Consultation Paper

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1. Responding to this consultation

The EBA invites comments on all proposals put forward in this paper and in particular on the specific questions included in section 3 of the consultation paper and listed in section 5.2.

Comments are most helpful if they:

- respond to the question stated;
- indicate the specific point to which a comment relates;
- contain a clear rationale;
- provide evidence to support the views expressed/ rationale proposed; and
- describe any alternative regulatory choices the EBA should consider.

Submission of responses

To submit your comments, click on the ‘send your comments’ button on the consultation page by the 11th of June 2021. Please note that comments submitted after this deadline, or submitted via other means may not be processed.

Publication of responses

Please clearly indicate in the consultation form if you wish your comments to be disclosed or to be treated as confidential. A confidential response may be requested from us in accordance with the EBA’s rules on public access to documents. We may consult you if we receive such a request. Any decision we make not to disclose the response is reviewable by the EBA’s Board of Appeal and the European Ombudsman.

Data protection

The protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the EBA is based on Regulation (EU) 1725/2018 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018. Further information on data protection can be found under the Legal notice section of the EBA website.
2. Executive Summary

Directive 2014/49/EU on deposit guarantee schemes (DGSD) introduced a number of innovations to improve preparedness and resilience of deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) in Europe, including the requirement for DGSs to perform stress tests of their systems every three years. A sufficient level of quality and consistency is necessary for DGS stress tests to be credible assessment tools. This is why, in 2016 the EBA issued own-initiative guidelines containing methodological principles for the conduct of DGS stress tests, the minimum requirements and areas to be tested.

Based on the results of the DGS stress tests conducted by the EU DGSs, in June 2020, the EBA issued the first peer review of DGSs’ stress tests and their resilience. This peer review provided early indications of the need to improve the robustness of the DGS stress testing framework and comparability of the outcomes reported by the DGSs. Amending the current guidelines is necessary to ensure all DGSs are well-prepared to perform each of their legally mandated function, so that depositors are sufficiently protected in all cases. It is also necessary to ensure the stress testing framework is more harmonised so that the EBA can fulfil its mandate of conducting robust peer reviews.

Based on the areas for improvement identified in the context of the peer review, the EBA is proposing a revision of said guidelines, which would repeal and replace the existing ones. The revised guidelines would further specify the requirements in relation to the design, the execution and the reporting of the results of the DGS stress tests. The amendments proposed in the revised guidelines are aiming inter alia to:

- Require DGSs to stress test their ability to perform all of the interventions they are legally mandated to perform, including reimbursing depositors, contributing to resolution, and, depending on national law provisions, to failure prevention and to insolvency proceedings. The current guidelines only require stress testing DGSs’ ability to reimburse depositors.

- Require DGSs to stress test their ability to have access in due time to all of their funding sources, including extraordinary ex post contributions and alternative funding arrangements, such as a credit line. The ability to raise these resources should be tested irrespective of the amount of available ex ante funds collected by the DGSs.

- Strengthen the cooperation between DGSs and different authorities by requiring to stress test interventions where cooperation with other authorities is necessary. The proposed revised guidelines specify how to assess the arrangements in place between DGSs and public authorities for obtaining information on problems detected at a credit institution that could give rise to DGS intervention. They also require DGSs to share the results of the DGS stress tests upon other authorities’ request.
Encourage DGSs to choose stress testing scenarios with additional business continuity challenges or external circumstances that create extra stress for the DGSs to perform their functions, such as a pandemic, ICT failures, or other such events.

Provide a more comprehensive, clear and harmonized template for recording and submitting the results of the stress tests to the EBA. Furthermore, the revised template puts more emphasis on reporting areas for improvement identified by a DGSs in the course of the execution of the stress tests. The deadline for the DGSs to submit their next reporting template is set on 16 June 2024.

Next steps

The public consultation will be closed the 11th of June 2021. Then, the guidelines will be subject to EBA final adoption.

The guidelines will be translated into the official EU languages and published on the EBA website. The deadline for competent authorities to report whether they comply with the guidelines will be two months after the publication of the translations. The guidelines will apply from [the day of the publication].
3. Background and rationale

3.1 Background

1. Article 4(10) of the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (DGSD, 2014/49/EU) provides that Member States shall ensure that DGSs perform stress tests of their systems and that the DGSs are informed as soon as possible in the event that the competent authorities detect problems in a credit institution that are likely to give rise to the intervention of a DGS. The DGSD requires that such tests shall take place at least every three years and more frequently where appropriate. The EBA, in turn, has to conduct, at least every five years, a peer review based on the results of the stress tests, pursuant to a mandate conferred on the EBA in Article 30 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (‘EBA Regulation’), in order to examine the resilience of DGSs.

2. To that end, the EBA issued in 2016 own-initiative guidelines on stress tests of DGSs (EBA/GL/2016/04, hereafter “Guidelines”), which specify the methodological principles that DGSs should apply to assess whether the operational and funding capabilities of DGSs are sufficient to ensure deposit protection in the event of a bank failure. The Guidelines specify that DGSs should perform four ‘priority tests’ and report the results of those tests to the EBA by 3 July 2019.

3. The main aim of the Guidelines was, and still is, to ensure consistency and good quality of DGS stress tests and, thus, to facilitate the comparability of the tests in the context of the peer reviews performed by the EBA. At the same time, the Guidelines provide a sufficient level of flexibility and proportionality, to enable DGSs to adapt the DGSs stress test exercises to their national specificities.

4. In compliance with the Guidelines, the EBA received in July 2019 reports on DGS stress tests from 32 DGSs from 27 EU Member States. In line with the DGSD, on 17 June 2020, the EBA applied those Guidelines to perform, and publish a report on, the first peer review of DGS stress tests and the resilience of national DGSs (hereafter “2020 peer review report”).

5. Based on the number of tests that DGSs have performed, the EBA concluded that such tests have become an established tool for preparing for DGS interventions. Most DGSs have identified areas for improvement on the basis of the tests, but the shortcomings are isolated and/or can easily be addressed by the DGSs at the point of failure, and are unlikely to affect the ability of DGSs to perform their tasks in line with the DGSD.

6. However, the EBA also concluded that the divergence in the type of exercises performed and in the way outcomes were reported, made it difficult to compare the tests between DGSs with the desired consistency. The EBA therefore provided early indications in the report of 45 areas in which the DGS stress testing framework could be improved to enhance the comparability for
future peer reviews and thus to strengthen the framework. Following the publication of the 2020 peer review report, the EBA therefore decided to write out revised guidelines. The early indications included in the 2020 peer review report served as the basis for the amendments to the Guidelines. The original guidelines will be repealed and replaced with the revised guidelines that are being proposed in this consultation paper.

7. More specifically, DGS stress tests contribute to maintaining the DGSs’ preparedness, identifying shortcomings and thus continuous improvement of the DGS framework. The first peer review on DGS stress tests and the resilience of DGSs that the EBA conducted in 2020 revealed that the framework would benefit from further improvements. This is in line with the nature of stress testing itself: to integrate lessons learned in existing practices and processes and maintain a continuous learning and improvement cycle. The EBA also identified ‘good practices’ in the 2020 peer review report, which it included at the time to provide advice for DGSs to take note of. A number of these good practices we have incorporated in the amendments to the Guidelines proposed in this consultation paper. The 2020 peer review report presented areas for improvement and good practices both regarding the design and execution of the stress tests (i.e. how a DGS plans and runs the exercises) and the reporting to the EBA (i.e. how the DGS consistently and accurately reflects the results of the exercises).

8. The remainder of this chapter explains in which specific areas the EBA is proposing to amend the Guidelines.

3.2 Rationale

3.2.1 Design and execution of stress tests in general

Definition of “stress testing” and “resilience of DGSs”

9. The 2020 peer review has shown that DGSs interpreted differently what constitutes “stress” when it comes to stress testing. Some considered “stress” to apply to any DGS payout, as such cases are rare, while others considered that it implies circumstances more challenging than what they would expect in a ‘standard’ payout case. In consequence, this also led to different interpretations of what is meant by ‘resilience of DGSs’ as referred in Article 4(10) DGSD. To some extent, such differences in interpretation can be explained by the differences in the number of real-life payout events across Member States. While both approaches have their respective merit, the EBA has arrived at the view that the Guidelines would benefit from a clearer definition of the concept of “stress testing” for future rounds of testing – complementing what is already currently specified in the Guidelines EBA/GL/2016/04.

10. In order to address this issue, the EBA proposes that the revised guidelines further specify what is meant by “stress testing” and the “resilience of the DGSs”. More precisely, “stress testing” is to be interpreted as “the execution of test exercises of the DGS’s systems, in order to assess the resilience of the DGS through the indicators provided by the guidelines and identify where the DGS is able to improve its processes in compliance with Article 4 (10) DGSD”. In consequence, the resilience of DGSs is then to be interpreted as “the ability of DGSs to perform the tasks
entrusted to them in accordance with Directives 2014/49/EU and 2014/59/EU” (assessed by means of the core tests). Thus, one stress testing cycle should correspond to the period of time that does not exceed three years, in compliance with Article 4(10) DGSD, and in which a DGS conducts at least once each of the stress tests defined as core tests.

**Formats of the stress testing exercises**

11. In the 2020 peer review report, the EBA observed that DGSs used different methodologies and in consequence different types of exercises to perform core tests, as the Guidelines were not prescriptive in this regard. For example, one DGS used a desk-based review while another DGS performed a simulation when conducting the same priority test. Although not explicitly reported on by DGSs, the following (non-exhaustive) types of exercises were identified from the DGSs stress test reports:

- Desk-based reviews, for example for assessing the quality of arrangements in place for requesting and obtaining SCV files (indicator i2 of the Guidelines EBA/GL/2016/04) and for obtaining information from the competent or resolution authorities on problems detected at a credit institution (i5), or the adequacy of ex ante funds to cover the funding need (i20); additionally, to outline and go through the processes of a (fictional) payout event from beginning to end, to assess a number of areas;

- On-site inspections, for example visits by DGSs or their service providers to credit institutions in order to assess the quality of their SCV files. These visits can be provided and specified through the applicable national framework;

- Simulations, for example the transmission of a payment instruction file from a home to a host DGS (indicators i15-i19), or the transfer of an amount of ex ante funding (i21, the ability to liquidate assets) or drawing on a credit line (i23, the assessment of the quality of the arrangements in place for accessing funds via AFA’s), or an end-to-end simulation of a payout event; and

- Real-life cases, for example to assess operational and fund ing capabilities.

12. To address these points, the EBA proposes to allocate in the revised reporting template (annexed to the revised guidelines) a field for the DGS to provide, for each exercise, a description about the type of exercise the DGS performed, using high-level categories that will be specified in the revised guidelines. This information would provide the EBA with further context of the type of exercise a DGS has performed to assess its capabilities.

**Use of multiple granular tests**

13. Some DGSs reported having performed multiple, granular tests, in addition to or instead of one comprehensive end-to-end test, in order to be able to assess all the indicators, as the reporting template provided by the Guidelines EBA/GL/2016/04 allows for a maximum of three tests per
core test. This approach can be considered as a good practice because it allows DGSs to perform in-depth assessments of specific aspects of their operations, in case an overall test did not, or would not, yield sufficiently detailed results. In addition, it increases the feasibility of performing stress tests in terms of time and resources needed to perform the test. Finally, performing multiple, granular tests also allows DGSs to build up the complexity of the test scenarios over time. At the same time, comprehensive tests assess a whole chain of steps of a payout process and provide insight into the interconnectedness of the different aspects and the time it takes to execute the whole payout process.

14. The EBA proposes that the revised guidelines require DGSs to perform core tests as end-to-end tests at least once per stress testing cycle (Guideline 3.7). The proposed guidelines also provide that DGSs can perform further iterations of the core tests (in the same stress testing cycle) by means of multiple granular tests.

Arrangements to ensure objectivity

15. The Guidelines EBA/GL/2016/04 specify that “DGSs should make arrangements to ensure objectivity in the definition of assumptions for the stress test, the running of the test and the elaboration of unbiased conclusions”, for example by providing for ‘the participation of external observers of the process’. Although the reporting template did not explicitly ask DGSs to report on this matter, one DGS reported that the national competent authority was in charge of designing, running and evaluating the stress test exercises performed. In addition, an external auditing firm was also involved in different stages of the test. Another DGS shared that there is a risk that the cost exceeds the benefits from hiring an external consultancy firm since it is difficult to find consultancy firms with sufficient knowledge about the functioning of the DGS. The DGS decided to involve the internal risk department to support them in the stress testing. Based on these examples, the EBA is of the view that a good practice is to take into account the particular setup of the DGS when involving a third party in the performance of these tasks, mindful of the need to comply with national provisions on professional secrecy and DGS oversight, which could be an obstacle to sharing information with third parties.

