Spread portfolios
(ratio with the median)


## SVaR: CTP portfolios

(ratio with the median)


SVaR: Equity portfolios
(ratio with the median)


## SVaR: FX portfolios

(ratio with the median)


SVaR: Interest Rate portfolios


Figure 20: sVaR submissions normalised by the median of each portfolio (by methodological approach)

## SVaR: all portfolios (exc. aggregated)

(ratio with the median - HS banks in orange)


SVaR: all portfolios (exc. aggregated)
(ratio with the median below 50\% - HS banks in orange


Table 27: VaR statistics (small banks only)

EU Statistics for VaR

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \& \& \multicolumn{8}{|c|}{Other stats} \& \multicolumn{7}{|c|}{Percentiles} \& \multirow[b]{2}{*}{\begin{tabular}{|c|}
\hline Intercuantile \\
range
\end{tabular}} \\
\hline \& Port. ID \& Min \& Max \& Ave. \& STDev \& STDev_trunc' \& \[
\begin{array}{|c|}
\hline \text { MAD (median } \\
\text { absolute } \\
\text { deviation) }
\end{array}
\] \& \[
\begin{array}{|c|}
\hline \text { Coefficient of } \\
\text { variation } \\
\text { (STDev/Mean) } \\
\hline
\end{array}
\] \& Num obs. \& 5th \& 10th \& 25th \& 50 th (Median) \& 75th \& 90th \& 95th \& \\
\hline \multirow{9}{*}{Equity} \& 1 \& 2,148,037 \& 2,736,658 \& 2,403,158 \& 236,731 \& \& \& 10\% \& \& 2,150,469 \& 2,152,901 \& 2,171,172 \& 2,495,262 \& 2,549,904 \& 2,631,959 \& 2,684,309 \& \({ }^{8 \%}\) \\
\hline \& 2 \& 1,984,839 \& 2,355,007 \& 2,232,890 \& 138,071 \& \& \& 6\% \& \& 2,025,031 \& 2,065,223 \& 2,161,883 \& 2,312,119 \& 2,327,248 \& 2,341,683 \& 2,348,345 \& 4\% \\
\hline \& 3 \& 12,800 \& 26,890 \& 16,869 \& 5,524 \& \& \& 33\% \& 6 \& 12,808 \& 12,815 \& 12,989 \& 14,633 \& 18,521 \& 23,159 \& 25,025 \& 18\% \\
\hline \& \({ }_{5}^{4}\) \& 143 \& 1,716 \& 722 \& 542 \& \& \& 75\% \& \& 208 \& 273 \& 437 \& 621 \& 798 \& 1,273 \& 1,495 \& 29\% \\
\hline \& 5 \& 727,947,916 \& 948,265,719 \& 801,052,469 \& 93,469,995 \& \& \& 12\% \& 6 \& \(728,093,026\) \& 728,238,137 \& 732,970,448 \& 757,36, 164 \& 857,29, 274 \& 917,523,108 \& 932,894,414 \& \({ }^{8 \%}\) \\
\hline \& \({ }_{6}^{6}\) \& 18,544 \& 45,808 \& 31,008 \& 9,891 \& \& \& 32\% \& 7 \& 19,867 \& 21,191 \& 23,240 \& 30,851 \& 37,688 \& 41,603 \& 43,706 \& 24\% \\
\hline \& \({ }_{8}\) \& 9,181
44,948 \& 15,479
113,825 \& 12,330
77,830 \& 4,453
28,084 \& \& \& \(36 \%\)
\(36 \%\) \& - \(\begin{array}{r}2 \\ 6\end{array}\) \& 9,496
47,941 \& 9,811
50,934 \& 10,756
58,976 \& 12,330
71,173 \& 13,905
101,08 \& 14,849
111,385 \& 15,164
112,605 \& \begin{tabular}{l}
\(13 \%\) \\
\(26 \%\) \\
\hline
\end{tabular} \\
\hline \& 9 \& 45,420 \& 80,584 \& 62,621 \& 14,367 \& \& \& 23\% \& \({ }_{6} 6\) \& 47,315 \& 49,210 \& 54,323 \& 58,567 \& 74,402 \& 80,886 \& 80,335 \& 16\% \\
\hline \& 10 \& 158,743 \& 290,245 \& 257,552 \& 49,593 \& \& \& 19\% \& 6 \& 183,935 \& 209,127 \& 263,178 \& 275,110 \& 283,955 \& 288,419 \& 289,332 \& 4\% \\
\hline \multirow{14}{*}{Interst Rote} \& \({ }_{12}\) \& 65,498 \& 77,076 \& 69,295 \& \({ }^{3,483}\) \& \& \& 5\% \& \({ }^{12}\) \& 65,641 \& 65,783 \& 66,153 \& 69,035 \& 70,476 \& 72,908 \& 74,827 \& \({ }^{3 \%}\) \\
\hline \& 12 \& 27,936 \& 48,403 \& 33,790 \& 7,629 \& \& \& 23\% \& 6 \& 28,207 \& 28,478 \& 29,121 \& 31,290 \& 34,388 \& 41,602 \& 45,002 \& \(8 \%\) \\
\hline \& \({ }^{13}\) \& 118,767 \& 169,957 \& 143,346 \& 15,203 \& \& \& 11\% \& \({ }^{11}\) \& 121,419 \& 124,071 \& 134,031 \& 144,541 \& 152,419 \& 156,862 \& 163,410 \& \(6 \%\) \\
\hline \& 14 \& 23,327 \& 29,502 \& 26,788 \& \({ }^{2,123}\) \& \& \& 8\% \& 11 \& 23,814 \& 24,300 \& 25,009 \& 27,439 \& 28,199 \& 29,473 \& 29,488 \& 6\% \\
\hline \& 15
16
16 \& 10,103
93378 \& \({ }^{31,178}\) \& 20,641 \& \({ }^{14,902}\) \& \& \& 72\% \& \(2^{2}\) \& \({ }^{11,157}\) \& 12,211 \& 15,372 \& 20,641 \& 25,909 \& 29,071 \& 30,124 \& 26\% \\
\hline \& \({ }_{17}^{16}\) \& \({ }^{93,378}\) \& 110,441 \& 102,031

222406 \& $\begin{array}{r}6,590 \\ \hline 3,256\end{array}$ \& \& \& 6\% \& ${ }_{8}^{9}$ \& 93,558 \& 93,738 \& 96,600 \& 103,299
23967 \& 106,809 \& 109,897 \& 110,169 \& $5 \%$
$6 \%$ <br>
\hline \& 18 \& 143,647
71,227 \& 258,130
424,949 \& 222,406
226,262 \& 126,041 \& \& \& 56\% \& 10 \& 150,766
73,915 \& 157,84
76,63 \& 218,788
10,088 \& ${ }^{239,697}$ \& 246,725
308,126 \& 254,020
365478 \& 256,075
395,213 \& 50\% <br>
\hline \& 19 \& 127,891 \& 160,306 \& 142,882 \& 8,512 \& \& \& 6\% \& 11 \& 130,510 \& 133,128 \& 140,065 \& 142,889 \& 145,742 \& 150,767 \& 155,537 \& $2 \%$ <br>
\hline \& ${ }^{20}$ \& 3,600 \& 6,935 \& 4,814 \& 1,215 \& \& \& 25\% \& ${ }^{9}$ \& 3,602 \& 3,604 \& 3,912 \& 4,103 \& 5,726 \& 6,122 \& 6,529 \& 19\% <br>
\hline \& ${ }_{22}^{21}$ \& 248,923 \& 321,710 \& 281,999 \& 25,704 \& \& \& 9\% \& ${ }^{11}$ \& 253,738 \& 258,53 \& 264,552 \& 275,179 \& 303,528 \& 319,311 \& 320,511 \& $7 \%$ <br>
\hline \& 22
23
23 \& 35,509
141,780 \& 57,377
191,324 \& 44,844
164,726 \& 7,07
19,273 \& \& \& 16\% \& 8
11 \& 36,254
142,491 \& 36,999
143,202 \& 39,409
148,198 \& 46,035
167,115 \& 47,963
179,845 \& 51,035
190,074 \& 54,206
190,69 \& 10\%
10\% <br>
\hline \& 24 \& 43,07 \& 403,906 \& 194,404 \& 113,758 \& \& \& 59\% \& 7 \& 73,375 \& 103,74 \& 145,275 \& 168,658 \& 227,353 \& 321,858 \& 362,882 \& 22\% <br>
\hline \& 25 \& 25,071 \& 98,576 \& 49,782 \& 26,721 \& \& \& 54\% \& 10 \& 26,838 \& 28,604 \& 30,550 \& 36,369 \& 60,304 \& 91,634 \& 95,105 \& 33\% <br>
\hline \& 26 \& 166,144 \& 504,299 \& 328,926 \& 103,328 \& \& \& 31\% \& 9 \& 186,060 \& 205,975 \& 244,325 \& 358,065 \& 371,190 \& 414,913 \& 459,606 \& 21\% <br>
\hline \multirow{5}{*}{${ }_{\text {Fx }}$} \& ${ }^{27}$ \& 405,693 \& 584,323 \& 492,986 \& 55,864 \& \& \& 11\% \& 11 \& 422,01 \& 438,309 \& 462,722 \& 488,152 \& 522,276 \& 579,838 \& 582,081 \& <br>
\hline \& ${ }^{28}$ \& 3,899 \& 15,291 \& 10,709 \& 3,539 \& \& \& 33\% \& 10 \& 5.278 \& 6,658 \& 8.592 \& ${ }^{11,492}$ \& 12,988 \& 14,579 \& 14,935 \& 20\% <br>
\hline \& 29
30 \& 65,112 \& 131,960
369840 \& 96,563
304918 \& 22,947 \& \& \& 24\% \& ${ }_{10}^{10}$ \& 68,426 \& 71,740
274397 \& 77,203 \& 98,435 \& ${ }^{113,696}$ \& ${ }^{121,351}$ \& 126,655 \& $\begin{array}{r}19 \% \\ \hline 6 \%\end{array}$ <br>
\hline \& 30
31 \& 261,170
242,625 \& 369,840
338,50 \& 304,918
290,609 \& 33,294
26,107 \& \& \& $11 \%$

$9 \%$ \& ${ }_{11}^{9}$ \& | 267,784 |
| :--- |
| 256408 | \& 274,397

270,190 \& 284,900
274,39 \& 295,218
29, 275 \& 321,786
300,56 \& 343,150

318,34 \& | 356,495 |
| :---: |
| 328,42 | \& $6 \%$

$5 \%$ <br>
\hline \& 32 \& 16,197 \& 23,219 \& 18,295 \& 2,559 \& \& \& 14\% \& 6 \& 16,363 \& 16,530 \& 16,866 \& 17,522 \& 18,378 \& 20,834 \& 22,027 \& 4\% <br>
\hline \multirow{3}{*}{Commodit} \& ${ }^{33}$ \& 520 \& 13,676 \& 6,362 \& 6,700 \& \& \& 105\% \& 3 \& 957 \& 1,394 \& 2,706 \& 4,891 \& 9,284 \& ${ }^{11,919}$ \& 12,798 \& 55\% <br>
\hline \& ${ }^{34}$ \& 251,518 \& 251,717 \& 251,618 \& 141 \& \& \& 0\% \& ${ }^{2}$ \& 251,528 \& 251,538 \& 251,568 \& 251,618 \& 251,667 \& 251,697 \& 251,707 \& \%\% <br>
\hline \& ${ }^{35}$ \& 224,173 \& 300,145 \& 264,715 \& 38,243 \& \& \& 14\% \& $3^{3}$ \& 228,739 \& 233,304 \& 247,001 \& 269,828 \& 284,987 \& 294,082 \& 297,113 \& 7\% <br>
\hline \multirow{16}{*}{Credit Spread} \& ${ }^{36}$ \& ${ }^{11,549}$ \& 22,328 \& 18,367 \& 5,930 \& \& \& 32\% \& $3^{3}$ \& 12,517 \& 13,484 \& 16,387 \& 21,224 \& 21,776 \& 22,107 \& 22,218 \& ${ }^{14 \%}$ <br>
\hline \& ${ }^{37}$ \& 13,303 \& 20,761 \& 16,185 \& 4,007 \& \& \& 25\% \& $3^{3}$ \& 13,422 \& 13,540 \& 13,897 \& 14,490 \& 17,626 \& 19,507 \& 20,134 \& 12\% <br>
\hline \& 38
30
30 \& 2,241 \& 3,884 \& ${ }^{3,038}$ \& 725 \& \& \& 24\% \& $4_{4}^{4}$ \& 2,307 \& 2,372 \& 2,569 \& 3,014 \& 3,484 \& 3,724 \& 3,804 \& 15\% <br>
\hline \& 39 \& 9,318
3,191 \& 13,249
5475 \& 11,184

4 \& | 1,973 |
| :--- |
| 1 |
| 1011 | \& \& \& 18\% \& $3_{3}^{3}$ \& 9,485

3,262 \& ${ }^{9,651}$ \& $\begin{array}{r}10,151 \\ 3,544 \\ \hline\end{array}$ \& 10,984 \& 12,117