16. The EBA proposes that the reporting template provided in the revised guidelines includes a field in which the DGS can provide (i) further information about the DGS’s arrangements to ensure objectivity in the definition of assumptions for the stress test, the running of the test and the elaboration of unbiased conclusions, and (ii) which elements (such as the DGS’s setup, governance, costs, conflicts of interest, added value) the DGS took into account when making such arrangements.

Q1: Do you have any comments on the proposed changes to the definitions, the test formats, the use of granular tests and the arrangements to be made by DGSs to ensure objectivity?
Increase of the complexity of the stress tests

17. While the Guidelines require DGSs to progressively increase the complexity of the stress tests, they do not provide much guidance how to give shape to this requirement. The 2020 peer review report also put forward the idea to incentivise DGSs to test scenarios with issues that affect the business continuity of the DGS, such as the extent to which a DGS is able to perform a payout during a power failure, ICT problems, a pandemic – events that some DGSs experienced in real life cases or during stress tests.

18. To that end, the EBA proposes that the revised guidelines require DGSs to apply increasingly sophisticated and severe scenarios and report how their tests have been made more complex over time (compared to the previous stress testing cycle and within the ongoing stress testing cycle). The proposed guidelines provide some examples of how the complexity of stress tests can be increased over time, and specify that increasing the complexity does not need to go beyond scenarios that can be realistically expected, and that DGSs should not lose sight of testing the baseline scenarios.

19. Also, the EBA proposes to introduce in the revised guidelines (in Guideline 4.109) an extra intervention scenario for such special business continuity challenges or external circumstance that create extra stress for a DGS to perform its functions. A DGS can use such a scenario as an “overlay” on top of the standard DGS intervention scenarios, once it has satisfied itself of its ability to perform the ‘standard’ intervention. In addition, the EBA is proposing that DGSs are asked to report on the characteristics of the extra stress intervention scenario and the outcomes corresponding to such tests.

Retesting the aspects impacted by significant changes in DGS’s systems and processes

20. Significant changes in DGS’s systems and processes might happen in the course of the execution of its stress testing programme. Currently, the Guidelines EBA/GL/2016/04 do not require to conduct additional tests and update the past outcomes in case of occurrence of such changes. However, significant changes are to be expected, for instance because Article 8(2) DGSD allows Member States to introduce the seven working day payout period in stages. Thus, some DGSs in Member States who implemented the transitional payout periods executed stress tests while implementing changes to their systems to progressively reach the shorter repayment deadline. Such changes include implementing new payout systems, introducing new SCV requirements, and/or developing other policies in relation to the implementation of the recast DGSD. This impacted the types of tests performed, as some DGSs did not test all aspects, while others only tested aspects to the extent the changes were implemented.

21. To address this, the EBA proposes that the revised guidelines (in Guideline 3.4) require that, in cases where DGSs implemented significant changes to the systems or processes during the stress testing cycle, DGSs should be retest certain areas or, if needed, certain core tests. These additional tests should be conducted within the ongoing stress testing cycle if it is operationally feasible from the DGS’s perspective. For example, when a DGS changes its payout method from an agent bank model to electronic transfer using the DGS’s dedicated IT platform, the payout
processes change significantly, and so to ensure resilience, the DGS should retest its repayment function for the test areas that are impacted by the change.

22. Second, the EBA proposes to allocate in the revised reporting template a dedicated field in which the DGSs would be able to provide information related to the changes in their systems that have affected the stress testing. DGSs should also reflect in case such changes were resulting from or linked to the outcomes of previous DGS stress tests, and if tests were used while making such changes. Furthermore, DGSs should indicate if the stress tests were performed under significantly different circumstances or using different systems in comparison to previous stress tests or stress testing cycles. This information is useful for the EBA when comparing the results of different stress tests or stress testing cycles.

Stress testing all the DGS’s legally mandated functions

23. As observed in the 2020 peer review, not all DGSs performed all priority tests, and within the tests, the aspects that were assessed varied. These differences might stem from the fact that DGSs differ in terms of governance, operational systems and procedures, national legislation applicable to them and the structures of the market where they operate. For example, the peer review showed that between 2014 and July 2019 only five DGSs reported having performed a test on their ability to contribute to resolution even though contribution to resolution is part of the mandate of all DGSs based on Article 109 of the BRRD. Furthermore, only one DGS reported having performed a test of the use of available financial means for preventive measures and no DGS tested the contribution to insolvency proceedings even though many DGSs are legally mandated to be able to perform such interventions.

24. To address this issue, the EBA proposes that the revised guidelines (in Guideline 3.2) require the DGSs to conduct stress tests related to all the legally mandated functions entrusted to them, according to the applicable national provisions transposing the DGSD and BRRD. Namely, these legally mandated functions include repayment of funds to depositors, contribution to resolution, repayment of funds to depositors in a cross-border scenario, failure prevention and contribution to insolvency proceedings. In addition to that, the EBA proposes to include the regular routine checks of the SCV files among this list of core tests to be performed in the course of a stress testing cycle.

25. The below figure outlines the various possible core tests and the applicable indicators as provided in the proposed revised guidelines.
Q2: Do you have any comments on the proposals to increase the complexity of stress tests (as provided in Guideline 4.109), retest the aspects impacted by significant changes in DGS’s systems and processes (Guideline 3.4), and require stress testing all the legally mandated functions of a DGS (Guideline 3.2)?

3.2.2 Reporting to the EBA on DGS stress testing in general

The grading of the outcomes

26. The Guidelines EBA/GL/2016/04 state that, where a qualitative score is required, the evaluation forms require a grade (score A-D) of the outcome. However, some DGSs did not include a
qualitative score where that was requested in the instructions. Some DGSs only reported “N/A” for certain indicators without further explanation, for example regarding whether or not a test was performed or an indicator was assessed because the respective area was not applicable to the DGS or because the DGS did not have sufficient time or resources to perform the test. Moreover, the Guidelines EBA/GL/2016/04 do not explicitly outline what results should be achieved in relation to a particular indicator to assign a particular grade. Thus, the interpretation of the success of the results differed between DGSs. Additional reporting specifications would make it easier for the DGSs to complete the assessment and improve the next iterations of the EBA peer reviews.

27. Furthermore, current description of scores might be unrealistic, for example because score “A – Optimal” is currently explained as “the area measured requires no improvement”. Nevertheless, satisfactory outcomes do not mean that any refinement of DGS’s process is not needed. If a test is sufficiently challenging, there are always lessons to be drawn from it. The current phrasing of the grades might also unintentionally incentivise DGSs to perform tests in a way that does not uncover areas for improvement, since finding such gaps leads to a lower score. Thus, given that the aim of the stress tests is to check the DGS’s resilience but also to improve their preparedness, current grading system might not be optimal.

28. To alleviate these aspects, the EBA proposes that the revised reporting template require (in Guideline 5.4) the DGSs to provide an overall assessment of their resilience for each of their legally-mandated functions, accompanied by the areas of improvements identified to improve their resilience. This overall assessment would not be an aggregation of the individual scores assigned by the DGSs when assessing the indicators. Thus, DGSs would be encouraged to identify potential weaknesses when stress testing the indicators and describe areas of improvement while reporting they would be sufficiently resilient in the achievement of their legally-mandated functions.

29. Second, the EBA proposes that the design of the revised reporting template requires the completion of such information, for example by means of a drop-down menu plus extra mandatory field for text. Additionally, the EBA proposes that the revised guidelines require DGSs – when they did not test a certain aspect – to report this by filling in “area not tested” in the relevant field and explaining the reasons for not assessing the area.

Deadlines for the next report submission and the next EBA peer review

30. The DGSD provides that DGSs should conduct new stress tests at least every three years and that the EBA should carry out a new peer review at least every five years. Current Guidelines EBA/GL/2016/04 do not provide guidance on the timing and or frequency of reporting on DGS stress tests to the EBA, except for specifying the reporting deadline of 3 July 2019. Thus further clarifications are needed regarding the future reporting deadlines applicable to the DGSs in order to make their stress testing programme future-proof and to ensure a smooth articulation of the reporting deadlines with the requirements in the DGSD.
31. To address the issue, the proposed guidelines (in Guideline 6.2) specify that the EBA will announce in advance the date of the next reporting deadline for the purpose of the second EBA peer review, considering this new peer review should be published by 16 June 2025 at the latest. The EBA proposes to set this reporting deadline on the 16th of June 2024, one year before the deadline applying to the publication of the second peer review. Regarding the later reporting cycle, the EBA proposes to provide the date of the next reporting deadline in EBA the peer review, or other means.

**Reporting of the areas not required by the Guidelines**

32. Currently, the reporting template does not provide an opportunity for DGSs to report on other areas beyond the ones required by the Guidelines. DGSs might deem it relevant to report on the results of the stress tests of additional special cases/processes stemming from the applicable national framework. The reporting template should be more flexible and allow DGSs to provide such information on a voluntary basis.

33. To address this, the EBA proposes to specify in the revised guidelines (in Guideline 4.112) that DGSs are allowed to report, in addition to the indicators outlined in the Guidelines, extra indicators for aspects that the DGS considered relevant for assessing its capabilities and which were assessed during the applicable stress testing cycle. The proposed guidelines provide that DGSs should consider developing their own indicators to assess the areas subject to the test, and report the outcomes of these indicators. The benefits of introducing this feature are to incentivise DGSs to report on aspects that they considered important, and in doing so to share lessons learned with their peers, which will also provide the EBA insight into such aspects for future peer reviews. The EBA therefore proposes that the revised reporting template include a designated area for reporting on such indicators.

**Background information on the DGSs**

34. The data provided in the reporting submitted in the context of the peer review was difficult to compare, partly because DGSs have different characteristics. Currently, only the number of credit institutions which are members of the DGS and the repayment periods applicable to the DGS are included for context in the reporting template provided by the Guidelines EBA/GL/2016/04.

35. Therefore, the EBA proposes that the reporting template provided by the revised guidelines asks for a description of the key characteristics of the DGS (payout method, repayment period, real-life cases yes/no, home-host relations yes/no and the number of relations, and if the use of AFM is allowed for the purpose of Article 11(3) and 11(6) DGSD). Additionally, the EBA proposes that the revised reporting template includes fields in which DGSs are required to provide background information on specific aspects, such as DGS’s funding structure (target level, amount of available financial means, placement-breakdown of the funds) and key drivers of DGS’s methodology to assess SCV files. This would enhance understanding why a DGS performed a core test in a certain way.
Q3: Do you have any comments on the grading of the outcomes (as proposed in Guideline 5), the deadline for the next report submission (Guideline 6.2), the reporting of the area not required by the guidelines and the background information on the DGS to fill in the revised reporting template?

3.2.3 Design, execution and reporting of SCV files stress tests

Differentiation of the two categories of SCV files stress tests

36. The results of the peer review identified two types of SCV files performed by DGSs: a regular routine testing of SCV files of all the member institutions, and a stress tests of obtaining an SCV file of a specific institution, in the context of a wider operational capability test in a repayment scenario. However, the Guidelines EBA/GL/2016/04 do not explicitly distinguish these two categories of tests dedicated to SCV files and do not specify the key elements to be taken into consideration when conducting these distinct assessments.

37. To address this issue, the EBA proposed that the revised guidelines and the revised reporting template distinguish between the two types of SCV files tests. The EBA also proposes that two different sets of indicators are applied when performing these two different assessments. In addition to that, the proposed guidelines clarify that the focus of these regular routine tests is on the role of the credit institution in generating an adequate SCV file, and the main aim of the tests is to review and improve the data quality of the SCV files. The focus of SCV files checks conducted in the context of a repayment function test is more on the role of the DGS in obtaining, receiving and processing the SCV file in order to perform a DGS payout and assessing the time it takes for DGS staff to process the SCV file and prepare the payout.

Stress testing of SCV files of all the relevant institutions

38. In the context of the 2020 peer review, two-thirds of the DGSs reported having tested on a regular basis SCV files of all their member institutions during the reporting period. One-third of the DGSs reported testing only some of their member institutions, for reasons varying from the characteristics of those credit institutions (e.g. no covered deposits) to an inability to test all institutions because of ongoing changes to IT systems. The Guidelines EBA/GL/2016/04 provide that DGSs should assess SCV files quality by means of regular routine checks of “all the affiliated credit institutions”. This requirement does not take into consideration that the failure of some affiliated credit institutions – those which do not hold eligible deposits – would not entail repayments from the DGS.

39. To alleviate this issue, the EBA proposes that the revised guidelines (in Guideline 4.9) require the DGSs to assess the SCV files quality in the context of regular routine tests with at least all of
the affiliated credit institutions holding eligible deposits. This assessment should be done in the course of the ongoing stress testing cycle.

**Defining “substandard entries”**

40. As observed in the context of the peer review, the Guidelines EBA/GL/2016/04 do not provide sufficient guidance regarding the concept of “substandard entries” used for the indicator *share of substandard entries* (4). Finding a common definition is not feasible from an operational perspective, since the exact data required to be able to perform a payout differs between DGSs, depending on their payout mechanism and how they structured the SCV file.

41. To address this issue, the EBA proposes that the revised guidelines (in Guideline 4.19) provide developments on how the DGSs can define substandard entries. To illustrate these developments, assuming that the depositor is supposed to be reimbursed though a bank transfer, an incorrect postal address should be considered as a substandard entry but the SCV file should be considered valid.

42. The proposed reporting template also asks DGSs to provide an explanation on how they defined the concept of “substandard entry” when reporting the share of substandard entries among the full amount of SCV files tested.

**Q4:** Do you have any comments on the proposals to address the issues related to the design, execution and reporting of SCV files stress tests, in particular the differentiation into two categories of SCV files stress tests (as proposed in Guideline 4.7), stress testing the SCV files of all relevant institutions (Guideline 4.9), and the definition of substandard entries (Guideline 4.19)?

### 3.2.4 Design, execution and reporting of operational capability tests

**Assessment of IT safety**

43. Currently, the Guidelines EBA/GL/2016/04 do not require stress tests of IT-related aspects of DGS’s operations. Several indicators partially rely on an assessment DGS’s IT systems, such as the indicators related the adequacy of DGS’s resources and capacity of DGS’s website. Nevertheless, these indicators mainly focus on a quantitative assessment of DGS’s IT systems to handle a high number of depositor queries. An indicator specific to safety of these systems and their robustness in case of operational challenges is therefore needed. The IT security aspects are becoming increasingly important, both because of increasing number of cybersecurity incidents, and also because of a trend towards electronic payouts.

44. The EBA proposes that the revised guidelines (in Guideline 4.32) provide an additional indicator to assess the security of DGS’s IT systems. In particular, the EBA proposes to insert a dedicated field within the revised reporting template in which the DGSs would be required to briefly...
outline the main conclusions from the most recently available internal / external audits related to the IT safety aspects or any IT issues encountered in the course of the stress tests (or real-life cases), with particular focus on any identified weaknesses.

**Stress tests of reimbursing depositors in complex cases**

45. In the context of the peer review, a large number of DGSs did not assess indicator i13 of the Guidelines EBA/GL/2016/04 (time to repay Temporary High Balances – THBs – and beneficiary accounts) because beneficiary accounts and THBs are not earmarked in their SCV files. The assessment and repayment processes of such cases is more complex than the process for “normal” cases, because DGSs need to assess different types of information, and, depending on the payout procedures, such assessments require more resources.

46. Therefore, the EBA proposes that the assessment requested by the indicator related to the compensation of THBs and beneficiary accounts in the revised guidelines focuses on the internal processes and resources put in place by the DGSs to handle depositors’ queries (Guideline 4.48). The proposed guidelines also allow the DGSs to conduct more complex tests, for example using fictional data and quantifying the time needed to compensate these depositors.

47. Second, the EBA proposes that the assessment requested by this indicator includes the time to compensate of “special cases” other than THBs and beneficiary accounts (Guideline 4.49). These “special cases” should be identified by the DGSs when relevant, if the reimbursement of these depositors raises specific operational challenges. The EBA proposes that the revised reporting template includes a field in which DGSs are asks to provide their assessment on the compensation of the special cases they might have identified.

**Selection of the partner DGS when stress testing cross border cooperation**

48. As part of the design and execution process of cross border cooperation tests, DGSs have to decide which DGS to perform the test with. The Guidelines EBA/GL/2016/04 are silent on the criteria which should lead to the selection of the partner DGS when stress testing the ability to cooperate as home DGS and/or host DGS.

49. To address this issue, the EBA proposes that the revised guidelines (in Guideline 4.51) encourage to use, when possible, a risk-based approach when selecting the partner DGS(s) for testing a repayment with cross border cooperation scenario. A risk-based approach means that DGSs assess the likelihood of having to cooperate with certain partner DGSSs as per Article 14 DGSD, based on the information that is available to the DGS. This also means that stress testing cross border cooperation is not relevant – and therefore not required – if a DGS would not be involved in a cross-border compensation in any case. The proposed reporting template includes a field in which the DGS can report with which partner DGS the test was performed, and explain the risk-based approach used to choose the testing partner for the cross-border cooperation test. In case a DGS is not able to conduct such a core test because any other DGS opted for participating as partner DGS in the context of cross-border cooperation exercises, the proposed guidelines
specify that this should be flagged as “area not tested” and justified in the revised reporting template.

Q5: Do you have any comments on the proposals on the assessment of the IT safety (as proposed in Guideline 32), stress tests of reimbursing depositors in complex cases (Guideline 48 and 49) and selection of DGS partner when stress testing cross-border cooperation (Guideline 4.51)? Do you have any further comments on the design, execution and reporting of operational capability tests?

3.2.5 Design, execution and reporting of funding capability tests

Stress testing the adequacy of the funding means for each affiliated credit institutions

50. The Guidelines EBA/GL/2016/04 require DGSs to test the adequacy of their funding means – namely, their available financial means, *ex post* contribution and the alternative funding arrangements (AFAs) – by assuming the failure of one or some credit institution(s) selected by the DGSs. The assessment requires a DGS to quantify the potential shortfall between the full amount of funding means to be mobilised by the DGS and the amount of covered deposits to be compensated held by the failing institution(s). In the context of the 2020 peer review, the information in the reports indicates that the scenario chosen for the test have influenced the outcome of the tests. More precisely, the assessment that leads to the conclusion that DGS’s funding means are adequate or inadequate relies on the selected credit institution(s).

51. To address this issue, the EBA proposes that the revised guidelines (in Guideline 4.65) require the DGSs to stress test the adequacy of their funding means in case of individual failure of each affiliated credit institutions. Also, the proposed reporting template includes a field in which DGSs are asked to report absolute and relative number of institutions for which DGSs would deal with a funding-means shortfall in case of failure and, if applicable, the shortfall in absolute value and as a share of the funding means.

Stress testing the access to all DGS’s funding means

52. The Guidelines EBA/GL/2016/04 require DGSs to test their ability to raise *ex post* contributions and use AFAs in cases where – when stress testing the adequacy of the funding means as abovementioned – the amount of available financial means is insufficient compared to the amount of covered deposits to be compensated. In the context of the 2020 peer review, most DGSs did not report any assessment related to their ability to access to funding means other than available funding means, even though the DGSD requires DGSs to be able to raise *ex post* contributions and access AFAs if needed.
53. To address this issue, the EBA proposes that the revised guidelines require the DGSs to stress test the access in due time to all of their funding means, including ex post contributions and AFAs irrespective of the amount of their available financial means (Guideline 4.72). The proposed guidelines provide indicators specific to testing raising ex post contributions and accessing alternative funding arrangements. Also, the proposed reporting template includes fields in which the DGSs are asked to quantify the time elapsed to make their various funding means available for the achievement of their intervention. Regarding the assessment of DGS’s ability to liquidate its invested assets, the proposed reporting template requires DGSs to elaborate on the chosen market assumptions.

Stress testing the governance framework of the funding means

54. In the context of the 2020 peer review, some DGSs performed tests of the governance framework and decision making process to be mobilised when using their funding means. This included cooperation with the other stakeholders involved in the process (such as competent authorities and/or credit institutions) to ensure clear roles and clear responsibilities. The assessment of this aspect is not required by the Guidelines EBA/GL/2016/04.

55. Thus, the EBA proposes that the revised guidelines require (in Guideline 4.70) the DGSs to conduct an assessment of governance and decision-making processes to obtain funding by means of an additional indicator and a dedicated field in the proposed reporting template.

Q6: Do you have any comments on the proposals on stress testing the adequacy of the funding means for each affiliated credit institutions (as provided in Guideline 4.65), stress testing the access to all of DGS’s funding sources (Guideline 4.72) and stress testing the governance framework of the funding means (Guideline 4.70)?

3.2.6 Design, execution and reporting of stress tests related to contribution to resolution, failure prevention and contribution to insolvency proceedings

Fitting the applicable framework with the DGS function that is stress tested

56. In the context of the peer review, some DGSs – including Institutional Protection Schemes (IPSs) recognised as DGSs – considered that the emphasis should be put on interventions other than the repayment function, such as the failure prevention function, when designing their stress testing programme. This conclusion relied on their legal mandate and real-life experience. Nevertheless, the Guidelines EBA/GL/2016/04 do not identify stress tests related interventions other than the repayment function as core tests. The existing guidelines also do not provide guidance on how to take into consideration and how to report specific aspects of these interventions.
57. To address this issue, the EBA proposes that the revised guidelines provide (in Guideline 4.84) specific sets of indicators for each DGS function other than repayment, namely contribution to resolution, failure prevention and contribution to insolvency proceedings. Regarding the indicators applicable to more than one core test, the proposed guidelines provide (in Guideline 4.92) specifications on how to apply and report the results of these indicators without unnecessary duplication, when testing aspects of core tests which are the same across different tests. More specifically, when stress testing contribution to resolution / failure prevention / contribution to insolvency proceedings, the proposed guidelines allow the DGSs to use the relevant results and conclusions stemming from the indicators in a former repayment function stress tests.

Selection of the credit institution(s) to stress test contribution to resolution

58. The Guidelines EBA/GL/2016/04 provide that, with a view to stress testing their ability to contribute to resolution, DGSs can select one or some affiliated credit institution(s) classified as significant institution(s) and directly supervised by the European Central Bank pursuant to Regulation (EU) 468/2014. This criterion cannot be applied by all the DGSs, including because Regulation (EU) 468/2014 is only applicable in Member States that are part of the Banking Union. Another selection methodology should be provided in order to be implemented by all the DGSs.

59. The EBA proposes that the revised guidelines simplify (in Guideline 3.27) the criteria for choosing credit institutions to be used for testing and require the DGSs to select one or some affiliated credit institution(s) they deem as relevant to conduct such a stress test. Where relevant, such a decision should be made in consultation with the resolution authorities.

Q7: Do you have any comments on the proposals to address the issues related to the design, execution and reporting of stress tests related to contribute to resolution, failure prevention and contribution to insolvency proceedings (as provided in Guideline 3.27, 4.84 and 4.92)?

Q8: Do you have any other comments on the proposed revised guidelines on stress tests of DGSs?
4. Draft Guidelines
Draft Guidelines

on stress tests of deposit guarantee schemes under Directive 2014/49/EU (Guidelines on DGS stress tests)(Revised)
1. Compliance and reporting obligations

Status of these guidelines

1. This document contains guidelines issued pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. In accordance with Article 16(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, competent authorities and financial institutions must make every effort to comply with the guidelines.

2. Guidelines set the EBA view of appropriate supervisory practices within the European System of Financial Supervision or of how Union law should be applied in a particular area. Competent authorities as defined in Article 4(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 to whom guidelines apply should comply by incorporating them into their practices as appropriate (e.g. by amending their legal framework or their supervisory processes), including where guidelines are directed primarily at institutions.

Reporting requirements

3. According to Article 16(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, competent authorities must notify the EBA as to whether they comply or intend to comply with these revised guidelines, or otherwise with reasons for non-compliance, by (dd.mm.yyyy). In the absence of any notification by this deadline, competent authorities will be considered by the EBA to be non-compliant. Notifications should be sent by submitting the form available on the EBA website with the reference ‘EBA/GL/201x/xx’. Notifications should be submitted by persons with appropriate authority to report compliance on behalf of their competent authorities. Any change in the status of compliance must also be reported to EBA.