4,798 \& | 12,796 |
| :---: |
| 5,204 | \& 13,023

5380 \& 9\% <br>
\hline \& ${ }_{4}^{40}$ \& 3,191
5,969 \& 5,475
7,881 \& 4,225
6,580 \& 1,011
856 \& \& \& 24\% \& - ${ }_{4}^{4}$ \& 3,262
5,988 \& 3,332
6,006 \& 3,544
6,062 \& 4,177 \& 4,798
6,777 \& 5,204
7409 \& 5,340
7,620 \& +6\% <br>
\hline \& ${ }_{4}$ \& 19,615 \& 38,345 \& 26,307 \& 10,477 \& \& \& 40\% \& 3 \& 19,750 \& 19,884 \& 20,289 \& 20,962 \& 29,654 \& 34,868 \& 36,607 \& 19\% <br>
\hline \& ${ }^{43}$ \& 9,602 \& 14,440 \& 12,060 \& 2,038 \& \& \& 17\% \& 5 \& 9,737 \& 9,873 \& 10,279 \& 12,987 \& 12,993 \& 13,861 \& 14,151 \& 12\% <br>
\hline \& 44 \& 4,965 \& 8,696 \& 6,385 \& 1,505 \& \& \& 24\% \& 5 \& 5,005 \& 5,045 \& 5,165 \& 6,265 \& ${ }_{6,834}$ \& 7,951 \& 8,324 \& 14\% <br>
\hline \& 45 \& 5,588 \& 10,255 \& 7,474 \& 2,156 \& \& \& 29\% \& $4^{4}$ \& 5,645 \& 5,701 \& 5,871 \& 7,027 \& 8,631 \& 9,605 \& 9,930 \& 19\% <br>
\hline \& ${ }^{46}$ \& 4,482 \& 5,354 \& 4,779 \& 407 \& \& \& 9\% \& 4 \& 4,485 \& 4,488 \& 4,496 \& 4,639 \& 4,921 \& 5,181 \& 5,267 \& 5\% <br>
\hline \& 47 \& 1,340 \& 3,408 \& ${ }^{2,428}$ \& ${ }^{1,038}$ \& \& \& 43\% \& ${ }^{3}$ \& ${ }^{1,460}$ \& 1,579 \& 1,938 \& 2,536 \& 2,972 \& 3,234 \& ${ }^{3,321}$ \& 21\% <br>
\hline \& ${ }^{48}$ \& 6,622 \& 11,010 \& 9,162 \& 1,848 \& \& \& 20\% \& $4^{4}$ \& 7,016 \& 7,410 \& 8.592 \& 9,509 \& 10,079 \& 10,638 \& 10,824 \& $8 \%$ <br>
\hline \& 49 \& 3,825 \& 7,680 \& 5,753 \& 2,726 \& \& \& 47\% \& ${ }^{2}$ \& 4,018 \& 211 \& 4,789 \& 5,753 \& 716 \& 7,295 \& 487 \& 17\% <br>
\hline \& 50
51 \& 15,465 \& 29,872 \& 24,499 \& 7,870 \& \& \& 32\% \& \& 16,734 \& 18,004 \& ${ }^{21,812}$ \& 28,159 \& 29,016 \& 29,529 \& 29,701 \& ${ }^{14 \%}$ <br>

\hline \& 52 \& | 46,903 |
| :---: | \& 281,923 \& 59,82

145,136 \& 12,298
128 \& \& \& 84\% \& ${ }_{3}^{3}$ \& 52,
4,71 \& 58,539 \& 76,743 \& 51,30
107,83 \& 6,962
19,503 \& 246,955 \& $\begin{array}{r}76,599 \\ \hline 2649\end{array}$ \& 43\% <br>
\hline \& 53 \& 73,168 \& 266,588 \& 145,221 \& 105,696 \& \& \& 73\% \& 3 \& 75,445 \& 77,722 \& 84,553 \& 95,937 \& 181,248 \& 232,434 \& 249,496 \& 36\% <br>

\hline \multirow{3}{*}{CTP} \& | 54 |
| :--- |
| 55 | \& 2,444 \& ${ }^{2,444}$ \& ${ }^{2,444}$ \& \#DIV/0! \& \& \& \#olvo! \& ${ }^{1}$ \& 2,444 \& 2,444 \& ${ }^{2,444}$ \& ${ }^{2,444}$ \& ${ }^{2,444}$ \& 2,444 \& 2,444 \& <br>

\hline \& 55 \& 4,934 \& 4,934 \& 4,934 \& \#IVV/0! \& \& \& \#OV/\%! \& 1 \& 4,934 \& 4,934 \& 4,934 \& 4,934 \& 4,934 \& 4,934 \& 4,934 \& 0\% <br>
\hline \& 56 \& 420,339 \& 420,339 \& 420,339 \& \#IVV/0! \& \& \& \#olvo! \& 1 \& 420,339 \& 420,339 \& 420,339 \& 420,339 \& 420,339 \& 420,339 \& 420,339 \& \% <br>
\hline $\overline{\text { Aut-N no.CTP }}$ \& ${ }^{57}$ \& 1,204,091 \& 1,497,085 \& 1,350,588 \& 207,178 \& \& \& 15\% \& \& 1,218,741 \& 1,233,390 \& ${ }^{1,277,340}$ \& 1,350,588 \& 1,423,837 \& 1,467,786 \& 1,482,435 \& $5 \%$ <br>
\hline Equiry Cumulotive \& ${ }_{58}$ \& 1,026,896 \& 1,391,385 \& 1,209,141 \& 257,733 \& \& \& 21\% \& \& 1,045,120 \& 1,063,345 \& 1,118,018 \& 1,209,141 \& 1,300,263 \& 1,354,936 \& 1,373,161 \& $8 \%$ <br>
\hline 1 R Cumulative \& 59 \& 177,258 \& 484,144 \& 314,504 \& 96,640 \& \& \& 31\% \& 9 \& 198,422 \& 219,626 \& 258,500 \& 280,123 \& 390,032 \& 1694 \& 447,919 \& 20\% <br>
\hline EXCumulative \& 60 \& 549,532 \& 811,37 \& 660,764 \& 81,370 \& \& \& 12\% \& 8 \& 569,016 \& 588,500 \& 615,474 \& 646,188 \& 688,980 \& 758,003 \& 784,690 \& 6\% <br>
\hline Commodity Cumulative \& ${ }_{61}$ \& 251,978 \& 252,006 \& 251,992 \& \& \& \& 0\% \& \& 251,979 \& 251,981 \& 251,985 \& 251,992 \& 251,999 \& 252,003 \& 252,005 \& 0\% <br>
\hline ${ }_{\text {cs comuative }}$ \& 62 \& 11,284 \& 15,698 \& ${ }^{13,648}$ \& 2,062 \& \& \& 15\% \& $4_{4}^{4}$ \& 11,481 \& 11,679 \& 12,270 \& ${ }^{13,806}$ \& 15,184 \& 15,492 \& 15,595 \& ${ }^{11 \%}$ <br>
\hline \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& 379,911 \& 0 <br>
\hline
\end{tabular}

Figure 21: VaR ratio with median (focus on small banks)
VaR: all portfolios (exc. aggregated)
(ratio with the median - Small banks in orange)