4. Notifications will be published on the EBA website, in line with Article 16(3).

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2. Subject matter, scope and definitions

Subject matter

5. These guidelines specify the minimum principles and content of stress tests that deposit guarantee schemes (“DGSs”) must perform pursuant to Article 4 (10) of Directive 2014/49/EU (DGSD).²

6. They aim at helping designated authorities and DGSs to increase the resilience of the DGSs’ systems within the European Union by setting a minimum level of consistency, quality and comparability of DGSs’ stress tests.

7. The resilience of DGSs can be defined as the ability of DGSs to perform the tasks entrusted to them in accordance with Directives 2014/49/EU and 2014/59/EU³. This definition covers all the tasks that a DGS is mandated to perform according to the national legislation, including DGS repayment (Article 8(1) and 11(1) DGSD), DGS repayment with cross border cooperation (Article 14 DGSD), contribution to resolution (Article 109 BRRD), contribution to failure prevention (Article 11(3) DGSD) and contribution to insolvency proceedings (Article 11(6) DGSD). The resilience of DGSs can be assessed by means of the stress tests provided in the guidelines.

Scope of application

8. These guidelines apply to DGSs when performing stress tests of their systems in accordance with Article 4(10) of Directive 2014/49/EU.

9. Where designated authorities administer a DGS, they should apply these guidelines when performing stress tests of the DGS’s systems. When a DGS is administered by a private entity, designated authorities should ensure that these guidelines are applied by such DGSs.

Addressees

10. These guidelines are addressed to competent authorities as defined in Article 4(2)(iv) of Regulation (EU) 1093/2010.

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11. These guidelines are also addressed to competent authorities as defined in Article 4(2)(i), (iii) and (v) of Regulation (EU) 1093/2010, to the extent that their cooperation, as safety net participants, is required in order to ensure adequate performance of the DGS stress tests.

**Definitions**

12. Unless otherwise specified, the terms used and defined in Directive 2014/49/EU have the same meaning in the guidelines. In addition, for the purposes of these guidelines, the following definitions apply:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exercises</td>
<td>means the different actions that a DGS takes in order to conduct one stress test.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core tests</td>
<td>means the stress tests assessing the resilience of the DGS to perform the different functions which are part of DGS’s legal mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stress testing cycle</td>
<td>means the period of time that does not exceed three years, in which a DGS conducts at least once each of the stress tests defined as core tests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting cycle</td>
<td>means the time range (determined by the EBA) between the completion and official submission of two reporting templates provided in Annex 1 by a DGS to the EBA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>means the information and parameters that are predetermined for the conduct of a DGS stress test.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal participants</td>
<td>means test participants who directly contribute to the achievement of the test and who are employed or subcontracted by the DGS. They also might be part of another public authority entrusted with the DGS’s functions provided by the DGSD and the BRRD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal observers</td>
<td>means test observers involved in order to monitor the completion of the test and provide views on the various phases of the test. They are employed or subcontracted by the DGS. They also might be part of another public authority entrusted with the DGS’s functions provided by the DGSD and the BRRD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External participants</td>
<td>means test participants who directly contribute to the achievement of the test. They are not employed or subcontracted by the DGS and are not entrusted with the DGS’s functions provided by the DGSD and the BRRD. They might be part of (inter alia) affiliated credit institutions, relevant public authorities or external providers of the DGS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External observers</td>
<td>means stakeholders involved in order to monitor the completion of the test and provide views on the various phases of the test. They are not employed or subcontracted by the DGS and are not entrusted with the DGS’s functions provided by the DGSD and the BRRD. They might be part of (inter alia) affiliated credit institutions, relevant public authorities or external providers of the DGS.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
views on the various phases of the test. They are not employed or subcontracted by the DGS and are not entrusted with the DGS's functions provided by the DGSD and the BRRD. They might be part of (inter alia) affiliated credit institutions, relevant public authorities or external providers of the DGS.

Single Customer View file ("SCV file")

| Description                                                                 | Definition                                                                                     |
|                                                                            | means a file containing the individual depositor information necessary to prepare for a repayment by a DGS, including the aggregate amount of eligible deposits of every depositor. |

3. Implementation

Date of application

13. These guidelines apply from **dd.mm.yyyy**.

Repeal

14. The guidelines EBA/GL/2016/04 are repealed with effect from **xx month xxxx**.

4. Guidelines on DGS stress tests

Guideline 1: Objectives of DGS stress tests

1.1 DGS stress tests should contribute to incrementally increasing the resilience of the European system of DGSs, by:

(i) assessing the resilience of DGSs, through testing the ability of DGSs to perform the tasks entrusted to them in accordance with Directives 2014/49/EU and 2014/59/EU, including when cooperating with other DGSs within the European Union;

(ii) identifying which dimensions of a DGS require improvements or have already improved compared to previous tests;

(iii) producing results which allow comparability and peer reviews.
Guideline 2: Methodology for DGS stress tests

2.1 In order to ensure a comprehensive approach, stress tests should be programmed over a medium-term perspective. Each stress test exercise should follow a number of key phases as described in Guideline 2.

2.2 To safeguard compliance with Article 4(11) of Directive 2014/49/EU, designated authorities should ensure that DGSs obtain and use the information necessary to perform stress tests of their systems only for the performance of those tests and keep it no longer than is necessary for that purpose. To safeguard compliance with Article 4(9) of that Directive and in particular where the test involves the processing of data pertaining to depositors’ accounts, designated authorities should ensure that DGSs preserve confidentiality, process that data pertaining to depositors’ accounts in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC and fully protect those data including by means of applying anonymisation methods as appropriate.

Programming of stress tests

2.3 Over a period that is not more than three years, DGSs should develop a stress testing programme including exercises covering all core tests defined in Guideline 3. In any event, a stress testing cycle reaches completion when all the core tests have been conducted at least once (since the enforcement of the guidelines or the adoption of the last cycle).

2.4 The programme should set out the estimated timeframe of programmed exercises and define the planned scope of each exercise in terms of formats and assumptions. The programme can include either one or several stress testing cycles.

2.5 The programme should be updated on a regular basis, taking into account the results of previous stress tests (e.g. results that would highlight a need for a deeper assessment), actual DGS interventions or regulatory developments (e.g. a shortening in repayment deadlines).

2.6 Where a real-life intervention occurred during the stress testing cycle and enabled a DGS to assess its resilience related to some or all of the core tests and/or the indicators under the programme, the DGS should consider amending the programme to reflect that the real-life-based test will substitute the originally envisaged test. In such a case, instead of completing all the below key phases, the DGS can focus on the reporting and corrective action phases.

Key phases of a stress test exercise

2.7 DGSs should complete the following phases when conducting a stress test exercise.

\[\text{Replaced by regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.}\]
Planning phase

2.8 DGSs should appoint, among their internal staff, a steering team or steering officer (hereinafter referred to as ‘steering team’) in charge of planning and coordinating the various tasks involved in a stress test exercise. For this purpose, internal staff means the staff employed or subcontracted by the DGS and staff from another public authority entrusted with the DGS’s functions provided by the DGSD and the BRRD. Without being part of the steering team, external participants and observers can be involved in the various phases of the stress tests. Senior management should ensure that the steering team is provided with all the information necessary and receives full support from the rest of the staff of the DGS.

2.9 Ahead of each exercise, the steering team should define the timeframe for executing the test and identify the internal and/or external participants and observers involved.

2.10 Based on the stress testing programme, the steering team should define in more detail the focus of the test, formats, indicators to be measured, and assumptions underpinning the exercise (e.g. amount to finance DGS’s intervention, level of payout in liquidation or credit institutions to be covered by quality checks of SCV files).

2.11 DGS can use assumptions from previous intervention cases and assess the way in which the DGSs’ systems performed. They can also simulate the way in which, under the current conditions, their scheme would behave if it were faced with a similar situation.

2.12 The DGS should allocate the necessary resources for the test in terms of supporting staff, budget and infrastructure. The adequacy of these means should be continuously reviewed during the development of the exercise.

2.13 DGSs should make arrangements to ensure objectivity in the definition of assumptions for the stress test, the running of the test and the elaboration of unbiased conclusions. DGSs are asked to report on such arrangements in the reporting template. Such arrangements should be documented by the scheme and ensure that objectivity requirements apply to all participants and observers to the test and in all phases. As part of those arrangements, DGSs should establish a clear separation between the steering team and other participants and observers who, within the DGS, also take part in the exercise. DGSs should also report on elements the DGSs took into account when making such arrangements, such as the particular setup/governance of the DGS, costs, conflicts of interest, added value, national provisions on professional secrecy and DGS oversight.

2.14 Those arrangements can provide for the involvement of external observers of the process. Observers might be the designated authorities where they are not themselves administering the schemes, other public authorities, consultancy firms or other DGSs. Observers should strive to verify that the process is being led objectively and, in case of doubt, express their concerns to the steering team. Observers should have access to the relevant information regarding all phases of the process. Any information shared in this context should be subject to strict professional secrecy requirements. The requirement to establish separation or
alternatively involve observers should be considered as met with regard to the tests of SCV files.

2.15 The steering team should contact the internal and external participants and observers who will be involved in the various stages of the exercise and ensure mutual understanding as to the role expected by everyone in the exercise.

Running phase

2.16 When running the exercise, the steering team should request and collect from test participants and observers the information necessary to assess the performance of the DGS’s systems in relation to the test areas and indicators described in Guidelines 3 and 4.

2.17 Exercises can be run in various formats, including live roleplaying sessions where internal and external participants simulate the actions and decisions they would take in a given core test as defined in Guideline 3, or back-office exchanges (e.g. where the steering team requests SCV files from an institution and measures the accuracy of the information). DGSs should report on the type of format chosen for each exercise in the reporting template, using the following categories:

- Desk-based reviews, which include reviews (of the quality) of existing procedures and arrangements in place, for example to outline and go through of the processes of a (fictional) payout event from beginning to end, to assess a number of areas;

- On-site inspections, for example visits by DGSs or their service providers to credit institutions in order to assess the quality of their SCV files. These visits can be provided and specified through the applicable national framework;

- Simulations, for example an end-to-end simulation of a certain core test, or simulations of parts of the process such as the transmission of a payment instruction file from a home to a host DGS, or the transfer of an amount of ex ante funding, and drawing on a credit line;

- Real-life cases that occurred during the stress testing cycle and that allowed for the assessment of the DGSs capabilities included in these guidelines;

- Other types of exercises, to be used only when the exercise does not fit in any of the categories above and should be explained by the DGS when reporting.

2.18 Distinguished from the steering team, participants in the running phase should represent those authorities, entities or even internal departments, including within the DGS, which would have to take the necessary actions or decisions or provide the necessary information in a real-life scenario. This can include internal participants (for example, the internal department in charge of funding issues within the DGS) or external participants (for example resolution authorities which would determine, after consulting the DGS, its contribution to resolution).
Reporting and corrective action phase

2.19 The steering team should process and interpret the results of the test with a view to making an objective assessment of the resilience of the DGS in the achievement of its legal functions.

2.20 The steering team should record results in a consistent manner over time, using a standard template such as the template developed by the European Forum of Deposit Insurers. DGSs should report stress tests results to the designated authorities at least annually.

2.21 Stress tests should be part of a continuous improvement process. Accordingly, where weaknesses in a DGS’s systems are identified in the context of a stress test, that DGS should take corrective measures. Where weaknesses have been identified that are attributable to credit institutions, for example flaws in the quality of SCV files, the DGS should seek corrective measures, if necessary via the competent authority in charge of the supervision of those institutions. The DGS should then seek to ascertain, in subsequent tests, that the weaknesses have been remedied.

Cooperation with relevant administrative authorities

2.22 DGSs should keep designated authorities fully informed when planning and conducting stress tests, unless the DGS is also the designated authority. For this purpose, within three months after finalising it, DGSs should submit their stress testing programme to the designated authorities. This information sharing could initiate a constructive dialogue and lead to refinements of the programme. The designated authorities should provide their input within six months after receiving the programme developed by the DGS. Any material update should be promptly notified to the designated authorities.

2.23 Subsequently, when planning each exercise, they should inform designated authorities of the scope of the test in terms of participating credit institutions, test formats, assumptions, and any other relevant information.

2.24 In addition, before conducting a core test defined in Guideline 3, DGSs should inform the public authorities that would be involved in the kind of legal function being tested. At a minimum, the “relevant administrative authority” identified pursuant to Article 3(1) of Directive 2014/49/EU, as well as the competent authority referred to in Article 2(1)(17) of the same Directive, should be informed when testing a repayment scenario. The competent and resolution authorities should be informed when testing a resolution scenario.