Table 28: VaR statistics (medium-sized banks only)
EU Statistics for VaR

|  |  | Other stats |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Percentiles |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Port.10 | Min | Max | Ave. | STDev | STDev_trunc | $\begin{array}{\|c\|} \hline \text { MAD (median } \\ \text { absolute } \\ \text { deviation) } \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|c\|} \hline \text { Coefficient of } \\ \text { variation } \\ \text { (STDev/Mean) } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | Num obs. | 5th | 10th | 25th | 50 th (Median) | 75th | 90th | 95th | Interquantile range |
| Equity | 1 | 2,081,748 | 3,206,116 | 2,659,786 | 381,177 |  |  | 14\% | 22 | 2,106,493 | 2,156,980 | 2,238,128 | 2,752,425 | 2,995,397 | 3,104,841 | 3,129,183 | 14\% |
|  | 2 | 1,909,923 | 2,845,713 | 2,364,727 | 316,185 |  |  | 13\% | 19 | 1,915,249 | 1,979,120 | 2,085,002 | 2,280,357 | 2,677,014 | 2,703,144 | 2,722,632 | $12 \%$ |
|  | 3 | 10,670 | 27,263 | 20,820 | 3,991 |  |  | 19\% | 19 | 15,260 | 16,628 | 19,259 | 20,447 | 24,096 | 25,129 | 26,480 | $11 \%$ |
|  | ${ }_{5}^{4}$ | 210 | 1,693 | 794 | 423 |  |  | 53\% | 18 | 283 | 337 | 392 | 738 | 1,156 | 1,254 | 1,336 | 49\% |
|  | 5 | 730,787,866 | 973,360.882 | 848,57,540 | 71,612,204 |  |  | 8\% | 20 | 735,196,011 | 760,759,249 | 776,161,082 | 864,153,529 | 902,750,644 | 911,677,828 | 934,286,231 | ${ }^{8 \%}$ |
|  | ${ }_{7}^{6}$ | 17,854 3,862 | 46,308 <br> 27986 | 34,830 | 9,064 |  |  | 26\% | 19 | 18,078 | 20,553 | 28,853 | 37,871 | 40,939 | 45,068 | 45,412 | 17\% |
|  | ${ }_{8}$ | 1,882 60,353 | 27,986 125,490 | ${ }_{9}^{11,7,10}$ | 5,670 23,849 |  |  | 48\% | 17 18 | 5,117 60,931 | 6,027 61,719 | 9,066 68,913 | 10,707 98,219 | 13,280 115,03 | 17,713 119,90 | 20,014 <br> 122,548 | 19\% |
|  | 9 | 36,574 | 89,738 | 63,298 | 14,456 |  |  | 23\% | 19 | 39,620 | 48,722 | 55,172 | 61,151 | 70,266 | 82,139 | 86,807 | 12\% |
|  | 10 | 244,093 | 331,241 | 284,697 | 23,939 |  |  | 8\% | 18 | 252,766 | 263,411 | 269,622 | 276,285 | 298,132 | 317,799 | 328,127 | 5\% |
| Interst Rote | ${ }^{11}$ | 64,021 | 78,21 | 70,576 | 4,334 |  |  | 6\% | 23 | 64,386 | 64,936 | 67,535 | 70,279 | 73,445 | 77,353 | 78,112 | 4\% |
|  | 12 | 32,826 | 54,016 | 42,309 | 6,186 |  |  | 15\% | 25 | 33,605 | 34,186 | 37,693 | 41,877 | 46,843 | 50,171 | 51,489 | 11\% |
|  | ${ }^{13}$ | 130,121 | 178,574 | 151,806 | 12,979 |  |  | 9\% | 24 | 135,088 | 135,233 | 140,661 | 154,006 | 160,174 | 166,980 | 168,209 | 6\% |
|  | 14 | 22,285 | 32,700 | 27,745 | 2,699 |  |  | 10\% | 26 | 23,488 | 24,386 | 26,165 | 27,841 | 29,029 | 31,761 | 32,187 | 5\% |
|  | 15 | 11,177 | 26,443 | 16,441 | 4,901 |  |  | 30\% | ${ }^{9}$ | 11,397 | 11,618 | 14,129 | 15,658 | 16,712 | 22,901 | 24,672 | 8\% |
|  | 16 | 90,921 | 119,751 | 103,326 | 6,732 |  |  | 7\% | 24 | 94,957 | 96,749 | 98,748 | 102,578 | 108,641 | 110,215 | 114,270 | 5\% |
|  | 17 | 153,246 | 362,697 | 248,882 | 53,296 |  |  | 21\% | 22 | 155,349 | 183,258 | 217,251 | 257,57 | 267,32 | 288,204 | 358,025 | 10\% |
|  | 18 19 18 | 123,379 | 472,329 | 300,752 | ${ }^{98,716}$ |  |  | 33\% | ${ }_{21}^{21}$ | ${ }^{165,983}$ | 189,885 | ${ }^{235,716}$ | 280,375 | 345,329 | ${ }^{438,667}$ | 453,468 | ${ }^{19 \%}$ |
|  | 19 20 | 126,580 3,105 | 167,912 6,996 | 150,277 4,499 | 12,424 1,043 |  |  | 8\% ${ }^{83 \%}$ | 25 26 | 130,448 3,266 | 131,945 3,323 | 143,239 3,562 | 152,853 4,267 | 160,537 5,220 | 163,464 5,865 | 165,082 6,04 | ${ }^{6 \%}$ |
|  | 21 | 243,192 | 323,341 | 287,928 | 22,231 |  |  | $8 \%$ | 26 | 253,246 | 265,199 | 272,464 | 285,814 | 308,922 | 315,689 | 316,482 | $6 \%$ |
|  | ${ }^{22}$ | 41,516 | ${ }^{63,601}$ | 50,764 | 5,992 |  |  | 12\% | 25 | 43,408 | 43,698 | 46,491 | 49,412 | 54,904 | 59,208 | 59,692 | $8 \%$ |
|  | ${ }^{23}$ | 142,629 | 201,294 | 169,295 | 18,414 |  |  | 11\% | 23 | 145,922 | 149,134 | 152,172 | 165,69 | 182,95 | 196,603 | 198,557 | 9\% |
|  | 24 | 42,451 | 329,688 | 172,377 | 86,767 |  |  | 50\% | 17 | 48,505 | 72,251 | 106,237 | 176,750 | 202,815 | 286,55 | 313,295 | $31 \%$ |
|  | ${ }^{25}$ | 12,685 | 109,079 | 45,742 | 24,035 |  |  | 53\% | 25 | 20,942 | 25,677 | 29,856 | 40,586 | 52,282 | 82,156 | 95,507 | 27\% |
|  | 26 | 227,460 | 547,837 | 395,750 | 88,172 |  |  | 22\% | 21 | 265,314 | 278,725 | 355,128 | 377,186 | 466,998 | 521,795 | 546,762 | 14\% |
| ${ }_{\text {Fx }}$ | ${ }^{27}$ | 388,925 | 588,161 | 470,794 | 50,161 |  |  | 11\% | 24 | 404,782 | 419,677 | 435,666 | 456,759 | 503,834 | 538,552 | 549,352 | \% |
|  | ${ }^{28}$ | 7,126 | 22,595 | ${ }^{11,862}$ | 3,298 |  |  | 28\% | 20 | ${ }^{8,372}$ | 8,602 | 10,298 | ${ }^{11,200}$ | 13,235 | 14,179 | 15,532 | $12 \%$ |
|  | 29 30 30 | ${ }^{61,605}$ | 148,573 370,393 | 98,912 | $\begin{array}{r}26,360 \\ \hline 3,005\end{array}$ |  |  | 27\% | ${ }^{21}$ | 63,079 | 66,074 | 81,317 | 87,630 | 114,537 | ${ }^{136,271}$ | ${ }^{138,968}$ | ${ }^{17 \%}$ |
|  | 30 <br> 31 <br> 1 | 256,067 | 370,393 337761 | 314,224 | ${ }^{31,005}$ |  |  | 10\% | 22 | 282,351 | ${ }^{284,326}$ | 293,199 | 304,887 | 336,579 | ${ }^{362,395}$ | 369,578 33547 | 7\% |
|  | 32 32 | 244,661 14,221 | 337,761 188,211 | 286,089 42,122 | 29,454 56,698 |  |  | 10\% | 17 19 | 251,294 15,55 | 254,339 15,710 | 262,398 16,49 | 279,566 17063 | 299,950 23,011 | 334,632 155,973 | 335,547 | 76\% |
| Commodity | ${ }^{33}$ | 3,512 | 14,224 | 9,156 | 3,675 |  |  | 40\% | ${ }^{9}$ | 4,200 | 4,889 | 6,555 | 9,684 | 10,864 | 14,057 | 14,140 | 25\% |
|  | 34 | 220,882 | 328,788 | 272,297 | 32,731 |  |  | 12\% | 9 | 233,140 | 245,399 | 251,551 | 270,640 | 296,736 | 306,550 | 317,69 | $8 \%$ |
|  | 35 | 211,155 | 378,924 | 299,182 | 55,716 |  |  | 19\% | 9 | 219,343 | 227,531 | 270,764 | 299,099 | 333,085 | 365,230 | 372,077 | 10\% |
| Credit Spread | ${ }^{36}$ | 12,745 | 22,562 | 17,835 | 3,448 |  |  | 19\% | 16 | 12,848 | 12,943 | 15,354 | 17,943 | 20,747 | 21,993 | 22,169 | 15\% |
|  | ${ }^{37}$ | 11,990 | 23,048 | 18,081 | 3,387 |  |  | 19\% | ${ }^{12}$ | 12,743 | 13,546 | 15,962 | 18,813 | 19,681 | 22,530 | 22,912 | 10\% |
|  | 38 30 30 | 2,181 | 4,542 | ${ }^{3,450}$ | 815 |  |  | 24\% | ${ }^{14}$ | 2,300 | 2,498 | 2,861 | 3,268 | 4,298 | 4,450 | 4,497 | 20\% |
|  | 39 | 6,926 | 13,379 | 10,032 | 1,549 |  |  | 15\% | 14 | 8,034 | ${ }^{8,683}$ | 9,067 | 10,148 | 10,590 | 11,610 | 12,461 | $8 \%$ |
|  | 40 | 3,367 | 6,529 | 4,679 | 960 |  |  | 21\% | ${ }^{14}$ | 3,382 | ${ }^{3,403}$ | 4,081 | 4,652 | 5,324 | 5,600 | 5,960 | 13\% |
|  | ${ }^{41}$ | 2,707 | 11,644 | 7,437 <br> 1,68 | 2,282 |  |  | ${ }^{31 \%}$ | ${ }^{13}$ | 4,433 | 5,617 | 5,973 | 7,531 | ${ }^{8,786}$ | 9,859 | 10,657 | 19\% |
|  | ${ }^{42}$ | 9,704 | ${ }^{40,738}$ | ${ }^{21,168}$ | ${ }^{10,645}$ |  |  | 50\% | ${ }^{12}$ | 11,228 | 12,490 | 14,391 | 16,483 | 25,182 | 38,639 | 39,923 | 27\% |
|  | 43 | 9,222 | 46,279 | 18,547 | 10,036 |  |  | 54\% | 15 | 10,041 | 10,790 | 12,570 | 14,156 | 20,524 | 30,489 | ${ }^{36,429}$ | 24\% |
|  | ${ }_{45}^{44}$ | 4,784 1 1,595 | 8,273 8,526 | 6,615 4,624 | 1,181 2,183 |  |  | 18\% |  | 4,966 <br> 1885 | 5,030 2 | 5,846 3,660 | ${ }_{6}^{6,571}$ | 7,354 5 5 | 8,244 7933 | 8,872 | ${ }^{11 \%}$ |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & 45 \\ & 46 \end{aligned}$ | 1,595 3,707 | 8,526 13,939 | 4,624 7,096 | 2,183 3,000 |  |  | 47\% | 13 16 | 1,885 3,931 | 2,130 4,094 | 3,660 4,810 | 4,390 6,365 | 5,291 9,983 | 7,933 10,428 | 8,341 11,309 | 18\% |
|  | 47 | 1,438 | 5,477 | 2,808 | 1,373 |  |  | 49\% | 14 | 1,562 | 1,635 | 1,746 | 2,246 | 3,665 | 4,868 | 5,166 | 35\% |
|  | ${ }_{4}^{48}$ | 5,856 | 12,492 | 9,417 | 2,152 |  |  | 23\% | 15 | 5,911 | 6,511 | 7,621 | 9,891 | 10,684 | 12,020 | 12,247 | 17\% |
|  | 49 | 2,421 | ${ }^{8,746}$ | 4,771 | 2,039 |  |  | 43\% | 16 | 2,839 | 3,096 | 3,266 | 3,618 | 6,731 | 7,407 | 7,884 | 35\% |
|  | 50 51 51 | ${ }^{111,671}$ | 37,596 | ${ }^{19,177}$ | 7,274 |  |  | 38\% | ${ }^{16}$ | 11,702 | 12,330 | 14,045 | 17,370 | ${ }^{21,337}$ | 28,689 | 31,032 | ${ }^{21 \%}$ |
|  | 51 52 5 | ${ }^{36,745}$ | 88,892 | ${ }^{61,408}$ | 17,278 54,099 |  |  | $28 \%$ $45 \%$ | 12 11 | 38,546 | 40,205 | 50,189 | 60,661 | 73,553 | ${ }^{84,723}$ | 87,194 | 19\% |
|  | 53 | 105,543 | 338,088 | 180,509 | 66,946 |  |  | 37\% | 12 | 10,485 | 113.037 | 133,054 | 167753 | 214,791 | 243.655 | 286,938 | $\xrightarrow{28 \%}$ |
| CTP | 54 | 962 | 4,997 | 3,143 | 2,037 |  |  | 65\% | ${ }^{3}$ | 1,213 | 1,464 | 2,217 | 3,471 | 4,234 | 4,692 | 4,844 | 44 <br> 21 <br> 70 |
|  | 55 | 22,705 | 35,669 | 29,187 | 9,167 |  |  | 31\% | ${ }^{2}$ | 23,353 | 24,001 | 25,946 | 29,187 | 32,428 | 34,373 | 35,021 |  |
|  | 56 | 186,900 | 282,132 | 234,516 | 67,339 |  |  | 29\% | 2 | 191,662 | 196,423 | 210,708 | 234,516 | 258,324 | 272,609 | 277,370 |  |
| $\overline{\text { Alu-N no.CTP }}$ | ${ }^{57}$ | 1,201,785 | 1,694,730 | 1,459,482 | 140,448 |  |  | 10\% | 10 | 1,264,088 | 1,326,391 | 1,362,655 | 1,472,192 | 1,545,454 | 1,584,937 | 1,639,834 |  |
| Equiry Cumulotive | ${ }_{58}$ | 950,141 | 1,466,377 | 1,232,208 | 143,931 |  |  | 12\% | 14 | 1,034,930 | 1,080,867 | 1,173,663 | 1,230,907 | 1,314,115 | 1,425,964 | 1,453,746 | 6\% |
| 1 R cumulative | 59 | 275,264 | 564,481 | 380,673 | 84,873 |  |  | 22\% | 18 | 295,419 | 301,948 | 314,565 | 364,268 | 402,009 | 501,403 | 544,947 | 12\% |
| ex Cumulative | ${ }_{60}$ | 448,969 | 827,112 | 617,694 | 100,313 |  |  | 16\% | 18 | 490,293 | 499,999 | 545,747 | 615,607 | 696,275 | 727,216 | 769,130 | 12\% |
| Commodity cumulative | ${ }_{61} 61$ | 222,801 | 331,312 | 271,974 | ${ }^{33,406}$ |  |  | 12\% | ${ }^{9}$ | 232,763 | 242,724 | 250,357 | 271,490 | 296,621 | 307,507 | 319,410 | 8\% |
| cs comulative | ${ }_{6}^{62}$ | 10,392 | 27,527 | 17,733 | 5,297 5 5685 |  |  | 30\% | ${ }^{13}$ | 10,697 | 11,547 | $\begin{array}{r}15,060 \\ \hline 19072\end{array}$ | 15.919 | ${ }^{21,646}$ | 24,672 | ${ }^{26,021}$ | 18\% |
| CTP Cumulative | 63 | 169,967 | 250,386 | 210,177 | 56,865 |  |  | 27\% |  | 173,988 | 178,009 | 190,072 | 210,177 | 230,281 | 242,34 | 246,365 | 10\% |

Figure 22: VaR ratio with median (focus on medium-sized banks)
VaR: all portfolios (exc. aggregated)
(ratio with the median - Medium banks in orange)


Table 29: VaR statistics (large banks only)
EU Statistics for VaR


Figure 23: VaR ratio with median (focus on large banks)
VaR: all portfolios (exc. aggregated)
(ratio with the median - Large banks in orange)


Table 30: VaR statistics (small TB banks only)

EU Statistics for VaR


Table 31: VaR statistics (medium TB banks only)

EU Statistics for VaR


Table 32：VaR statistics（large TB banks only）

EU Statistics for VaR

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Vacme |  |  |  |  |  | cemenemesme |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 0ot．0． | ma | $\pm$ | me | sow | mem | mmose | sm | \％om | 2 zin | smmam | 7 zm | sm | smin | － | spoweme | mesm |  |
| san |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | cose |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | $\underbrace{8595858}$ | $\underbrace{8593280} 8$ | ， |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ${ }^{22}$ |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | $\begin{array}{r} 40,922 \\ 18,377 \\ 118,023 \end{array}$ |  | $\begin{array}{r} 8,737 \\ 4,445 \\ 19,491 \end{array}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | cosm |  |  | cose |
|  |  | ${ }_{55784}$ |  | cien | ， |  |  | Stise | Stise | ， | （ex |  | （19，9 |  |  |  |  |  |
| meremer |  |  |  |  | 速 | \％ |  | $\underbrace{\substack{\text { ana }}}_{\substack{6,382}}$ |  |  | cismo |  |  |  | col | cose | cose | ， |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & 18 \\ & 14 \\ & \hline 4 \end{aligned}$ |  | $\underbrace{\substack{12858 \\ 32700}}$ |  |  |  |  |  | ${ }_{\substack{13539 \\ 2539}}^{1}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | cos |
|  | ， | cince | （20，5 |  |  |  |  |  | ${ }_{\substack{1258 \\ 9,205}}$ |  | cis | cinc |  | cin |  | cos | cire |  |
|  | \％ |  |  | ， |  | ， | ． | 边 |  | ${ }^{227236}$ | coit |  | cose |  | ${ }_{258}^{28}$ |  |  |  |
|  | 20 | cince | ， | ${ }_{\text {a }}^{4}$ |  |  | ${ }^{2}$ | ， 3 Sts | cism | ${ }_{\substack{3 \\ 2302 \\ 2705}}$ | ， | cise | cise | ，5， | 5 | ， | ， | ， |
|  | ${ }^{3}$ |  | cos | cose | ， | ， |  | cosis | cosis | cin |  | cos |  | cose | 5 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | cos |  |  |  | cos | cose |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | cose |
|  |  |  | ${ }_{\text {stas }}$ | ${ }^{\text {a23s8 }}$ |  |  |  | 26838 | ${ }^{33583}$ | 3515909 | ${ }_{31888}$ | satas | s97837 | St， $3^{3}$ |  |  |  | ， |
| ${ }^{\text {x }}$ |  | cis |  | （12， |  |  |  | ， |  |  |  | ， | coin |  | 碞 |  | ， | cit |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Comaty |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ${ }^{\text {a，011 }}$ | 5，06 |  | \％，19 | ${ }^{6218}$ | ${ }^{6,200}$ |  | ${ }^{\text {cose }}$ | 4，98 |  | ${ }_{\text {a }}$ |
|  | ${ }_{3}^{36}$ |  |  | seaso |  | ${ }^{122}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | （tasp |  | $\substack{33,2,5 \\ \text { dizss }}$ |
| cmasmax |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ${ }_{\substack{19,290}}^{\substack{1920}}$ | ${ }_{\substack{\text { 2，} \\ \text { 2，} 1,9 \\ \hline}}$ | $2{ }^{209}$ | ${ }_{\substack{20 \\ 1 \times 2}}^{2}$ |  | cose |  |
|  | ${ }_{8}^{80}$ | $\underset{\substack{1398 \\ 6,90}}{\substack{\text { a }}}$ |  | （inco | ｜in | $\substack{358 \\ 2 \times 1}$ |  | $\underset{\substack{12,20 \\ 1,04}}{ }$ | $\underset{1288}{2120}$ |  |  | ${ }_{\text {cose }}^{\text {a }}$ | ${ }^{414585}$ | ${ }_{1}^{4,485}$ | $\underset{\substack{208 \\ 100}}{20}$ | cos |  | （4， |
|  | \％ | $\underset{\substack{3,03 \\ 6,0}}{\text { and }}$ | ${ }_{\text {c }}^{659}$ | （539 | $\xrightarrow{1235}$ | $\xrightarrow{238}$ |  | ${ }_{3}^{3095}$ |  | ${ }_{\substack{3,28 \\ 3,255}}$ | ${ }_{\text {a }}$ | ${ }_{\text {S }}^{52,5}$ | Ss．as | （1，2） | ${ }^{188}$ | ， | ${ }_{2}^{23,5}$ | （tam |
|  | \％ |  | 20， 21 | ， |  | 15 |  | ， | 退 | ${ }^{17329}$ |  | ， | 20， | ${ }^{20,38}$ | ${ }^{6}$ | ， | 约 | （2， |
|  | ${ }_{\text {a }}^{4}$ |  | $\underbrace{}_{\substack{8,23 \\ 8,83}}$ |  |  | ${ }_{658}^{175}$ |  |  |  |  |  | $\substack{\text { cese } \\ \text { gese }}$ | $\underbrace{}_{\substack{8,15 \\ 9,78}}$ | ${ }_{\substack{82, 8,2 m}}^{\substack{\text { a }}}$ | ${ }_{68}$ | cin | （tar |  |
|  | \％ |  |  |  | $\underset{\substack{\text { 2，} 2,58 \\ 1,38}}{ }$ |  |  | $\underbrace{}_{\substack{3290 \\ 1,90}}$ |  | $\underset{\substack{4.458 \\ 3202}}{4}$ | cost | ${ }_{\text {8，}}^{8.45}$ | $\substack{9.95 \\ \hline 985}$ | cos | ${ }^{18}$ | 隹 | ${ }_{8}^{8, s s_{0}}$ |  |
|  | ， |  | $\substack{12,49 \\ 7,56}$ | ， |  | $\underbrace{\substack{28}}_{\substack{238 \\ 38}}$ |  | ${ }_{\substack{6,35 \\ 3,198}}^{19}$ |  |  | ， | $\underbrace{\substack{\text { con }}}_{\substack{1007 \\ 5602}}$ | $\underset{\substack{\text { mits } \\ 7,258}}{ }$ | ， | ${ }^{23}$ |  | cose | cos |
|  |  |  |  | cin | cinc | $\underset{\substack{358 \\ 258}}{ }$ |  | $\underbrace{}_{\substack{11,51 \\ 3,502}}$ |  | $\underbrace{}_{\substack{13,58 \\ \hline 8,38}}$ | cincin |  | $\underset{\substack{2985 \\ 7825}}{ }$ | cise | ${ }_{\substack{29 \\ 159}}$ | （ispas | （200 | cose |
|  |  |  |  |  | cos | ¢9x |  | $\underbrace{\text { ase }}_{\substack{\text { aent } \\ \text { cise }}}$ |  |  | （2007 |  | coin |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | \％ | cosm |  |  | ， | cix ${ }_{\text {cke }}^{6 \times 8}$ |  |  |  | ${ }^{12302}$ |  |  |  | ， | \％x | coilize |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 边 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | cent |  | cosin | $\underset{\substack{\text { 12x } \\ 10 \times 0}}{ }$ |  |  |  |  |  | cosisisin |  | cise | \％ | cois | cisize |  |
|  |  |  | cos |  |  |  |  | cis | coit | cis |  |  | cinem | cos | $\xrightarrow{\text { cos }}$ |  |  | （tas |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Table 33: VaR statistics (same business model - cross-border universal bank)

EU Statistics for VaR


Table 34: VaR statistics (low L3 A\&L banks only)
EU Statistics for VaR


Table 35：VaR statistics（medium L3 A\＆L banks only）

EU Statistics for VaR

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Vacmeme |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | om． | m | $\pm$ | me | sow | mem | mmomb | sm | \％om | 23 n | smmemen | 7 mm | sm | smin | ceme | Sme | mome | 2rsousume |
|  |  |  | $\begin{array}{r} \hline 3,130,276 \\ 2,845,713 \\ 28,701 \end{array}$ |  |  | $\underset{\substack{1,5 \times x \\ 1 \times 2 \times}}{ }$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | cosize |  |  |
|  |  |  | cese |  |  | ${ }^{23 \times}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ${ }_{12}$ |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{array}{r} 3,240 \\ 23,774 \end{array}$ | ${ }^{238}$ |  |  | cex |  | coin |  |  |  |  |  |  | cose |
|  | ， |  |  | cosem |  | ${ }_{228}$ |  |  |  |  | cis | coich |  | 8728 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | 208 | ${ }^{35}$ |  | $\underbrace{\text { and }}_{\substack{6,32 \\ 33,22}}$ | cos |  |  |  |  | citat | ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | cosise |  | ， |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & 18 \\ & 14 \\ & \hline 4 \end{aligned}$ | $\underset{\substack{\text { 30，212 } \\ 25091}}{\substack{201}}$ | $\underbrace{\substack{12858 \\ 32700}}$ |  |  | $\stackrel{9}{\%}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ctice |  |  |  | coick |
|  | ， |  |  | $\underbrace{}_{\substack{1732 \\ 123,304}}$ |  | ，358 |  | ${ }_{\text {a }}^{112.218} 9$ |  | ${ }_{\substack{12,29 \\ 9.956}}$ | cis | ${ }_{\text {a }}^{123}$ | $\underbrace{\substack{\text { a }}}_{\substack{20,43 \\ \text { 10，} 93}}$ |  | ${ }^{208}$ | cos |  |  |
| mese | \％ |  |  | ${ }^{20}$ |  |  | ${ }^{10}$ |  |  | ${ }^{202523}$ |  | cos | cos | cose | ${ }_{300}$ | cose |  |  |
|  | $\begin{gathered} 20 \\ { }_{2 n}^{20} \end{gathered}$ | ， 3 Sex | ， | $\begin{aligned} & 14393) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} \substack { 2 \times x \\ \begin{subarray}{c}{680{ 2 \times x \\ \begin{subarray} { c } { 6 8 0 } } \\ { } \\ {\hline} \end{gathered}$ |  | ， 3,7 | 3， 3 | cosion | atem |  | Sex | cos | ${ }^{198}$ | ， | ， | ， |
|  | ${ }_{n}$ |  |  |  |  | cosy | ，${ }_{10}^{19}$ | cose |  |  |  |  |  | cose | ${ }^{58}$ |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | cos |  |  | ${ }_{5}^{5}$ |  | cos | cosme | cos |  |  | 为越， | 20 | cosit |  | cose |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | ${ }_{\substack{28 \\ 28 \\ 28}}$ |  | ${ }_{\substack{23,35 \\ 1243}}$ |  |  |  | ， |  | ${ }_{\substack{2031 \\ 1820}}$ |  | ， | ${ }_{\substack{1.12595 \\ 1.258}}$ | $\underbrace{13,29}_{13}$ | ， 12.3 | ${ }_{\substack{128 \\ 108}}^{108}$ |  | cilitize | cos |
|  |  |  |  | ${ }_{\substack{31598 \\ 26618}}^{\substack{18}}$ |  |  | ， |  | ces |  |  |  | cex |  |  |  |  |  |
| matar | ， | \％ | 2ma | \％eacter | \％es | ${ }^{688}$ |  | \％ 408 |  | Ssmb | 8， | ${ }^{12,265}$ | \％ | 2ma | ， | \％ | ， 14.62 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ${ }^{27293}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ${ }_{\substack{12,200}}^{1212}$ |  |  |  | 2008 | 2， | ${ }_{128}^{218}$ | ， | cin |  |
|  | $x_{n}^{8}$ | \％ |  |  | $\xrightarrow[\substack{89 \\ 1,99}]{\text { a }}$ | $\underset{\substack{20 \times 4 \\ 2004}}{2}$ |  | $\substack{1,98 \\ 698}_{\substack{\text { a }}}$ |  | $\underbrace{2}_{\substack{2581 \\ 882}}$ | $\substack{2086 \\ 9,906}$ | $\underbrace{\substack{\text { a }}}_{\substack{3,580 \\ \text { Leso }}}$ |  | ${ }_{\substack{4 \\ 1828 \\ 18,8}}$ | ， | ， | （1380 |  |
|  | ${ }^{\circ}$ | ， | cise |  | 込 |  |  |  | cincise | $\underbrace{}_{\substack{3,12 \\ 6,102}}$ | ${ }_{\text {cose }}^{\text {a }}$ | cinc | $\substack{\text { s．ex } \\ \text { gese }}$ | cos | coss |  | ${ }_{2}^{2,35}$ | Stice |
|  | ${ }^{2}$ | cin |  |  |  | ${ }_{48} 8$ |  |  |  |  | （1as） |  |  | cose | ， | cinco |  |  |
| emstest | $4$ | ， | $\underbrace{\substack{\text { a }}}_{\substack{8.895 \\ \text { Re，}}}$ | （tin） | $\xrightarrow{\substack{\text { L，} \\ 2,08 \\ 2,0}}$ | ${ }_{108}^{108}$ |  |  |  |  | ${ }_{\substack{\text { a } \\ 6,38 \\ 6,30}}$ |  |  | cos |  | cin | （tar | $\xrightarrow{2,5}$ |
|  | ${ }_{\text {a }}$ | S |  | $\underset{\substack{1,989 \\ 2,98}}{ }$ | $\xrightarrow{\substack{2909 \\ 1,309}}$ | $\xrightarrow[\substack{\text { css } \\ 488}]{ }$ |  | ${ }_{\substack{3,55 \\ 1,55}}$ | ${ }_{\substack{4,98 \\ 1,50}}^{4}$ | 50， |  | 8，30 | coin | ${ }^{212}$ | 37 | ， | ${ }_{\text {cse }}^{8.50}$ | ， |
|  | ${ }_{\text {d }}$ | （tas | $\substack{12,49 \\ 7,56}$ | \％e， $2 \times 1$ | $\underset{\substack{\text { c，} 1,58 \\ 1,59}}{ }$ | $\underbrace{1980}_{108}$ |  |  |  |  | ， 930 | cise | $\underset{\substack{4558 \\ 685}}{\substack{\text { cse }}}$ | ， 123 | ${ }_{10}^{128}$ |  |  |  |
|  | 号品 |  |  | $\underset{\substack{19,94 \\ 6,296}}{\substack{\text { a }}}$ | cis |  |  |  | cince |  | cise | $\underbrace{}_{\substack{2,7,11 \\ \eta, 10}}$ | $\underbrace{\substack{\text { a }}}_{\substack{26,58 \\ 8,745}}$ |  | ${ }_{20}^{208}$ |  | （120） |  |
|  |  | cis |  |  | （int |  |  | ， |  |  |  |  |  | S8， |  |  |  |  |
|  | \％ | ， |  |  | ， | ${ }_{508}^{680}$ |  |  |  | ${ }_{\text {2 }}^{12,202}$ |  | cosis | ${ }_{\text {a }}^{43}$ | ， 4 | ${ }_{\text {a }}^{3}$ |  | 9，${ }^{2}$ |  |
|  |  |  | cisish |  |  |  |  |  | （12，391 | 边 |  | cose | $\underbrace{3}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| comen |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | colin |  | ， | ${ }^{1055} 5$ |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ${ }^{2023} 24$ | 20， | Smas | ${ }^{313,39}$ | \％os9 | 30938 |  |  |  | （3ama |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 90832 |  |  |  | 627，7es |  |  |  |  |  |