2.25 DGSs should seek the opinion of those authorities on assumptions for the test and offer them participation in the running phase. Where a DGS is separate from the designated authority, such participation or consultation can be organised via the designated authority.

2.26 Competent and resolution authorities should cooperate, directly or via designated authorities, with DGSs in defining scenarios and running tests.
2.27 DGSs should share the outcomes of the stress tests in the form of the reporting template provided in Annex 1 with the designated authorities. They should also share the outcome of the stress tests, in the form of the reporting template or in another form, with relevant authorities\(^5\) upon their request and subject to applicable confidentiality provisions.

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\(^5\) Including (but not limited to) resolution authorities or national competent authorities.
Guideline 3: Core tests

3.1 In order to comprehensively assess their capacity to effectively deal with cases of institution failure, DGSs should conduct the core tests as prescribed in this guideline.

DGS functions to be covered by core tests

3.2 With a view to the peer review conducted by the EBA, DGSs should perform core tests of the functions legally entrusted to them (set out in Directives 2014/49/EU and 2014/59/EU as transposed in national law) during a DGS stress testing cycle, and report the results to the EBA. For these purposes, the following DGS functions should be:

- to compensate depositors in their Member State in the event of a credit institution’s insolvency pursuant to Article 11(1) of Directive 2014/49/EU (“repayment function”);

- to compensate depositors at branches set up by credit institutions authorised in another Member State in the event of a credit institution’s insolvency pursuant to Articles 11(1) and 14 of Directive 2014/49/EU (“repayment with cross border cooperation function”). DGS should perform such a core test only in cases where they could be involved in cross-border compensations (as home DGS, as host DGS, or in both roles) pursuant to the abovementioned Article 14 of the DGSD and the applicable national provisions;

- to finance the resolution of credit institutions in order to preserve continuous access to deposits in pursuant to Article 11(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU and Article 109 of Directive 2014/59/EU (“contribution to resolution function”);

- to use their available financial means for alternative measures in order to prevent the failure of a credit institution, if allowed under the law of the Member State where the DGS is established, pursuant to Article 11(3) of Directive 2014/49/EU (“failure prevention function”);

- to use their available financial means to finance measures to preserve the access of depositors to covered deposits in the context of national insolvency proceedings, if allowed under the law of the Member State where the DGS is established, pursuant to Article 11(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU (“contribution to insolvency proceedings function”).

3.3 In addition, DGSs should perform and report results of their regular SCV files tests, which are conducted by the DGS on a regular basis. The regular SCV files tests are also core tests. The results of the regular SCV files tests should not be confused or commingled with the SCV files assessment performed when conducting a core test dedicated to repayment function. In the latter case, the SCV files assessment should be reported as part of the results of this core test on depositor-compensation.

3.4 In case DGSs implemented significant changes to the systems or processes during the stress testing cycle, DGSs are required to retest certain core tests during the ongoing stress testing
cycle – if retesting within this timeframe is operationally feasible. For example, when a DGS changes its payout method from an agent bank model to electronic transfer, using the DGS’s dedicated IT platform, the payout processes change significantly, and so to ensure resilience, the DGS should retest its repayment function for the indicators described in Guideline 4 that are impacted by the change.

3.5 Depending on the core test, DGSs will use the indicators outlined in Guideline 4. DGSs should report results on the above core tests to the designated authorities and the EBA using the reporting template provided in Annex 1.

3.6 For each of the core tests, DGSs should report to the EBA using the reporting template, up to a maximum of three tests.

3.7 A core test should be performed as end-to-end tests at least once per stress testing cycle. The other iterations of the core test within the same stress testing cycle can be conducted by means of series of granular tests which together cover all indicators related to this certain core test.

### Repayment function

3.8 DGSs should test their ability to repay depositors as provided for under Article 11(1) of Directive 2014/49/EU. No DGS should abstain from testing the repayment function on the grounds that it has tested the resolution or failure prevention functions described hereinafter, or that all affiliated credit institutions would fall under the category described in paragraph 3.27.

3.9 In a repayment scenario, the DGS should simulate the failure of one or several credit institutions in order to assess whether the repayable amount as referred to in Article 7 of Directive 2014/49/EU would be available within the repayment periods prescribed in Article 8 of that Directive.

3.10 Additionally, when testing its resilience to compensate depositors, the DGS should assess the quality of its internal processes to collect and analyse the SCV files and liaise with the relevant credit institution for requesting further/corrective data if needed. These tests related to SCV files should not be confused or commingled with the regular routine SCV files assessments.

3.11 Over the time of the programme as referred to in Guideline 2, DGSs should apply the indicators described in Guideline 4 that are applicable to the repayment function.

### Repayment with cross border cooperation

3.12 In case DGSs fulfil a role as home DGS or host DGS under Article 14 of the DGSD, the DGS should simulate the failure of one or several credit institutions with one or more branches in another Member State.

3.13 DGSs should perform such tests in the roles that are applicable to them: as home DGS, as host DGS, or in both roles if applicable. A DGS should test its role as a host DGS if it is in a Member State where there is at least one branch held by a credit institution from another Member
State. A DGS should test its role as a home DGS if any of its member institutions holds a branch established in another Member State. A DGS should test both roles if both cases apply. In case the national provisions provide that a single DGS is in charge of managing cross-border-compensation actions on behalf of the other DGSs in place in the same Member State, the requirement of conducting home-host-cooperation core tests only applies to the relevant DGS.

3.14 DGSs should consider using, when possible, a risk-based approach when selecting the partner DGS(s) for testing a repayment with cross border cooperation scenario. For example, if DGS X is home and host for DGS Y, and only host for DGS Z, DGS X can decide, based on a risk-based approach, to perform the test in the role of home for DGS Y, and in the role of host for DGS Z.

3.15 Over the time of the programme as referred to in Guideline 2, DGSs should apply the indicators specific to the repayment scenario with home-host cooperation, as described in Guideline 4.

3.16 In case a DGS is not able to conduct such a core test because no other DGS opted for participating as partner DGS in the context of cross-border cooperation exercises, this should be specified in the reporting template as “area not tested” as provided in paragraph 5.7.

Contribution to resolution

3.17 Resolution scenarios should assume intervention in relation to an affiliated credit institution that has been placed under resolution in accordance with Directive 2014/59/EU and for which a DGS contribution is required under Article 109 of that Directive.

3.18 DGS stress tests under resolution scenarios can be performed on a stand-alone basis or can be part of a broader resolution test performed under the leadership of resolution authorities, provided that the dedicated set of indicators described in Guideline 4 are tested and applied, respectively.

3.19 Where a DGS stress test under a resolution scenario is performed on a standalone basis, the DGS should consult the resolution authority in designing the scenario and running the test, and should request it to participate in the test. Resolution authorities should cooperate with the DGSs and provide them with the necessary information, either directly or through the designated authorities, to design and run stress tests.

3.20 The assumed level of DGS contribution to resolution financing should be calibrated in consideration of the rules laid down in Articles 108 and 109 of Directive 2014/59/EU and the profile of credit institutions selected for the test involving a resolution scenario.

3.21 In exceptional cases, after consulting the resolution authority, a DGS can abstain from testing resolution scenarios where it conversely determines that no affiliated credit institution falls in the category described in paragraph 3.27.
Failure prevention

3.22 Where, pursuant to Article 11(3) of Directive 2014/49/EU, a DGS is allowed to use funds for the prevention of failure of a credit institution, it should perform at least two types of tests:

- a test simulating a significant deterioration of the financial situation of one or several affiliated credit institutions, including their capital position, asset quality and liquidity position. In this context, the test should assess whether the DGS would be able to prevent failure under the conditions set out in Article 11(3) of Directive 2014/49/EU, including by considering the type of alternative measures that could be implemented and whether the DGS would have the available financial means to provide the necessary support; and

- a test of the risk monitoring systems of the DGS. Where distress situations have been recorded in the past, DGSs should determine whether the monitoring systems have been able to detect the imminence of the risk.

3.23 DGS stress tests related to failure prevention should be performed by means of a dedicated set of indicators described in Guideline 4.

Contribution to insolvency proceedings

3.24 Core tests related DGS contribution to insolvency proceedings should assume intervention to preserve the access of depositors to covered deposits in the context of national insolvency proceedings pursuant to Article 11(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU.

3.25 DGS stress tests related to contribution to insolvency proceedings should be performed by means of a dedicated set of indicators described in Guideline 4.

Selection of affiliated credit institutions to be included in core tests

3.26 With a view to conducting core tests, a DGS should select one or more of its affiliated credit institutions whose profile is adequate in relation to the planned focus of the test, including the type of functions, the severity and complexity of the scenario, and its geographical reach.

3.27 A DGS should select one or more affiliated credit institutions deemed as relevant with a view to testing contribution to resolution. DGSs should consider selecting one or more affiliated credit institutions in consultation with the resolution authorities.

Severity and complexity of core tests

3.28 DGSs should conduct core tests assuming different levels of severity and complexity. However, the EBA recognizes that there is a limit to increasing complexity and severity of tests, and that the stress test scenarios should remain realistically applicable to the DGSs. Thus, over time DGSs should apply increasingly sophisticated and severe scenarios, while maintaining assessments of the ability to manage baseline scenarios that can be realistically expected. For example, a DGS could initially perform a cross border cooperation test in the role of home DGS.
with one other DGS as host DGS. Subsequently, the DGS could increase complexity of the test by performing another cross border cooperation test with two or three host DGSs at the same time. DGSs can also increase the level of severity and complexity of the design of the stress tests exercises, for example by choosing a different type of exercise (i.e. a DGS might initially perform a desk-top exercise to assess a certain aspect, and subsequently a simulation for assessing that aspect).

3.29 DGSs should consider adding another layer of complexity and stress to one or more of the core tests, by adding to the chosen core test a “special” scenario with severe business continuity challenges or external circumstances that would bring extra stress for a DGS to perform its functions, outlined in Guideline 4.

3.30 DGSs should report if and how they have increased the severity and complexity over time of the stress tests performed by the DGS (compared to the previous stress testing cycle or, where applicable, within the reported stress testing cycle). A DGS should consider increasing the severity and complexity of a stress test from one stress testing cycle to another. A DGS should also consider increasing the severity and complexity of two similar stress tests (dedicated to the same legal function) conducted within the same stress testing cycle.

3.31 In order to ensure historical relevance, DGSs should, over its programme as referred to in Guideline 2, test scenarios assessing the capacity of their systems to deal with intervention cases of a type and intensity experienced in the past, and in particular during the 2008-2012 period.
Guideline 4: Indicators

4.1 Stress tests should aim at assessing the DGS’s resilience, by covering two main risk areas:

(i) operational risks, i.e. risks that the DGS cannot meet its obligations due to inadequate or failed internal processes, inadequate staffing and systems; and

(ii) funding risks, i.e. risks that the funding sources provided for in Article 10 of Directive 2014/49/EU (regular contributions, extraordinary contributions and alternative funding arrangements) are insufficient to enable the DGS to meet its potential liabilities, or to meet them within the time periods required by national or Union law.

4.2 Stress tests should cover various operational stages of a DGS intervention, ranging from pre-failure planning to preparation upon failure, to execution of intervention, including repayment, contribution to resolution, etc. They should at a minimum measure the indicators set out in this guideline.

4.3 Operational and funding capabilities should be tested under the core tests described in Guideline 3. In addition, DGSs should run targeted exercises regular checks of SCV files of all member institutions during a stress testing cycle.

4.4 In case a DGS decided to assess additional aspects that the DGS considered relevant for assessing its capabilities, other than the aspects that are included by means of the indicators in these guidelines, a DGS can report on the outcomes of tests of these aspects by including own-initiative, self-developed indicators and the outcomes in the reporting template. The reporting template will contain a designated section for reporting on such indicators.

Operational capabilities

4.5 DGS stress tests should cover the DGS’s capacity to run the processes and mechanisms involved in an intervention, including access to data, staff and other operational resources, communication, payment systems, time measurement, and cross border cooperation.

Access to data

4.6 Access to good quality data on credit institutions, depositors and deposits should be tested as a matter of core in order to ensure that DGSs are prepared to perform their tasks at all times.

4.7 DGSs should perform two types of tests in relation to the SCV files:

a. Assessment of the SCV files quality in the context of a test on DGS’s resilience to compensate depositors in the event of a credit institution’s insolvency pursuant to Article 11(1) of Directive 2014/49/EU (“repayment function”);
b. Assessment of the SCV files quality in the context of regular routine tests with at least all of the affiliated credit institutions holding eligible deposits.