Table 36: VaR statistics (high L3 A\&L banks only)

EU Statistics for VaR


Table 37: VaR statistics (IR and CS asset classes - only banks with general and specific IR risk approval)

EU Statistics for VaR

|  |  | Other stats |  |  |  |  |  | Percentiles |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Port. 10 | Min | Max | Ave. | sTDev | $\begin{array}{\|c\|} \hline \text { Coefficient of } \\ \text { variation } \\ \text { (STDev/Mean) } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | Num obs. | 5th | 10th | 25th | 50 th (Median) | 75th | 90th | 95th | Interquantile range |
| interst fate | ${ }_{11}$ | 64,332 | 78,21 | 71,098 | 4,323 | 6\% | 26 | 65,346 | 65,758 | 67,996 | 70,167 | 74,064 | 77,684 | 78,098 | $4 \%$ |
|  | 12 | 27,936 | 51,757 | 41,416 | 6,922 | 17\% | 26 | 30,052 | 33,151 | 36,542 | 41,708 | 47,625 | 50,005 | 50,210 | 13\% |
|  | 13 | 118,767 | 178,574 | 153,183 | 13,956 | \% | 29 | 135,186 | 138,448 | 142,884 | 155,313 | 163,172 | 170,804 | 175,225 | 7\% |
|  | 14 | 22,285 | 32,700 | 27,797 | 2,403 | 9\% | 26 | 23,655 | 24,819 | 27,178 | 27,838 | 28,825 | 30,49 | 32,187 | 3\% |
|  | 15 | 10,103 | 31,178 | 16,432 | 5,104 | 31\% | 14 | 11,118 | 12,010 | 14,162 | 16,015 | 16,767 | 20,481 | 25,222 | $8 \%$ |
|  | 16 | 93,828 | 119,751 | 104,567 | 5,838 | 6\% | 25 | 96,891 | 97,974 | 102,384 | 103,299 | 109,230 | 110,170 | 114,045 | 3\% |
|  | 17 | 138,867 | 362,697 | 252,350 | 52,295 | 21\% | 25 | 153,388 | 180,573 | 237,623 | 258,130 | 266,882 | 305,785 | 353,468 | 6\% |
|  | 18 | 136,877 | 472,329 | 307,560 | 93,051 | 30\% | 25 | 170,763 | 204,885 | 254,443 | 293,170 | 358,870 | 436,104 | 455,549 | 17\% |
|  | 19 | 132,157 | 167,912 | 199,707 | 9,905 | 7\% | 27 | 133,308 | 136,900 | 143,665 | 148,399 | 156,825 | 162,604 | 163,515 |  |
|  | ${ }^{20}$ | 3,259 | 6,017 | 4,272 | 881 | 21\% | 27 | 3,292 | 3,336 | 3,527 | 4,016 | 4,732 | 5,741 | 5,873 | 15\% |
|  | 21 22 22 | ${ }^{261,893}$ | 323,341 59726 | 293,966 50765 | 19,112 5 5 | 7\% | 28 | 266,806 | 271,046 | 276,170 | 299,129 | 309,189 | 315,848 | 319,950 | 6\% |
|  | 22 23 23 | 43,070 142,629 | 59,726 201,294 | 50,765 170,743 | 5,345 17179 | 11\% | 26 28 | 43,908 149.013 | 45,443 149.560 | 46,355 154,889 | 48,905 170,276 | 56,277 186,696 | 58,032 192564 | 59, 338 198.506 | 10\% |
|  | 24 | 87,072 | 403,906 | 221,207 | 92,275 | 42\% | 26 | 92,758 | 111,501 | 150,577 | 196,402 | 270,381 | 356,837 | 392,683 | 28\% |
|  | 25 | 26,621 | 90,863 | 44,352 | 19,111 | 43\% | 28 | 28,49 | 28,993 | 30,568 | 34,782 | 51,546 | 76,321 | 85,833 | 26\% |
|  | 26 | 166,144 | 547,837 | 376,201 | 93,484 | 25\% | 24 | 228,981 | 245,916 | 349,360 | 374,444 | 404,529 | 504,299 | 519,171 | $7 \%$ |
| Credit Spread | ${ }^{36}$ | 9,872 | 22,562 | 17,628 | 4,137 | 23\% | 25 | 10,582 | 12,027 | 14,103 | 18,771 | 21,224 | 22,262 | 22,328 | 20\% |
|  | 37 | 11,990 | 23,048 | 17,389 | 3,563 | 20\% | 23 | 12,566 | 13,257 | 14,490 | 18,021 | 19,977 | 22,371 | 22,777 | 16\% |
|  | ${ }^{38}$ | 1,534 | 4,472 | 3,072 | 806 | 26\% | 23 | 1,866 | 2,193 | 2,678 | 2,966 | 3,520 | 4,305 | 4,392 | 14\% |
|  | 39 | 6,926 | 13,249 | 9,939 | 1,692 | 17\% | 22 | 6,951 | 7,471 | 9,067 | 10,104 | 10,739 | 11,868 | 13,185 | 8\% |
|  | 40 | 3,003 | 6,529 | 4,457 | 945 | 21\% | 23 | 3,191 | 3,226 | 3,548 | 4,506 | 5,210 | 5,477 | 5,635 | 19\% |
|  | ${ }^{41}$ | 2,707 | 11,644 | 7,092 | 2,007 | 28\% | 23 | 3,397 | 5,617 | ${ }^{6,033}$ | 7,266 | 8,002 | 9,480 | 9,964 | 14\% |
|  | 42 | 9,704 | 40,738 | 21,060 | 8,551 | 41\% | 23 | 12,490 | 13,097 | 16,277 | 19,314 | 21,338 | 37,292 | 39,165 | 13\% |
|  | ${ }^{43}$ | 9,222 | 46,279 | 16,596 | ${ }^{8,013}$ | 48\% | ${ }^{26}$ | 10,307 | 10,643 | 12,989 | 14,143 | 17,481 | 25,065 | ${ }^{31,134}$ | 15\% |
|  | 44 | 4,784 | ${ }^{8,696}$ | 6,572 | 1,110 | 17\% | ${ }^{26}$ | 5,028 | 5,082 | 5,796 | ${ }_{6}^{6.571}$ | 7,071 | 8,244 | ${ }^{8,273}$ | 10\% |
|  | 45 46 | 1,595 2,733 | 10,255 13,939 | 5,564 <br> 6,357 <br> 2, | 2,608 2,618 | 47\% | 24 27 | 2,106 3,796 1 | 2,287 4,11 | 3,698 4,501 | 5,229 5 5476 | 8,089 7433 | 9,392 10,325 | 9,806 10,430 | $37 \%$ <br> $25 \%$ |
|  | ${ }_{4}^{46}$ | 2,733 1,340 | 13,939 5,47 | 6,357 2,663 | 2,618 1,261 | 47\% | ${ }_{23}^{27}$ | - $\begin{aligned} & \text { 3,496 } \\ & 1,42\end{aligned}$ | 4,500 | 4,565 | ${ }_{\text {5,476 }}$ | 7,433 3,262 | 10,325 4,636 | 10,430 4,964 | 33\% |
|  | ${ }^{48}$ | 5,668 | 12,492 | 9,186 | 1,971 | 21\% | 26 | 5,876 | 6,278 | 7,574 | 9,708 | 10,533 | 11,449 | 12,066 | 16\% |
|  | 49 | 2,421 | 8,746 | 4,546 | 1,867 | 41\% | 23 | 2,504 | 3,025 | 3,337 | 3,676 | 5,540 | 7,520 | 7,672 | 25\% |
|  | 50 | 11,671 | 37,596 | 19,680 | 6,995 | 36\% | 24 | 11,790 | 12,444 | 14,116 | 17,788 | 23,514 | 29,564 | 29,872 | 25\% |
|  | 51 | 32,646 | 88,892 | 58,990 | 17,084 | 29\% | 22 | 36,613 | 37,073 | 45,397 | 58,292 | 72,474 | 82,771 | 85,671 | 23\% |
|  | 52 | 38,414 | 310,499 | 120,439 | 76,319 | 63\% | 21 | 43,819 | 46,403 | 78,799 | 107,083 | 136,370 | 247,517 | 281,923 | 27\% |
|  | 53 | 58,488 | 338,088 | 166,472 | 82,248 | 49\% | 23 | 73,168 | 74,322 | 100,740 | 159,469 | 220,113 | 278,784 | 319,07 | 37\% |
| IR Cumulotive | 59 | 265,651 | 564,481 | ${ }^{390,519}$ | ${ }^{84,790}$ | ${ }^{22 \%}$ | 25 | 276,236 | 290,860 | 327,361 | 379,424 | 437,241 | 511,116 | 548,479 | 14\% |
| cs cumulative | 62 | 10,392 | 29,923 | 17,319 | 5,282 | 30\% | 23 | 10,938 | 11,437 | 14,454 | 15,698 | 20,056 | 24,672 | 27,276 | 16\% |

Table 38: VaR statistics (IR and CS asset classes - only banks with general IR risk approval)
EU Statistics for VaR


Table 39: VaR statistics (EQ asset class - only banks with general and specific EQ risk approval)

EU Statistics for VaR


Table 40: VaR statistics (EQ asset class - only banks with general EQ risk approval)
EU Statistics for VaR

|  |  | Other stats |  |  |  |  |  | Percentiles |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Port. ID | Min | Max | Ave. | STDev | Coefficient of variation Variation (STDev/Mean) | Num obs. | 5th | 10th | 25th | 50th (Median) | 75th | 90th | 95th | Intercuantile <br> range |
|  | 1 | 2,104,118 | 2,811,041 | 2,408,790 | 288,315 | 12\% | 10 | 2,123,882 | 2,143,645 | 2,152,752 | 2,340,731 | 2,693,034 | 2,744,096 | 2,777,569 | $11 \%$ |
|  | 2 | 1,909,923 | 2,355,007 | 2,230,531 | 144,148 | 6\% |  | 1,993,479 | 2,077,035 | 2,197,769 | 2,312,119 | 2,321,696 | 2,337,241 | 2,346,124 | $3 \%$ |
|  | 3 | 10,670 | 26,890 | 16,660 | 5,303 | 32\% | ${ }^{8}$ | 11,416 | 12,161 | 12,823 | 15,616 | 19,428 | 21,667 | 24,278 | 20\% |
|  | 4 | 143 | 1,716 | 941 | 643 | 68\% |  | 242 | 342 | 581 | 766 | 1,495 | 1,716 | 1,716 | 44\% |
| Equity | ${ }^{5}$ | 727,947,916 | 948,265,719 | 835,858,991 | 91,466,039 | ${ }^{11 \%}$ |  | 728,122,048 | 728,296,181 | 748,511,981 | 886,780,497 | 895,497,422 | 921,834,895 | 935,050,307 | 9\% |
|  | 5 7 7 | 18,103 | 45,808 | 27,67 | 10,037 | 36\% | 9 4 | 18,279 5976 | 18,456 6,522 | 21,165 8,157 | 23,525 | 36,576 15479 | 40,202 | 43,005 15479 | $27 \%$ $31 \%$ |
|  | 8 | 44,948 | 15,479 113,825 | 11,364 83,203 | $\begin{array}{r}4,978 \\ \hline 27,366\end{array}$ | 44\% | 7 | 5,976 50,48 | 6,522 56,027 | 8,157 64,279 | 12,273 77,200 | 15,49 108,94 | 15,479 110,896 | 15,479 <br> 112,361 | 26\% |
|  | 9 | 36,574 | 79,588 | 56,395 | 12,527 | 22\% | 8 | 39,670 | 42,766 | 51,105 | 58,291 | 59,420 | 66,682 | 73,135 | 8\% |
|  | 10 | 158,743 | 290,245 | 259,469 | 45,812 | 18\% | 7 | 188,973 | 219,204 | 263,414 | 274,179 | 283,143 | 290,245 | 290,245 | 4\% |
| Equit Cumulative | 58 | 1,241,240 | 1,391,385 | 1,341,337 | 86,886 | 6\% | ${ }^{3}$ | 1,256,255 | 1,271,269 | 1,316,313 | 1,391,385 | 1,391,385 | 1,391,385 | 1,391,385 | -36 |

Table 41: Stress VaR statistics (2008-2009 stress period only)

EU Statistics for SVaR

|  |  | Other stats |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Percentiles |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{array}{\|c\|} \hline \text { Interquantile } \\ \text { range } \end{array}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Port. 10 | Min | Max | Ave. | SToev | Stov_trunc | $\begin{array}{\|c\|} \hline \text { MAD (median } \\ \text { absolute } \\ \text { deviation) } \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|c} \hline \begin{array}{c} \text { Coefficient of } \\ \text { (sariation } \\ \text { (STDev/Mean) } \end{array} \\ \hline \end{array}$ | Num obs: | 5th | 10th | 25th | 50th (Median) | 75th | 90th | 95th |  |
| Equily | $\stackrel{1}{2}$ | 5,678,137 | ${ }^{8,456,509}$ | $7,490,880$ | ${ }^{731,761}$ |  |  | 10\% | ${ }^{21}$ | ${ }^{6,678,100}$ | ${ }^{6,736,024}$ | 7 7,012,906 | $7,413,133$ | ${ }_{8,173,504}$ | ${ }^{8,442,716}$ | ${ }^{8,450,366}$ | ${ }^{8 \%}$ |
|  | 2 | 4,992,883 | 15,75,620 | 11,215,044 | 2,994,222 |  |  | 27\% |  | 6,659,151 | 7,801,996 | 9,139,771 | 11,641,776 | 13,617,070 | 14,578,602 | 15,224,667 | 20\% |
|  | 3 | 15,670 | 44,779 | 31,336 | 9,243 |  |  | 29\% | 19 | 17,385 | 18,475 | 25,366 | 31,959 | 38,359 | 43,782 | 44,147 | 20\% |
|  | ${ }_{5}^{4}$ | 209 | 2,624 | 891 | 652 |  |  | 73\% | 17 | 381 | 427 | 515 | 648 | ${ }^{23}$ | 1,893 | 2,125 | 23\% |
|  | ${ }_{5}^{4}$ | 1,860,241,962 | 3,288,699,322 | 2,718,992,047 | 404,445,424 |  |  | 15\% | ${ }^{18}$ | 2,200,099,5880 | 2,328,093,445 | 2,404,135,861 | 2,711,333,579 | 3,042,181,472 | 3,234,314,966 | 3,284,550,671 | ${ }^{12 \%}$ |
|  | ${ }_{7}^{6}$ | 26,704 18,786 | 94,924 112,863 | 56,689 49,831 | 17,777 28,366 |  |  | 31\% | 18 15 | 34,677 19,312 | 37,531 <br> 19,588 | 43,632 27.841 | 55,988 45,788 | 68,412 670.015 | 75,912 86,125 | 87,515 99385 | ${ }_{41 \%}^{22 \%}$ |
|  | 8 | ${ }_{62,244}$ | 120,68 206,30 | 49,831 | 28,7665 47,275 |  |  | 57\% | 18 | 19,312 7594 | 195,787 7878 | ${ }_{991,120}^{27,1}$ | 45,788 15,668 | -67,015 | 86,125 184,280 | 99,385 <br> 205,59 | 31\% |
|  | 9 | 51,570 | 188,135 | 124,962 | 33,503 |  |  | 27\% | 20 | 67,968 | 89,323 | 109,721 | 123,110 | 146,525 | 155,551 | 183,447 |  |
|  | 10 | 486,431 | 1,275,453 | 1.013,908 | 199,956 |  |  | 20\% | 18 | 573,857 | 799,291 | 967,935 | 1,043,676 | 1,127,522 | 1,196,303 | 1,218,829 | ${ }_{8 \%}$ |
| Interst Rote | ${ }_{12}$ | 102,131 | 295,110 | 216,824 | 47,568 |  |  | 22\% | 27 | 114,941 | 150,834 | 204,011 | 227,74 | 247,967 | 257,223 | 269,847 | 10\% |
|  | 12 | 18,112 | 154,369 | ${ }_{86,073}$ | 36,828 |  |  | 43\% | 26 | 23,254 | 39,702 | 69,490 | 86,982 | 105,290 | 135,460 | 151,21 | 20\% |
|  | 13 | 140,153 | 464,215 | 331,702 | ${ }^{80,617}$ |  |  | 24\% | 29 | 191,514 | 222,50 | 293,67 | 352,116 | 386,500 | 430,710 | 446,513 | 14\% |
|  | 14 | ${ }^{31,521}$ | 136,400 | 87,055 | 26,327 |  |  | 30\% | 29 | ${ }^{37,028}$ | 52,973 | 71,173 | 87,490 | 106,590 | 117,964 | 121,286 | 20\% |
|  | 15 | 23,551 | 149,760 | 71,346 | ${ }^{43,173}$ |  |  | 61\% | 11 | 25,226 | 26,901 | 30,721 | 60,680 | 100,270 | 115,337 | 132,549 | 53\% |
|  | 16 | 90,693 | 276,954 | 197,328 | 48,529 |  |  | 25\% | 26 | 112,613 | 144,584 | 158,235 | 202,817 | 220,091 | 256,725 | 272,259 |  |
|  | 17 | 204,54 | 569,977 | 366,817 | 102,327 |  |  | 28\% | 23 | 225,251 | 236,770 | 295,210 | 359,557 | 425,056 | 491,702 | 557,781 | 18\% |
|  | 18 | 179,619 | 496,968 | 318,176 | ${ }^{81,105}$ |  |  | 25\% | 23 | 206,680 | 212,607 | 261,309 | 325,219 | 375,267 | 402,787 | 440,226 | 18\% |
|  | 19 20 20 | 112,007 | ${ }^{450,642}$ | 320,080 | ${ }_{69,176}$ |  |  | ${ }^{22 \%}$ | 27 | 193,065 | 243,554 | 293,322 | 337,004 | 355,235 | 380,177 | 404,577 |  |
|  | 20 21 20 | 639 387,28 | ${ }_{857,951}^{47,25}$ | 15,162 673,37 | 9,455 102,276 |  |  | 62\% $15 \%$ | 22 22 | 2,844 546,635 | 3,571 565,687 | 10,791 644,284 | 14,728 681,107 | ${ }_{7}^{18,851}$ | 22,418 820,55 | 24,174 837,43 | $27 \%$ $5 \%$ |
|  | 22 | 32,078 | 231,111 | 164,852 | 59,849 |  |  | 36\% | 27 | 43,218 | 63,041 | 147,058 | 180,400 | 214,820 | 223,657 | 227,993 | 19\% |
|  | 23 | 199,708 | 394,565 | 300,799 | 57,175 |  |  | 19\% | 23 | 206,325 | 231,563 | 257,239 | 295,609 | 342,421 | 375,296 | 389,538 | 14\% |
|  | ${ }_{26} 2$ | 113,522 | 1,051,258 | 582,005 | 296,936 |  |  | 51\% | 16 | 204,677 | 246,492 | 370,837 | 545,910 | 849,777 | 977,171 | 1,040,330 | 39\% |
|  | 25 | 46,006 | 335,649 | 170,489 | 75,650 |  |  | 44\% | 25 | 58,994 | 73,388 | 125,010 | 166,124 | 208,031 | 273,420 | 293,586 |  |
|  | ${ }^{26}$ | 210,600 | 901,797 | 580,359 | 194,013 |  |  | 33\% | 23 | 233,928 | 257,361 | 507,731 | 604,857 | 711,106 | 767,510 | 854,489 | 17\% |
| ${ }_{\text {fx }}$ | ${ }^{27}$ | 771,218 | 1,993,455 | ${ }^{1,422,623}$ | 291,328 |  |  | 20\% | 26 | ${ }^{1,054,835}$ | 1,144,262 | 1,257,808 | 1,358,471 | 1,672,025 | ${ }^{1,775,240}$ | 1,922,016 | 14\% |
|  | ${ }^{28}$ | 10,544 | ${ }^{41,281}$ | 27,758 | 10,318 |  |  | 37\% | 24 | ${ }^{11,309}$ | 12,413 | 16,935 | 30,100 | 36,019 | ${ }^{39,176}$ | 39,92 | 36\% |
|  | 29 20 30 | ${ }^{219,958}$ | 531,072 | 399,383 | 81,439 |  |  | 20\% | 25 | 258,146 | 312,220 | 356,008 | 385,620 | 457,593 | 511,013 | 518,456 | 12\% |
|  | 30 31 31 | 688,770 820,87 | $1,362,190$ $1.455,293$ | 984,275 | 206,204 |  |  | 21\% | ${ }^{24}$ | ${ }^{685,775}$ | ${ }^{704,476}$ | 759,924 | 1,071,919 | 1,138,319 | 1,168,379 | 1,239,521 | 20\% |
|  | ${ }^{31}$ | 820,087 | 1,455,293 | 1,120,748 | 182,337 |  |  | 16\% | 25 | 862,081 | 902,166 | 971,943 | 1,166,365 | 1,277,546 | 1,342,177 | 1,374,642 | 14\% |
|  | 32 | 74,876 | 747,800 | 165,197 | 147,217 |  |  | 89\% | 20 | 89,743 | 96,283 | 114,317 | 127,814 | 146,349 | 175,976 | 364,354 | 12\% |
| Commodty | ${ }^{33}$ | ${ }^{10,563}$ | 44,302 | 26,555 | ${ }^{9,730}$ |  |  | ${ }^{37 \%}$ | ${ }^{13}$ | ${ }^{14,563}$ | ${ }^{17,490}$ | 19,042 | ${ }^{23,831}$ | ${ }^{34,408}$ | ${ }^{38,315}$ | 40,925 | 29\% |
|  | ${ }^{34}$ | 343,950 | 568,199 | 448,241 | 68,742 |  |  | 15\% | ${ }^{13}$ | 366,841 | 384,914 | 396,975 | 438,633 | 491,795 | 554,838 | 567,32 | 11\% |
|  | ${ }^{35}$ | 762,601 | 1,287,124 | 1,080,308 | 155,713 |  |  | 14\% | 14 | 839,959 | 886,539 | 1,025,422 | 1,070,781 | 1,199,556 | 1,267,488 | 1,277,342 | ${ }^{8}$ |
| credit spread | ${ }^{36}$ | 7,618 | 58,664 | 23,538 | 11,663 |  |  | 50\% | 15 | 12,216 | 14,704 | 18,162 | 20,977 | 24,861 | 32,663 | ${ }^{41,878}$ | 16\% |
|  | ${ }^{37}$ | ${ }^{36,321}$ | ${ }^{181,375}$ | 80,983 <br> 15784 | ${ }^{46,827}$ |  |  | 58\% | ${ }^{13}$ | 36,609 | 37,739 | 50,275 | ${ }^{80,40}$ | 87,998 | ${ }^{155,544}$ | ${ }^{176,081}$ | 27\% |
|  | ${ }^{38}$ | ${ }^{6,426}$ | ${ }^{22,833}$ | 15.784 | 5,784 |  |  | $37 \%$ | ${ }^{13}$ | 7.000 | 7,531 | 9,703 | 18,437 | 19,693 | 20,685 | 21,552 | 34\% |
|  | ${ }^{39}$ | 13,991 | 78,963 | 39,790 | 19,317 |  |  | 49\% | ${ }^{14}$ | 18,814 | 22,682 | 26,658 | 36,034 | 44,742 | 70,738 | 78,124 | 25\% |
|  | 40 | ${ }^{9,215}$ | 38,000 | 20,377 | 10,054 |  |  | 49\% | 11 | ${ }^{9,687}$ | 10,158 | 12,473 | 18,991 | 28,241 | 32,444 | 35,222 | 39\% |
|  | ${ }^{42}$ | ${ }^{11,218}$ | 52,137 | 33,793 | 14,798 |  |  | 44\% | ${ }^{14}$ | 11,455 | 12,941 | 18,806 | 39,835 | 43,722 | 48,676 | 51,015 | 40\% |
|  | ${ }^{42}$ | 30,960 | 115,078 | 73,044 | 32,942 |  |  | 45\% | 11 | 35,632 | 40,304 | 44,011 | 59,511 | 105,776 | 109,460 | 112,269 | $41 \%$ |
|  | ${ }^{43}$ | 24,990 | 107,130 | 67,600 | 25,460 |  |  | 38\% | 15 | 33,265 | 37,284 | 51,614 | 66,475 | 86,149 | 101,926 | 106,017 | 25\% |
|  | ${ }_{4}^{44}$ | ${ }^{12,000}$ | ${ }^{41,719}$ | ${ }^{25,493}$ | 10,623 |  |  | ${ }^{42 \%}$ | 13 | 12,458 | 13,158 | ${ }^{17,428}$ | 24,872 | 34,093 | 39,140 | 40,249 | ${ }^{32 \%}$ |
|  | ${ }_{4}^{45}$ | 12,306 9,994 | 38,328 37,861 | 24,247 19,823 | 8,823 7,583 |  |  | $36 \%$ $38 \%$ | 13 13 | 12,478 10,677 | 12,857 12,496 | 16,327 16,757 | 26,608 17,781 | 30,635 20,381 | 34,347 29,846 | 36,056 34,014 | $30 \%$ $10 \%$ |
|  | ${ }_{47}$ | 5,859 | 18,485 | 9,292 | 3,418 |  |  | 37\% | 12 | 6,442 | 6,921 | 7,466 | 8,444 | 9,308 | 12,675 | 15,477 | 11\% |
|  | ${ }^{48}$ | 12,764 | 54,105 | 34,022 | 13,629 |  |  | 40\% | 14 | 12,858 | 15,926 | 24,207 | 34,074 | 43,383 | 51,993 | 52,760 | 28\% |
|  | ${ }^{49}$ | ${ }_{6,394}$ | 24,485 | 13,315 | 5,900 |  |  | 44\% | 15 | 7,538 | 8,137 | 8,371 | 12,049 | 15,674 | 22,816 | 23,677 | 30\% |
|  | 50 | 15,668 | 36,874 | 27,336 | 5,667 |  |  | 21\% | 15 | 16,750 | 19,606 | 24,608 | 28,535 | 30,468 | 32,559 | 33,558 | 11\% |
|  | 51 | 87,563 | 391,206 | 211,635 | 82,624 |  |  | 39\% | 10 | 111,593 | 135,623 | 168,461 | 201,59 | 250,328 | 269,541 | 330,374 | 20\% |
|  | 52 | 102,860 | 824,581 | 497843 | 216,366 |  |  | 43\% | 13 | 189,718 | 258,751 | 384,019 | 477,977 | 629,238 | 769,046 | 797,74 | 24\% |
|  | 53 | 162,544 | 750,312 | 546,478 | 181,207 |  |  | 33\% | 12 | 289,180 | 394,429 | 464,790 | 504,868 | 712,501 | 747,648 | 749,232 | 21\% |
| CTP | 54 | 1,924 | 17,752 | ${ }^{9,838}$ | 11,192 |  |  | 114\% |  | 2,715 | ${ }^{3,507}$ | 5,881 | 9,838 | 13,795 | 16,169 | 16,961 | 40\% |
|  | ${ }_{5}^{55}$ | 44,280 | 44,280 | 44,280 | \#olv/0! |  |  | \#olvo! |  | 44,280 | 44,280 | 44,280 | 44,280 | 44,280 | 44,280 | 44,280 | \%\% |
|  | $\frac{56}{57}$ | 753,735 | ${ }^{753,735}$ | ${ }^{753,735}$ | \#0170! |  |  | \#olvo! |  | 753,775 | 753,735 | 753,735 | 753,735 | 753,735 | 735,735 | 753,735 | ${ }^{0 \%}$ |
|  | 58 | $5,088,498$ $4,619,215$ | $7,790,838$ $6,271,099$ | ¢ $\begin{aligned} & \text { 6,543,155 } \\ & 5,630,07\end{aligned}$ | 895,236 460,54 |  |  | $\begin{array}{r}14 \% \\ 8 \% \\ \hline 8\end{array}$ | 12 | 5,167,579 $4.888,505$ | $5,247,750$ $4,993,059$ | 5,886,392 $5,455,932$ | 6,767,497 $5,793,906$ | $7,112,065$ $5,902,425$ | $7,361,908$ $6,095,502$ | $7,558,791$ $6,210,684$ | -9\% |
| R cumulaive | 59 | 291,685 | 809,653 | 530,411 | 143,158 |  |  | 27\% | 21 | 302,348 | 318,971 | 421,746 | 548,184 | 62,493 | 696,325 | 733,890 | 19\% |
| ex cumulative | 60 | 1,788,964 | 3,079,300 | 2,559,677 | 352,441 |  |  | 14\% | 22 | 2,020,566 | 2,067,086 | 2,327,393 | 2,588,491 | 2,884,104 | 2,952,902 | 3,028,891 | 10\% |
| modity cumulative | ${ }_{61}^{61}$ | 344,32 | 575,046 | 442,058 | 68,331 |  |  | 15\% | 13 | 371,049 | 389,461 | 394,089 | 415,794 | 465,177 | 548,910 | 566,594 | $8 \%$ |
| cs cumulative | 62 | 24,990 | 101,072 | 65,505 | 22,733 |  |  |  | ${ }^{13}$ | 32,229 | 38,681 | 52,025 | 65,592 | 72,935 | ${ }^{94,807}$ | 97,684 | 17\% |
| CTP Cumulave | ${ }^{63}$ | 1,059,709 | 1,059,709 | 1,059,709 | \#olv/0! |  |  | \#oiv/0! |  | 1,059,709 | 1,059,709 | 1,059,709 | 1,059,709 | 1,059,709 | 1,059,709 | 1,059,709 | $0 \%$ |