4.8 For both types of tests, the guidelines provide different sets of indicators. DGSs are asked to report separately on the regular SCV files tests in the reporting template.

4.9 In principle, all member institutions that have eligible deposits should be subject to regular testing of SCV files. A DGS can choose not to test SCV files of member institutions that are not deposit takers. In the reporting template, DGSs should report the number of unique institutions (i) which are members of the DGS at the moment of reporting, (ii) which are members of the DGS at the moment of each round of SCV files testing and (iii) of which SCV files were tested. Where applicable, DGSs should report the reason(s) for the difference between the number of unique institutions tested and the number of unique institutions which are members of the DGS at the moment of each exercise, for example because not all member institutions are deposit takers or because there was a change in membership during the SCV files testing round.

4.10 The quality of an institution’s SCV files can be tested based on a sample covering a subset of depositors, provided the sampling method is determined by the DGS, not the institution, and provided the sample is sufficiently large and diversified to be representative of the institution’s book of eligible deposits. This is without prejudice to the right of DGSs to test full SCV files. In case sampling was used, DGSs should provide in the reporting template the reasons for using such an approach and the average number of depositors included in the sample as an absolute number and as a proportion of all depositors.

4.11 The quality of the SCV files should be assessed in relation to whether it would provide the DGS, in case of failure, with all the information necessary to complete its intervention in relation to a depositor, including the identity of depositors, their contact details, accounts held and corresponding amounts, and amounts of eligible and covered deposits. For this purpose, DGSs should define criteria for a valid or invalid SCV file (e.g. incorrect identity data, incorrect address data, inconsistent data for the same account holder or beneficiary, duplicated entries, etc.) and measure the number of invalid SCV files entries as a share of the institution’s records or, where applicable the sample.

4.12 Further to identifying the criteria for valid or invalid SCV files, DGSs should consider developing an internal methodology on how to assess SCV files, which sets out different grading criteria. The reporting template include a field in which the DGS can provide further information about the methodology it applies to assess the SCV files in the section on the regular SCV files tests. DGSs should consider sharing the methodology with the credit institutions, with the purpose to inform them of the assessment criteria and provide incentives to perform well. DGSs should also consider informing credit institutions how well they performed in relation to industry average, in order to incentivise further improvement among those who score below average. The EBA encourages DGSs to develop such methodology and to share a summary of the methodology and the high-level outcomes of the performance with the credit institutions, for transparency and encouragement.
4.13 When performing regular tests of SCV files, some DGSs combine desk-top reviews of SCV files with on-site visits at credit institutions, which requires a methodology for the on-site reviews. The reporting template will include a field for DGSs to report on the way they perform regular tests of SCV files. When reporting to the EBA, DGSs should describe the key drivers on how such tests are performed (through desk-top reviews of SCV files and/or on-site visits). This includes how credit institutions are selected (each credit institution annually vs. risk-based approach), whether or not SCV file data is compared/checked with original data in the credit institution (for example through on-site inspections), whether requests for SCV files tests are done ad hoc or are announced in advance, the degree of involvement of the credit institution in evaluating the quality (for example by means of involving the internal auditor), whether or not the institution’s external auditor is involved, the level of automation of checking the quality of SCV files through the use of data models and validation scores, and the follow-up process with the credit institution in case errors are identified.

4.14 Where insufficient quality has been observed at an institution, a follow-up check should be conducted within at least two years to assess progress. The DGS can adjust this two-year period where, considering the human and other resources available, it is necessary to prioritise tests at other credit institutions that raise concerns in terms the quality of SCV files’ or on the basis of the DGS's general risk assessment of credit institutions.

4.15 Where, according to national law, arrangements are in place to earmark, on a continuous basis, temporary high balances ("THBs") as defined in Article 6(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU or beneficiary accounts as governed by Article 7(3) of that Directive, those THBs should be included in the SCV files tests. This prescription should not entail any obligation for the DGS or the affiliated credit institutions to request information from depositors as a result of the test.

4.16 For the purpose of performing the regular routine tests of SCV files, DGSs should use the following indicators:

- **i1:** Time to obtain transmission of valid SCV files, from the day of the initial request to the affiliated credit institution (qualitative and quantitative)
- **i2:** Share of invalid SCV files, and share of substandard entries in valid SCV files (qualitative and quantitative)
- **i3:** Quality assessment of arrangements in place for requesting and obtaining SCV files (qualitative)
- **i4:** Quality assessment of the arrangements in place for analysing SCV files and liaising with the relevant credit institutions to request additional / corrective data when needed (qualitative)

4.17 When assessing the time to obtain transmission of SCV files (indicator i1), DGSs should, in line with their payout process, establish the deadline to receive SCV files of sufficient quality from the credit institution to the DGS, in order to repay depositors within 7 working days. DGSs
should report on this deadline in number of days when reporting to the EBA. Subsequently, DGSs should assess how many credit institutions were able to deliver SCV files of sufficient quality within that deadline. When reporting to the EBA, DGSs should report on the deadline, established by the DGS, for submitting a valid SCV file of sufficient quality for the DGS to be able to perform for a payout within 7 working days (or fulfil other functions under the DGSD) which is applied in regular SCV files tests.

4.18 When reporting to the EBA on indicator i1, DGSs should report a qualitative score and the following quantitative aspects:

- the minimum, average, maximum time (in hours if possible) for the whole sample of credit institutions of which SCV files were tested,
- the absolute and relative number of credit institutions who delivered valid SCV files within that deadline, and
- if applicable, how many SCV files were requested at the earliest possible moment at which the DGS would be able to request the SCV file during a DGS payout scenario (thus ‘ad hoc’), and how many SCV files were requested by informing the credit institution in advance that it would receive a request to submit an SCV file to the DGS in the near future (‘with prior notice’), and whether there were differences in the time to obtain transmission of SCV files in those cases.

4.19 When assessing indicator i2, DGSs should, in line with their payout process and SCV files requirements, define when an SCV file is of insufficient quality in order to reimburse depositors timely and correctly (an invalid SCV file), entailing the SCV file would be rejected by the DGS and lead to a request to the credit institution for a new submission. DGSs should also define the concept “substandard entry”, by specifying when entries in SCV files can be considered as “substandard”, considering that a substandard entry does not lead to reject the SCV file and not jeopardise the compensation of the depositors in due time. Subsequently, DGSs should assess how many credit institutions were able to deliver SCV files of sufficient quality, and in addition, the share of substandard entries for both the invalid SCV files and the valid SCV files.

When reporting to the EBA, DGSs should describe the following aspects:

- the definition of “invalid SCV files” and “valid SCV files”;
- the definition of substandard entries, as established by the DGS.

4.20 When reporting to the EBA on indicator i2, DGSs should report the following aspects:

- the number of credit institutions that were able to deliver valid SCV files in an SCV files testing round (in absolute numbers and the relative share of institutions tested) and
• the relative share of substandard entries and the minimum, maximum and average of these shares in each SCV files testing round for each invalid SCV file and each valid SCV file.

4.21 In indicators i3 and i4, the “arrangements in place” could be comprised, inter alia, of the relevant:

• regulations, requirements, guidelines which give DGSs legal enforcement powers to obtain SCV files;

• regulations, requirements, guidelines, and/or data models which specify the content of the SCV files and the (technical) data requirements of the SCV files;

• communication channels used to obtain the SCV files from, and exchange information with, affiliated credit institutions;

• transmission channels to transfer SCV files between the DGS and affiliated credit institutions; and

4.22 The quality assessment of such arrangements in place could be based on a desk-top evaluation of such arrangements or a simulation of the workings of the arrangements in practice, or a combination of both. When reporting on the results, DGSs should report a qualitative score and indicate the type of exercise performed to conduct the quality assessment.

4.23 For the purpose of testing the obtainment of SCV files in the context of a repayment function test, DGSs should only use the abovementioned indicator i3:

| i3: Quality assessment of arrangements in place for requesting and obtaining SCV files (qualitative) |

Information on problems detected at a credit institution that are likely to give rise to the intervention of a DGS

4.24 DGSs should assess the arrangements in place for obtaining, as provided for in Article 4(10) of Directive 2014/49/EU, information on problems detected at a credit institution that are likely to give rise to the intervention of a DGS. In this regard they should assess whether these arrangements would allow sufficiently early information, for example where competent authorities exercise powers under Article 27 of Directive 2014/59/EU (early intervention) or Article 104 of Directive 2013/36/EU⁶ (supervisory powers), or where competent or resolution authorities determine under Article 32 of Directive 2014/59/EU that an institution is failing or likely to fail.

4.25 For the purpose of testing the obtainment of such information, DGSs should use the following indicator:

i5: Quality of the arrangements in place for obtaining information from competent or resolution authorities on problems detected at a credit institution which could give rise to DGS intervention, including whether they ensure receiving timely information on early deterioration of an institution’s financial situation (qualitative)

4.26 In indicator i5, the “arrangements in place” could be comprised, inter alia, of:

- national law or other requirements that ensure information exchange and cooperation between the DGS and the competent and/or resolution authorities;
- the DGS’s governance structure, in case the DGS shares common areas of governance with the competent and/or resolution authorities; or
- memoranda of understanding or other agreements between the DGS, the competent and/or resolution authorities;
- a crisis manual or handbook between the DGS, the competent and/or resolution authorities.

4.27 The quality assessment of such arrangements in place could be conducted by simulating cooperation between the different authorities in the context of a core test, by performing a walk-through with the authorities (for example by testing the communication channels, the governance and decision making process, and the timelines of information sharing), or by conducting a desk-based review of the elements mentioned in paragraph 4.21. When conducting a desk-based review, the competent and resolution authorities should be informed of the conclusions stemming from this assessment. The competent and resolution authorities can also be involved in the desk-based review. When reporting to the EBA on indicator i5, DGSs should report a qualitative score accompanied by an explanation justifying the qualitative score, and provide a description of how the tests of this area was performed in that explanation.

Staff and other operational resources

4.28 DGSs should test, under the core tests, whether they would have at their disposal the necessary resources to cope with the sudden increase in activity caused by an intervention, in terms of budget, staff, office space, IT equipment, call centres etc., including by reallocating existing permanent resources or entering into temporary outsourcing arrangements.

4.29 Existing staff means the internal staff employed or subcontracted by the DGS in business-as-usual. It can also include staff not directly employed by the DGS but from another public authority entrusted with the DGS’s functions provided by the DGSD and the BRRD. Existing
budget means the DGS’s budget in business-as-usual. Similarly, existing resources can be defined as the DGS’s resources in business-as-usual.

4.30 Extra staff means the staff needed for the purpose of a DGS intervention in addition to the existing staff. Extra staff include, for example, employees from (external) service providers and colleagues from other departments in case a DGS is part of another authority (e.g. competent authority, resolution authority, central bank). Extra budget can be defined as the budget needed for a DGS intervention in addition to the existing budget. This includes provisions made by the DGS in its budgets during business-as-usual for a potential intervention. Extra resources mean the resources needed in addition to the existing resources, for the purpose of a DGS intervention. Examples are additional office and IT equipment, office space and/or server space.

4.31 A conclusive assessment in this regard should not exclusively rely on a hypothetical budget increase but should at least in part reflect contingency mechanisms arranged for in good times (e.g. some provisioning for employing staff on a temporary basis).

4.32 Given the importance of information technology (IT) systems when performing DGS functions, DGSs should assess the security of their IT systems. In particular, DGSs should briefly report the main conclusions from the most recently available internal / external audits related to the IT safety aspects or any IT issue encountered in the course of stress testing exercises (or real-life cases), with particular focus on any identified weaknesses.

4.33 For the purpose of testing the staff and other operational resources, DGSs should use the following indicators:

i6: Adequacy of the existing staff, budget and other resources that would be available in a real-life scenario (qualitative and quantitative)

i7: Adequacy of extra staff, budget and other resources that would be available at short notice when needed (qualitative and quantitative)

i8: Security assessment of the IT systems that are crucial for the execution of the tasks that are mandated to the DGS (qualitative).

4.34 When reporting on indicators i6 and i7, DGSs should report the following outcomes:

- Qualitative: per category (staff, budget, other resources) a qualitative score indicating the adequacy.

- Quantitative: where applicable, the number of staff (specifying if this number is reported per capita or in terms of full time equivalent), and budget and resource gaps to perform the DGS tasks.
Communication with depositors and the wider public

4.35 DGSs should make an assessment of the communication processes that would be applied on the occurrence of a repayment scenario, reviewing the communication strategy and resources.