Table 42: PV statistics

## EU Statistics for PV

|  |  |  |  |  | Main sta | tistics |  |  |  |  | Percentiles |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Port. ID | Min | Max | Ave | STDev | STDev_trunc ${ }^{1}$ | MAD (median absolute deviation) | Coefficient of variation (STDev/Ave) | Num obs. ${ }^{3}$ | 25th | 50th (Median) | 75th | Interquanti le range |
| Equity | 1 | 34,719,924 | 38,119,714 | 36,548,211 | 540,554 | 11,162,286 | 8,700 | $2 \%$ | 31 | 36,431,000 | 36,431,486 | 36,463,416 | 0\% |
|  | 2 | -31,804,002 | -28,605,845 | -30,246,360 | 603,531 | 9,743,864 | 62,905 | 2\% | 29 | -30,133,278 | -30,076,236 | -30,021,066 | 0\% |
|  | 3 | -40,144 | -35,432 | -38,097 | 965 | 1,501 | 305 | 3\% | 29 | -38,550 | -38,231 | -37,988 | 1\% |
|  | 4 | 3,154 | 3,909 | 3,450 | 220 | 253 | 133 | 6\% | 29 | 3,267 | 3,410 | 3,598 | 5\% |
|  | 5 | -11,938,244,471 | -11,630,403,454 | $-11,693,972,380$ | 62,497,781 | 3,607,325,715 | 18,349,013 | 1\% | 29 | -11,697,799,988 | -11,677,500,000 | $-11,662,359,679$ | 0\% |
|  | ${ }^{6}$ | -55,120 | -39,554 | -47,975 | 3,204 | 11,702 | 1,855 | 7\% | 28 | -49,850 | $-48,534$ | -46,073 | 4\% |
|  | 7 | 1,046,305 | 1,082,159 | 1,067,872 | 9,292 | 11,631 | 7,006 | 1\% | 25 | 1,061,069 | 1,068,429 | 1,075,054 | 1\% |
|  | 8 | 136,037 | 184,671 | 158,418 | 10,784 | 14,591 | 5,110 | 7\% | 29 | 153,905 | 156,839 | 163,108 | 3\% |
|  | 9 | 688,578 | 710,763 | 699,203 | 4,439 | 9,161 | 1,154 | 1\% | 32 | 698,391 | 699,838 | 700,600 | 0\% |
|  | 10 | -2,505,172 | -22,152 | -1,904,269 | 683,247 | 3,774,962 | 18,207 | 36\% | 31 | -2,171,191 | -2,164,120 | $-2,133,141$ | $1 \%$ |
| interest Rate | 11 | -79,822 | -70,270 | -75,421 | 2,227 | 2,772 | 1,473 | 3\% | 42 | -76,586 | -74,934 | -73,892 | $2 \%$ |
|  | 12 | -39,632 | -36,040 | -37,502 | 979 | 1,868 | 744 | $3 \%$ | 40 | -38,148 | -37,470 | -36,592 | 2\% |
|  | 13 | 62,662 | 93,112 | 77,915 | 7,361 | 9,552 | 4,729 | 9\% | 43 | 73,186 | 77,710 | 82,660 | 6\% |
|  | 14 | 34,503 | 44,546 | 40,736 | 1,981 | 3,548 | 590 | 5\% | 42 | 40,400 | 41,342 | 41,854 | 2\% |
|  | 15 | 1,044,194 | 1,140,937 | 1,091,637 | 31,797 | 37,100 | 27,951 | 3\% | 18 | 1,064,734 | 1,097,302 | 1,118,071 | 2\% |
|  | 16 | 5,127,090 | 5,180,221 | 5,162,431 | 7,201 | 34,598 | 1,353 | 0\% | 39 | 5,160,907 | 5,161,821 | 5,164,170 | 0\% |
|  | 17 | 10,618,800 | 10,931,508 | 10,816,447 | 104,003 | 137,128 | 4,336 | 1\% | 35 | 10,746,065 | 10,875,126 | 10,879,521 | $1 \%$ |
|  | 18 | 2,082,940 | 2,392,705 | 2,266,664 | 106,204 | 135,407 | 3,826 | 5\% | 35 | 2,181,498 | 2,336,986 | 2,340,570 | 4\% |
|  | 19 | 42,784 | 59,918 | 51,295 | 4,476 | 4,855 | 3,298 | 9\% | 43 | 48,089 | 51,000 | 54,755 | 6\% |
|  | 20 | -19,659 | -7,899 | -14,194 | 2,130 | 4,837 | 475 | 15\% | 39 | -14,508 | -13,965 | -13,477 | 4\% |
|  | 21 | 174,715 | 199,355 | 186,644 | 5,713 | 6,716 | 2,841 | 3\% | 42 | 183,501 | 185,933 | 190,282 | 2\% |
|  | 22 | -115,922 | -110,308 | -113,000 | 1,876 | 2,725 | 1,718 | 2\% | 38 | -114,819 | -112,579 | -111,232 | 2\% |
|  | 23 24 24 | 7,293,445 | 7,563,054 | 7,428,106 | 37,424 | 135,243 | 1,895 | 1\% | 42 | 7,428,514 | 7,431,579 | 7,432,807 | 0\% |
|  | 24 | 257,895 | 740,614 | 459,117 | 111,852 | 179,072 | 77,617 | 24\% | 30 | 382,230 | 434,454 | 530,285 | 16\% |
|  | 25 | -10,307,217 | -10,275,195 | -10,293,894 | 7,960 | 19,942 | 4,279 | 0\% | 38 | -10,298,401 | -10,294,205 | -10,290,401 | 0\% |
|  | 26 | 19,821,327 | 20,162,804 | 20,021,915 | 108,381 | 142,443 | 5,173 | 1\% | 35 | 19,911,090 | 20,083,909 | 20,087,777 | 0\% |
| FX | 27 | 484,617 | 565,494 | 526,570 | 15,825 | 33,848 | 4,473 | 3\% | 35 | 520,913 | 528,610 | 530,832 | $1 \%$ |
|  | 28 | 828,950 | 919,590 | 910,139 | 16,101 | 314,907 | 1,454 | 2\% | 32 | 911,740 | 912,972 | 915,083 | 0\% |
|  | 29 | 895,858 | 908,300 | 903,261 | 3,036 | 4,432 | 1,736 | 0\% | 34 | 901,853 | 902,951 | 905,434 | 0\% |
|  | 30 | 859,969 | 882,464 | 871,535 | 6,196 | 8,701 | 4,087 | 1\% | 34 | 865,999 | 872,648 | 876,210 | 1\% |
|  | 31 | -956,649 | -929,633 | -943,017 | 6,504 | 8,214 | 3,958 | 1\% | 33 | $-947,826$ | -942,466 | -940,506 | 0\% |
|  | 32 | -27,228 | 152,065 | 55,845 | 42,638 | 52,081 | 15,150 | 76\% | 33 | 43,922 | 52,134 | 66,206 | 20\% |
| Commodity | 33 | $-7,093$ | 4,242 | -1,472 | 3,014 | 3,014 | 1,254 | 205\% | 17 | -2,503 | $-1,256$ | 7 | 100\% |
|  | 34 | 32,736 | 50,885 | 41,789 | 5,746 | 6,421 | 1,120 | 14\% | 14 | 35,725 | 44,609 | 45,027 | 12\% |
|  | 35 | 110,184 | 152,022 | 131,692 | 10,268 | 22,140 | 5,340 | 8\% | 14 | 126,296 | 134,236 | 136,197 | $4 \%$ |
| Credit Spread | ${ }^{36}$ | 3,170 | 5,739 | 4,469 | 625 | 812 | 237 | 14\% | 23 | 4,384 | 4,520 | 4,756 | $4 \%$ |
|  | 37 | -13,299 | -10,215 | -11,055 | 861 | 1,383 | 184 | 8\% | 20 | -11,231 | $-10,748$ | -10,541 | 3\% |
|  | 38 | 9,518 | 12,960 | 10,031 | 692 | 2,164 | 61 | 7\% | 21 | 9,848 | 9,912 | 9,943 | \%\% |
|  | 39 | 18,338 | 20,303 | 19,494 | 479 | 674 | 245 | 3\% | 21 | 19,326 | 19,634 | 19,739 | 1\% |
|  | 40 | 3,329 | 4,931 | 3,965 | 329 | 1,634 | 43 | 8\% | 21 | 3,851 | 3,918 | 3,944 | 1\% |
|  | 41 | 45,110 | 46,554 | 46,137 | 416 | 644 | 224 | 1\% | 23 | 45,877 | 46,148 | 46,482 | 1\% |
|  | 42 | 1,125,587 | 1,144,079 | 1,135,732 | 3,554 | 7,751 | 1,513 | 0\% | 21 | 1,134,388 | 1,135,000 | 1,137,610 | \% |
|  | 43 | 3,134,295 | 3,153,203 | 3,147,865 | 4,837 | 11,949 | 1,347 | 0\% | 21 | 3,145,384 | 3,149,772 | 3,150,762 | \%\% |
|  | 44 | 22,517 | 24,958 | 23,878 | 513 | 765 | 245 | 2\% | 25 | 23,721 | 23,969 | 24,080 | 1\% |
|  | 45 | 991,443 | 1,003,654 | 998,937 | 3,543 | 7,889 | 1,822 | 0\% | 21 | 996,625 | 999,828 | 1,001,389 | 0\% |
|  | 46 | 1,032,993 | 1,053,331 | 1,048,702 | 6,291 | 10,231 | 610 | 1\% | 25 | 1,048,862 | 1,051,841 | 1,052,145 | 0\% |
|  | 47 | 33,814 | 35,407 | 34,685 | 317 | 466 | 166 | 1\% | 23 | 34,471 | 34,656 | 34,832 | 1\% |
|  | 48 | 6,616 | 11,789 | 10,063 | 1,179 | 2,923 | 618 | 12\% | 25 | 9,718 | 10,596 | 10,806 | 5\% |
|  | 49 | -10,767 | -9,388 | -10,249 | 387 | 2,503 | 120 | 4\% | 23 | -10,480 | -10,430 | -10,106 | 2\% |
|  | 50 | 1,156,942 | 1,193,570 | 1,189,074 | 8,343 | 32,376 | 464 | 1\% | 25 | 1,190,921 | 1,192,143 | 1,192,529 | 0\% |
|  | 51 | 5,224,968 | 5,350,906 | 5,311,266 | 30,060 | 51,142 | 6,033 | 1\% | 22 | 5,308,539 | 5,317,156 | 5,323,175 | 0\% |
|  | 52 | 5,363,404 | 5,669,826 | 5,465,398 | 83,015 | 140,799 | 62,873 | 2\% | 21 | 5,406,716 | 5,429,206 | 5,516,325 | 1\% |
|  | 53 | 10,620,829 | 11,011,008 | 10,781,184 | 97,857 | 179,424 | 61,392 | 1\% | 20 | 10,708,803 | 10,753,799 | 10,838,600 | 1\% |
| Correlation Troding | 54 58 | 149,715 | 173,734 | 163,997 | 10,280 | 19,966 | 4,728 | 6\% |  | 156,997 | 164,279 | 170,997 | $4 \%$ |
|  | 55 | 71,898 | 111,330 | 88,055 | 20,657 | 20,657 | 9,038 | 24\% | 3 | 71,898 | 80,936 | 111,330 | 22\% |
|  | 56 | 16,207,952 | 16,306,076 | 16,241,816 | 55,678 | 55,678 | 3,468 | 0\% | 3 | 16,207,952 | 16,211,420 | 16,306,076 | 0\% |
| ALL-IN no-CTP *** | 57 | 9,706,138 | 15,308,988 | 14,432,075 | 1,365,854 | 10,877,643 | 249,708 | 10\% | 16 | 14,168,843 | 14,814,243 | 15,132,655 | $3 \%$ |
| Equity Cumulative ** | 58 | 6,994,553 | 9,125,875 | 8,036,083 | 353,783 | 1,931,959 | 43,742 | 4\% | 22 | 8,041,560 | 8,048,098 | $8,122,353$ | 0\% |
| 1 R Cumulative *** | 59 | 1,657,719 | 2,462,921 | 2,292,959 | 176,375 | 393,597 | 19,294 | 8\% | 35 | 2,168,195 | 2,406,953 | 2,414,556 | 5\% |
| FX Cumulative ** | 60 | 531,753 | 1,718,544 | 1,303,572 | 354,638 | 501,441 | 57,015 | 27\% | 30 | 1,364,215 | 1,402,545 | 1,478,206 | 4\% |
| Commodity Cumulative "* | 61 | 23,789 | 44,783 | 38,779 | 6,491 | 17,047 | 4,361 | 17\% | 13 | 35,953 | 39,097 | 44,103 | 10\% |
| CS Cumulative ** | 62 | 3,175,638 | 3,209,840 | 3,203,071 | 8,094 | 15,935 | 1,584 | 0\% | 18 | 3,198,929 | 3,206,175 | 3,207,347 | 0\% |
| CTP Cumulative -* | 63 | 14,813,890 | 14,875,601 | 14,847,183 | 31,143 | 31,143 | 23,543 | 0\% | , | 14,813,890 | 14,852,058 | 14,875,601 | 0\% |