4.36 For the purpose of testing the communication with depositors and the wider public, DGSs should use the following indicators:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i9</td>
<td>Time to set up call centres and ad hoc websites or webpages (qualitative and quantitative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i10</td>
<td>Capacity of websites or call centres in terms of number of connections or calls (qualitative and quantitative)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.37 When reporting on indicator i9, DGSs should report a qualitative score and provide quantitative information. In the latter case, DGSs should use the moment of the activation of the DGS as the starting point for measuring the time \(t = 0\). DGSs should report the time in number of hours.

4.38 When reporting on indicator i10, DGSs should report a qualitative score and provide quantitative information and the following quantitative results:

- For websites: the number of visitors per hour,
- For call centres: the number of incoming calls that a call centre can process in an hour.

Payment instruments

4.39 DGSs should test their ability to proceed with payments to depositors, i.e. to effectively transfer the repayment amounts to depositors.

4.40 To that effect, DGSs should assess the quality of existing processes for collecting payment details (information that is required to make the reimbursement in addition to what is in the SCV file), the payment instruments available (e.g. bank transfers, cheques, prepaid cards), and where applicable their capacity to repay non-resident depositors in the EU and to pay in foreign currencies. When making a qualitative judgement, DGSs should take into account these elements, and whether or not the payment instrument(s) available are adequate to reimburse the number of depositors of a credit institution with a number of depositors of no less than the second quartile of affiliated credit institutions. The institution selected for the test should not fall in the category described in paragraph 3.27.

4.41 Once DGSs have reviewed the various processes and instruments available, they should verify their capacity to apply them swiftly in stress situations involving a high number of payments. In order to assess this, DGSs should apply one of the following two more severe scenarios, which both should involve a higher number of payments than under indicator i11:
• the simultaneous failure of two credit institutions. Each selected institution should hold a number of depositors no less than the second quartile of affiliated credit institutions. Each selected institution should not fall in the category described in paragraph 3.27. or

• the failure of one credit institution with a number of depositors no less than the third quartile of affiliated credit institutions. The selected institution should not fall in the category described in paragraph 3.27.

4.42 For the purpose of testing the payment instruments, DGSs should use the following indicators:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i11:</td>
<td>Review of payment instruments available for payout scenarios (qualitative and quantitative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i12:</td>
<td>Adequacy when applied to a high number of payments, as defined in the more severe scenarios provided in the guidelines (qualitative and quantitative)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.43 When reporting on indicator i11, DGSs should:

• take into account the elements described in paragraph 4.41 when providing a qualitative judgement, by providing both a qualitative score and an explanation, among others justifying the score and explaining the scenario used, and

• report on the number of depositors applicable to the test of the area measured by indicator i11 (quantitative).

4.44 When reporting on indicator i12, DGSs should provide a qualitative score accompanied by an explanation to justify the qualitative score (qualitative), the type of severe scenario chosen and the number of depositors applicable to the test of the area measured by indicator i12 (quantitative).

Repayment period

4.45 DGSs should measure the time from the determination of unavailability of deposits until the point when the repayable amount must be available in accordance with Article 8(1) of Directive 2014/49/EU and, on that basis, measure any delay compared to the repayment periods provided for under Article 8(2) to 8(5) of such Directive.

4.46 For the purpose of testing the repayment period, DGSs should use the following indicators:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i13:</td>
<td>For repayment scenarios, the ability of the DGS to make the repayable amount available within the applicable repayment deadline, including the time from the determination of unavailability of deposits to the moment when the repayable amount is made available (qualitative and quantitative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i14:</td>
<td>For THBs, beneficiary accounts, or other special cases, quality assessment of DGS’s internal procedures and resources to collect and handle claims from depositors (qualitative)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.47 When reporting on indicator i13, DGSs should report:

- a qualitative score, indicating the DGS’s ability to make the repayable amount available within the applicable repayment deadline, accompanied by an explanation justifying the qualitative score;

- the time to make the repayable amount available in number of working days, and the applicable repayment deadline in case deviating from the information provided in the “General information” section of the reporting template (quantitative).

4.48 To assess the area measured by indicator i14, DGSs should test their internal processes for reimbursing special cases such as THBs, beneficiary accounts or other special cases. When such cases are not earmarked in SCV files, DGSs should also consider simulating the reimbursement process and the reimbursement period with fictional cases. Additionally, DGSs should consider using SCV files or fictional data in order to quantify the period of time in which these deposits would be compensated. This optional quantitative assessment can compute the time elapsed from the determination of unavailability of deposits to the moment when the repayable amount is made available, deducting the time the DGS had to wait for the depositor or another stakeholder to provide the DGS with the necessary information.

4.49 In case a DGS considers that other “special” cases than THBs and beneficiary accounts are relevant to be assessed, a DGS can test such cases and report on them under indicator i14. The assessment should focus on reviewing DGS’s internal processes. Additionally, DGSs can use fictional data in order to quantify the period of time in which these deposits would be compensated. Other special cases are deposits or depositors that require more attention and/or a special treatment by the DGS in order to perform repayment, for example because the DGS needs to obtain specific information, or because it needs to deviate from the normal repayment procedures in another way. Such special cases might for example result from national legislation, or specific characteristics of products offered by affiliated credit institutions. When reporting to the EBA, DGSs should provide further information in case they tested other special cases.

**Cross border (home-host) cooperation**

4.50 In case DGSs fulfil a role as home DGS or host DGS under Article 14 of the DGSD, DGSs should test the systems in place for repaying depositors at branches set up by their affiliated credit institutions in other Member States.

4.51 DGSs should consider using, when possible, a risk-based approach when selecting with which DGS(s) to perform a cross border cooperation test. A risk-based approach means that DGSs assess the risks and likelihood of having to cooperate with certain partner DGSs and in which role, based on the information that is available to the DGS. This approach might be more appropriate than using the number of cross border branches as the only criterion. When reporting to the EBA, DGSs should report with which partner DGS a test was performed and in
which role (home or host), and explain the risk-based approach used to choose the partner DGS.

4.52 Home and host DGSs should assess their ability to efficiently and securely communicate with each other. Therefore, DGSs should assess their ability to access and exchange the data required for repayment. First, DGSs should, in their role as home DGSs, verify that they are able to extract earmarked SCV files information and produce payment instruction files (PIFs) on depositors at branches set up by their affiliated credit institutions in other Member States, after the home DGSs have retrieved the SCV files of such credit institutions.

4.53 Second, DGSs should, in their role as home DGSs, measure the time taken to prepare PIF(s) and to submit them to the DGSs of host Member States within the deadlines provided for in the EBA Guidelines on cooperation agreements between deposit guarantee schemes under Directive 2014/49/EU7.

4.54 DGSs should, in their role as home DGSs, submit a (sample) PIF to the DGSs of host Member States in order to test that communication channels are properly established. Subsequently, host DGSs should assess the received PIFs to check whether or not the file contains all necessary information to effect a payment and provide a confirmation to the home DGS.

4.55 Third, home and host DGSs should assess the channels for the transmission of other files than the PIF(s), such as communications documents and supporting documents required to perform payouts complex cases in both directions.

4.56 Fourth, DGSs should assess, in the capacity of host DGS, their ability to communicate with depositors at branches and the wider public, in specific by creating statements and information for individual depositors (for example letters for depositors or Q&As for call centre staff). Since the ability to communicate with depositors is measured in the context of repayment function core tests (without assuming cross-border cooperation), the assessment should focus on the aspects specific to the communication with foreign depositors at branches and the wider public located in another Member States than the host DGS. Thus, since the set-up of a call centre by the host DGS is part of the indicators i8 and i9, this aspect is therefore out of scope of such assessment.

4.57 Fifth, home and host DGSs should assess the channels for the transmission of the funds between them, by for example simulating the actual transfer of (part of) funds to the partner DGS or through a desk-based review of the needed internal processes. In cases where during the ongoing stress testing cycle DGSs have used such a transmission channel in the context of transfers of funds between DGSs when a member institution changes its affiliation8, such an assessment of transmission channels is optional.

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7 EBA/GL/2016/02.
8 In compliance with Article 14 (3) of the DGSD.
4.58 DGSs should not test their capabilities to cooperate on a cross-border basis in case they would be involved neither as home DGS nor as host DGS pursuant of Article 14 of the DGSD for any of the following reasons:

- no affiliated credit institution has any branch in another Member State and/or any branch from EU credit institutions is established in the DGSs’ Member State,
- the resolution plan of all affiliated credit institutions with branches in other Member States provides that resolution action is to be taken or that the power to write down or convert relevant capital instruments and eligible liabilities in accordance with Article 59 of the BRRD is to be exercised in accordance with the relevant scenario referred to Article 10 (3) of the BRRD.

4.59 For the purpose of testing their capabilities to cooperate on a cross-border basis, DGSs should use the following indicators:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i15</td>
<td>Ability to extract earmarked SCV information and produce PIF(s) on depositors at branches set up by their affiliated credit institutions in other Member States (qualitative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i16</td>
<td>Time to produce PIF(s), from the transmission of SCV files by institution (qualitative and quantitative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i17</td>
<td>Time to transmit the PIF(s) to host authorities, from the transmission of SCV files by institution (qualitative and quantitative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i18</td>
<td>Quality assessment of channels for the transmission of PIF(s) (qualitative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i19</td>
<td>Assessment by and confirmation from host DGSs that the PIF(s) would be adequate for repaying depositors (qualitative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i20</td>
<td>Quality assessment of channels for the transmission of other files than the PIF file (qualitative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i21</td>
<td>Quality assessment of the ability of the host DGSs, on behalf of and in cooperation with the home DGS, to communicate with depositors at branches and the wider public, in specific by creating statements and information for individual depositors (qualitative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i22</td>
<td>Quality assessment of channels for the transmission of funds required for the repayment to depositors at branches by the host DGS (qualitative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i23</td>
<td>Ability to meet the deadlines laid down in the Guidelines on cooperation arrangements between deposit guarantee schemes under Directive 2014/49/EU (qualitative and quantitative)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.60 When reporting on indicator i15, i16, i18, i19, i20, i21 and i22, DGSs should report a qualitative score accompanied by an explanation to justify the qualitative score.
4.61 When reporting on indicator i16 and i17, DGSs should report a qualitative score, accompanied by an explanation to justify the qualitative score, and the time in hours, using the transmission of the SCV file by the CI as the starting point (t=0) (quantitative).

4.62 When reporting on indicator i21, host DGSs should focus on the specific aspects related to the communication with foreign depositors at branches and the wider public located in another Member States than the home DGS (in comparison with communicating with depositors from a credit institution located in the same Member State than the DGS in the context of a repayment scenario without cross-border cooperation).

4.63 When reporting on indicator i23, DGSs should report a qualitative score accompanied by an explanation to justify the qualitative score, and the time in working days (quantitative).

**Funding capabilities**

4.64 In addition to operational capabilities, DGSs should test the adequacy and the access to their funding means in order to meet their payment obligations under the core tests.

**Adequacy of the funding means**

4.65 First, DGSs should assess the adequacy of the *ex ante* funds (available financial means), *ex post* contributions and alternative funding arrangements available for a DGS intervention for all member institutions not likely to be subject to a resolution action according to paragraph 3.27. This assessment should be based on the most recent reported amount of covered deposits of all member institutions at a certain point in time. This is a desk-top (calculation) exercise.

4.66 Reliance on *ex post* contributions should take into account the constraints laid down in Article 10 (8) of Directive 2014/49/EU, including whether some institutions’ payments can be deferred in whole or in part on the grounds that the payments would jeopardise their liquidity or solvency position\(^9\). Likewise, DGSs should consider whether the necessary extraordinary *ex post* contributions would meet the annual 0.5% ceiling laid down in that provision. Where this is not the case, they should make an explicit judgement as to whether they would be able to raise the 0.5% ceiling.

4.67 Reliance on alternative funding arrangements, such as loans or credit lines from public or private third parties, should be based on an objective assessment of elements known at the time of the test, such as mutual lending commitments entered into via written cooperation agreements, formal credit lines, etc.

4.68 For the purpose of testing the adequacy of their funding means, DGSs should use the following indicators:

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\(^9\) See the delegated act adopted by the Commission pursuant to Articles 104(4) and 115 of Directive 2014/59/EU.
4.69 When reporting on indicator i24, i25, i26, DGSs should report a qualitative score accompanied by an explanation to justify the qualitative score.