${ }_{2}^{1}$ STDev trunc is the standard deviation computed excluding values below the 5 th and above the 95th percentile
Refers the number of banks included in the computation of the statistics
(
the computation of the benchmarks for that particular aggregate portfolio.

Table 43: IRC - modelling choice: source of LGD - market convention

EU Statistics for IRC


Table 44: IRC - modelling choice: source of LGD - non-market convention

EU Statistics for IRC


Table 45: IRC - modelling choice: source of LGD - 1-2 modelling factors

EU Statistics for IRC

|  |  | Other stats |  |  |  |  |  | Percenties |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { Interquantile } \\ \text { range } \end{gathered}$ |  | Extreme Values range (full Sample) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Port. ID | Min | Max | ave. | sto | $\begin{array}{\|c\|} \hline \text { Coefficient of } \\ \text { variation } \\ \text { (STDev/Mean) } \end{array}$ | Num obs. | 5th | 10th | 25 th | soth (Median) | 75th | goth | 95th |  | stoev_tunc' | -2:stoev_tunc | +2:stevy trune |
| Equity |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| intest fate | $\begin{aligned} & 11 \\ & \hline 12 \\ & 13 \\ & 13 \\ & 14 \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & 15 \\ & 16 \\ & 17 \\ & 17 \\ & 18 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 73,418 \\ 0 \\ 120,037 \\ 1,905,673 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 344,836 \\ 951,181 \\ 4,071,968 \\ 5,445,837 \end{array}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 105,238 \\ 25,1,801 \\ { }_{2}^{1,23,30,076} \\ 1,392,036 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 478 \\ 108 \\ 528 \\ 528 \\ 18 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 6 \\ & 15 \\ & 15 \\ & 15 \end{aligned}$ |  |  | $\begin{array}{r} 165,889 \\ 121,477 \\ 1,394,271 \\ 2,607,884 \end{array}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 307,887 \\ & \text { 228,314 } \\ & \text { 2, } 2,76,146 \\ & 4,46,0,055 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 340,428 \\ 554, \\ 3,595 \\ 3,89632 \\ 5,268,280 \end{array}$ |  |  | $\begin{array}{r} 92,915 \\ 410,04 \\ 1,169,924 \\ 1,612,903 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 30,451 \\ -5045154 \\ -30,56 \\ 339,514 \\ 23,814 \end{array}$ |  |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & 19 \\ & 20 \\ & 21 \\ & 22 \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & 23 \\ & 23 \\ & 24 \\ & 25 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0 \\ 64,540 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 2,4,4,740 \\ & 5,43,420 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 653,358 \\ 2,806,386 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 626,990 \\ 1,609897 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 96 \% \\ & 578 \end{aligned}$ | ${ }_{15}^{16}$ | $\begin{gathered} 98,638 \\ 616,168 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 131,517 \\ & 950,816 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 301,558 \\ 1,700,143 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 468,936 \\ 2,458,451 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 760,421 \\ 4,278,607 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1,317,832 \\ & 4,861,400 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1,632,45 \\ & 5,173,012 \\ & 5 \end{aligned}$ | $\left.\begin{aligned} & 438 \\ & 438 \end{aligned} \right\rvert\,$ | $1,106,207$ $1,699,777$ | $\begin{gathered} 1,655,109 \\ -217,763 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 2,74,717 \\ & 6,381,225 \end{aligned}$ |
|  | ${ }_{26}^{26}$ | 1,A18,315 | 5,736,849 | 3,85,486 | 1,435,884 | 39\% | 15 | 1,47,557 | 1,664,402 | 3,031,871 | 3,675,535 | 4,884,993 | 5.642,A60 | 5,700,371 | 218 | 1,93, 605 | -191,676 | 7,542,745 |
| ${ }_{\text {Ex }}$ | 27 28 28 29 30 31 32 32 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Commastiy | $\begin{array}{r} 33 \\ 34 \\ 34 \\ \hline \end{array}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Credit spread | 36 <br> 36 <br> 37 <br> 38 <br> 39 <br> 40 <br> 41 <br> 42 <br> 43 <br> 48 <br> 45 <br> 46 <br> 46 <br> 47 <br> 48 <br> 18 <br> 50 <br> 51 <br> 52 <br> 53 <br> 58 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $50 \%$ $21 \%$ $32 \%$ $39 \%$ $19 \%$ $13 \%$ $9 \%$ $23 \%$ $27 \%$ $65 \%$ $91 \%$ $54 \%$ $75 \%$ $39 \%$ $80 \%$ $80 \%$ $50 \%$ |  |  |  |
| CTP | $\begin{aligned} & \mathbf{5 4} \\ & 55 \\ & 56 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 1,560,606 | 5,46,901 | 3,75, 280 | 1,513,120 | 40\% |  | 1,722,102 | 1,883,599 | 2,766,686 | 3,990,778 | 5.26,190 | 5,374,715 | 5,419,308 | $31 \times$ | 1,994,064 | -297,30 | 7,678,977 |
|  |  | 398,73 |  | 681,572 | 171,200 | 25\% | ${ }^{11}$ | 451,152 | 503,56 | 576,359 | 655,298 | 820,211 | 911,487 | 918,29 | 17\% | 402,216 | 68,997 | 540,2 |

Table 46: IRC - modelling choice: source of LGD - >2 modelling factors
EU Statistics for IRC


Figure 24: Additional P\&L charts with examples of low IQD

Portfolio 19: 3 months daily P\&L
(orange: daily median)


Portfolio 27: 3 months daily P\&L
(orange: daily median)


Portfolio 34: 3 months daily P\&L
(orange: daily median)


Portfolio 46: 3 months daily P\&L
(orange: daily median)


Figure 25: Additional P\&L charts with examples of high IQD

Portfolio 24: 3 months daily P\&L
(orange: daily median)


Portfolio 29: 3 months daily P\&L
(orange: daily median)


Portfolio 33: 3 months daily P\&L
(orange: daily median)


Portfolio 52: 3 months daily P\&L
(orange: daily median)


Figure 26: Comparison between IMV and truncated STD deviation method to select outlier for risk measures


Figure 26. Example of dispersion in VaR submission for Portfolio 1. Above the chart, marked in yellow: the portfolios which would have been excluded based on the IMV methodology outlier, which was used in 2019 (and before) to detect outliers among risk measures. Below the chart: the same submission, but marked in yellow, indicating the submissions that have been excluded in VaR and benchmarking statistics in the 2020 exercise based on the +/- two times truncated standard deviation of the sample.



[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ IQD is defined as the absolute value of the ratio of the interquartile range ( $Q 3-Q 1$ ) divided by the sum of the quartiles ( $\mathrm{Q} 3+\mathrm{Q} 1$ ). The higher the IQD is, the higher the dispersion in the data.
    ${ }^{2} \mathrm{CV}$ is computed as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean.

[^1]:    ${ }^{3}$ These values are derived as a simple average of the IQD across all non-correlation trading portfolios.

[^2]:    ${ }^{4}$ https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019L0878\&from=EN

[^3]:    ${ }^{7}$ The range means the interval between the first and third quartiles. These quartiles were considered and subsequently updated when resubmissions were received.
    ${ }^{8}$ Some banks reported values for aggregated portfolios, taking into account only those components for which they had permission to use an internal model. This is clearly not a data quality issue and it is correct that banks report results only where they have permission to do so for regulatory purposes.
    ${ }^{9}$ Annex 5, Market risk 2020 BM, Section 1 (Common instructions), letter (ee).

[^4]:    ${ }^{10}$ The truncated standard deviation is computed by excluding the values below the 5th and above the 95th percentile of the data series.

[^5]:    ${ }^{11}$ The standard deviation was considered in order to gain a sense of the entire variability and a harmonised approach across the HPE. Obviously, a truncated standard deviation may appear more consistent for some highly dispersed trades.

[^6]:    ${ }^{13}$ It should be noted that this expectation depends on the lookback period for VaR.

[^7]:    ${ }^{14}$ Some banks apply data weightings at a risk factor level and these will be present in the P\&L vectors. This is an implicit source of variability that cannot be controlled.

[^8]:    ${ }^{15}$ The portfolio median is the median of the average VaR and sVaR over the submission period.
    ${ }^{16}$ Note that the figures are restricted to VaR-median and sVaR-median ratios below 450\%.

[^9]:    ${ }^{17}$ The minimum among the single asset class portfolios (1-21) between the 25 th and 75 th percentiles is 0.96 ; see

[^10]:    1825 banks adopted 1-day returns, while 13 banks adopted 10-day returns.
    1916 banks adopted 1-year, while 22 banks adopted > 1 year.
    ${ }^{20} 10$ banks adopted 1-day, unweighted \& 1-year, while 13 banks adopted 1-day, unweighted \& >1 year.

[^11]:    ${ }^{21}$ The size of the trading book was defined as: (assets held for trading + liabilities held for trading) / (total assets * 2 ). Data source: FINREP data)
    ${ }^{22}$ https://eba.europa.eu/-/eba-reports-on-the-monitoring-of-the-Icr-implementation-in-the-eu

[^12]:    ${ }^{23}$ (Level 3 assets held for trading + level 3 liabilities held for trading) / (assets held for trading+ liabilities held for trading)

[^13]:    ${ }^{2}$ STDDe trunc is the standard deviation computed excluding values below the
    ${ }^{2}$ Refers to the number of banks included in the computation of the statistics