Access to the funding means

4.70 Second, DGSs should assess the governance framework and decision-making process for obtaining funding required for a DGS intervention. DGSs should also assess their ability to access ex ante funds, by liquidating the invested assets, within the within the deadline applicable to the intervention.

4.71 In this regard, for DGS repayment scenarios, the test should consider the amounts that would effectively be available within the repayment period. For other intervention scenarios, DGSs should determine the applicable period for contributing to such interventions. For all scenarios, this implies an assessment of the liquidity of the invested available financial means and payment commitments, including under market stress. DGSs should test the liquidation of their assets, either the full amount or part of their assets, and report on this when reporting their stress test results. If possible, DGSs should apply stressed market conditions. When reporting to the EBA, DGSs should describe the assumptions/conditions applicable to the test, such as whether or not they applied stressed market conditions and if yes, provide further details.

4.72 Additionally, DGSs should test raising ex post contributions and accessing alternative funding arrangements, regardless of their amount of ex ante funds. In order to carry out this assessment, DGSs can perform failure-simulation exercises of one selected credit institution or run multiples tests with different assumptions (such as separate tests for each possible funding sources). The credit institution selected to perform these exercises should not fall in the category described in paragraph 3.27 of the guidelines. In case a DGS selects one credit institution for assessing both operational and funding capabilities, the DGS should ensure that
they select a credit institution with a number of depositors no less than the second quartile of affiliated credit institutions not falling in the category described in paragraph 3.27. DGSs should, in an anonymized way, report to the EBA the characteristics of the credit institution that was selected for the test.

4.73 Where national law provides a particular sequence related to the use and depletion of available financial means, ex post contributions and alternative funding arrangements, applicable rules should be taken into consideration when designing the stress test.

4.74 Where a DGS has arrangements in place to access alternative funding arrangements from more than one source (e.g. a commercial loan or a loan from the State), the DGS should test accessing funds from at least one of these sources in a given stress testing cycle. The other sources of AFA can be assessed by the DGS in the next cycles.

4.75 DGSs should assess the time to access funding from ex post funds and alternative funding arrangements. When reporting to the EBA, DGSs should also report the applicable deadline for accessing funds applicable to the intervention. DGSs should also consider assessing the transmission channels for raising ex post contributions and accessing alternative funding arrangements, by for example simulating the actual transfer of all or some funds to the DGS or through a desk-based review of the needed internal processes. Nevertheless, where the transmission channels used to raise ex post and ex ante contributions are the same, DGSs can test the transmission channels for either ex ante or ex post contributions. Where ex ante or ex post contributions have been collected within the current stress testing cycle, DGSs are not required to test the transmission channels separately and should report on the real life experience.

4.76 For the purpose of testing the access to their funding means, DGSs should use the following indicators:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i27:</td>
<td>Qualitative assessment of the DGS’s governance framework and decision making process for obtaining funding required for a DGS intervention (qualitative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i28:</td>
<td>Assessment of the DGS’s ability to access ex ante funds by liquidating assets invested as part of the available financial means within the deadline applicable to the intervention (quantitative supported with qualitative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i29:</td>
<td>Assessment of the DGS’s ability to raise ex post contributions by raising extraordinary contributions within the deadline applicable to the intervention (quantitative supported with qualitative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i30:</td>
<td>Assessment of the DGS’s ability to access alternative funding arrangements within the deadline applicable to the intervention (quantitative supported with qualitative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i31:</td>
<td>For cross border cooperation scenarios: time for transmission of the funds required for the repayment to depositors at branches by the host DGS (qualitative and quantitative)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.77 When reporting on indicator i27, DGSs should report a qualitative score accompanied by an explanation to justify the qualitative score.

4.78 When reporting on indicator i28, DGSs should report a qualitative score indicating if \textit{ex ante} funds were accessed within the deadline applicable to the intervention, accompanied by an explanation to justify the qualitative score, and the time needed to access \textit{ex ante} funds in working days and the deadline applicable to the intervention tested in working days (qualitative and quantitative).

4.79 When reporting on indicator i29, DGSs should report a qualitative score indicating if \textit{ex post} contributions were raised within the deadline applicable to the intervention, accompanied by an explanation to justify the qualitative score, and the time needed to raise \textit{ex post} contributions in working days and the deadline applicable to the intervention tested in working days (qualitative and quantitative).

4.80 When reporting on indicator i30, DGSs should report a qualitative score indicating if alternative funding arrangements were accessed within the deadline applicable to the intervention, accompanied by an explanation to justify the qualitative score, and the time needed to access alternative funding arrangements in working days and the deadline applicable to the intervention tested in working days (qualitative and quantitative).

4.81 When assessing the area measured by indicator i31, home and host DGS should liaise with each other to determine the deadline for transferring funds to the host DGS. DGSs should quantify the full time elapsed: this includes the time to transfer the funds from the home DGS to the host DGS and the time to make the funds available from the host DGS to the depositors. The outcomes of the application of indicator i22 can also be used to perform this assessment. When reporting on indicator i31, DGSs should report a qualitative score indicating if funds were transmitted within that deadline, accompanied by an explanation to justify the qualitative score, and report the time needed for transmission and the deadline applicable to the test which was agreed with the partner DGS (qualitative and quantitative).

**Capabilities to contribute to resolution, prevent failure and contribute to insolvency proceedings**

4.82 DGSs should assess their operational and funding capabilities to contribute to resolution and, when relevant, to use their available financial means for conducting interventions related to failure prevention functions and contribution to insolvency proceedings as referred to in paragraph 3.2.

4.83 DGSs should use the indicators defined as applicable to the relevant core test which is conducted in accordance with this guideline. DGSs conducting core tests related to contribution to resolution, failure prevention and contribution to insolvency proceedings can use the relevant results and conclusions stemming from the indicators applied in a former
repayment function stress test. These past outcomes should stem from a repayment function stress test conducted during the ongoing stress testing cycle (if feasible) or the last stress testing cycle achieved by the DGS. When using past outcomes, DGSs should consider whether there is a need to complement them with additional assessments specific to contribution to resolution, failure prevention or contribution to insolvency proceedings.

Specific indicators

4.84 DGSs should use the following indicators for the purpose of testing their capabilities to contribute to resolution, prevent failures and contribute to insolvency proceedings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i32</td>
<td>For contribution to resolution, time elapsed from the resolution authority’s request to the payment of the contribution (qualitative and quantitative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i33</td>
<td>For failure prevention, (estimation of) time elapsed to perform DGS’s intervention (Optional – qualitative and quantitative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i34</td>
<td>For failure prevention, quality assessment of the procedures and resources set by the DGS to make sure that the costs of the measures do not exceed the costs of fulfilling the statutory or contractual mandate of the DGS as per Article 11(3)(c) of the DGSD (qualitative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i35</td>
<td>For failure prevention, quality assessment of the procedures and resources set by the DGS to make its risk-monitoring on the credit institution more stringent and its verification rights greater as provided by Article 11(3)(d) of the DGSD (qualitative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i36</td>
<td>For failure prevention, quality assessment of the DGS’s ability to extraordinary contributions as per Article 11(5) of the DGSD (qualitative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i37</td>
<td>For contribution to insolvency proceedings, time elapsed to perform DGS’s intervention (qualitative and quantitative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i38</td>
<td>For contribution to insolvency proceedings, quality assessment of the internal procedures and resources set by the DGS to make sure that the costs borne by the DGS do not exceed the net amount of compensating covered depositors as per Article 11(6) of the DGSD (qualitative)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.85 When the planning phase as referred to in Guideline 2 and for the purpose of assessing the area measured by indicator i32, DGSs should liaise with resolution authorities to define on a collaborative manner the timeframe in which the payment of the contribution to resolution needs to be made in order for the resolution authority to execute the resolution measures. This timeframe might differ depending on the scenario/resolution tool used. Furthermore, the EBA encourages DGSs and resolution authorities to cooperate when designing and executing stress tests of contribution to resolution scenarios, for example by running a joint exercise. When reporting on indicator i32, DGSs should report a qualitative score indicating if funds were transmitted within the applicable deadline, accompanied by an explanation to justify the
qualitative score, and report the time needed for transmission and the deadline applicable to the test (quantitative).

4.86 The application of indicator i33 is optional. When deciding to apply indicator i33, DGSs should liaise with relevant authorities to define the timeframe in which the measures should be performed. DGSs can also determine this timeframe if mandated. DGSs should take into consideration past real-life experiences, if any. This timeframe might differ depending on the scenario / measure used. Consequently, DGS can perform an estimation of time based on one of the possible scenarios. The relevant starting point to quantify the elapsed time depends on the applicable national framework. Inter alia, this starting point can be the request from the credit institution, from the designated authority or from the supervisory authority. When reporting on indicator i33, DGSs should specify the starting point from which the elapsed time is assessed and the reasons leading to choose this starting point. DGSs should also report the main assumptions of the test.

4.87 When applying indicator i35, DGSs should consider involving supervisory authorities in compliance with Article 11(3)(d) of the DGSD and the applicable national provisions. In that case, DGSs should focus their assessment only on the internal actions they can take.

4.88 When applying indicator i36, DGSs should focus on the specific processes that they might have been put in place as per Article 11(5) of the DGSD. In case no specific process has been put in place, DGSs should only report this finding.

4.89 When applying indicator i37, DGSs should liaise with relevant authorities to define the timeframe in which the measures should be performed. DGSs can also determine this timeframe if mandated. DGSs should take into consideration past real-life experiences, if any. This timeframe might differ depending on the scenario / measure used. The relevant starting point to quantify the elapsed time depends on the applicable national framework. Inter alia, this starting point can be the request from the credit institution, from the designated authority or from the supervisory authority.

4.90 When reporting on indicators i33 and i37, DGSs should report a qualitative score indicating if the measures were conducted within the applicable deadline, accompanied by an explanation to justify the qualitative score, and report the time needed and the deadline applicable to the test (quantitative). DGSs should also report the starting point from which the elapsed time is assessed and reasons leading to choose this starting point. When reporting on indicator i38, DGSs should specify if they are put in place (in the context of past real-life experiences or for the sake of preparedness) procedures compliant with national provisions in order to identify a potential buyer to take over the transferred covered deposits.

4.91 When reporting on indicator i34, i35, i36 and i38, DGSs should report a qualitative score accompanied by an explanation to justify the qualitative score.
Other applicable indicators

4.92 In addition to the specific indicators provided in paragraph 4.84, DGSs should use the following indicators, which also apply to test their repayment function.

4.93 For the purpose of testing their capabilities to contribute to resolution, DGSs should use the following abovementioned indicators: i5, i6, i7, i8, i27, i28, i29 and i30.

4.94 When applying these indicators for that purpose, DGSs should take into consideration that the contribution of a DGS to resolution might need to be executed in a shorter timeframe than the applicable period provided for making available the repayable amount available to depositors.

4.95 When applying indicators i6 and i7, DGSs should assess the adequacy of the extra staff, budget and other resources for the purpose of providing their contribution in a timeframe compatible with the needs of resolution procedures. DGSs should liaise with resolution authorities to define this timeframe which might differ depending on the scenario and resolution tool used.

4.96 DGSs should apply indicator i8 only in case they use other IT systems than the ones used in the context of their repayment function. When applying indicator i8, DGSs should assess the security of the IT systems that are crucial for the purpose of contributing to resolution in a timely manner.

4.97 When applying indicator i27, DGSs should take into consideration the national legal, contractual or statutory provisions (if any) related to DGS’s governance and decision-making process specific to the context of contribution to resolution.

4.98 For the purpose of testing their capabilities to prevent failures, DGSs should use the following abovementioned indicators: i5, i6, i7, i8, i27 and i28.

4.99 When applying indicator i6, DGSs should assess the adequacy of the existing staff for the purpose of quantifying the costs of DGS’s interventions as provided in Article 11(3) of the DGSD.

4.100 When applying indicator i7, DGSs should assess the adequacy of the extra staff for the purpose of quantifying the costs of DGS’s interventions as provided in Article 11(3) of the DGSD.

4.101 DGSs should apply indicator i8 only in case they use other IT systems than the ones used in the context of their repayment function. When applying indicator i8, DGSs should assess the security of the IT systems that are crucial for the purpose of quantifying the costs of DGS’s interventions as provided in Article 11(3) of the DGSD.

4.102 When applying indicator i27, DGSs should take into consideration the national legal, contractual or statutory provisions (if any) related to DGS’s governance and decision-making process specific to the context of failure prevention.
4.103 For the purpose of testing their capabilities to prevent failures, DGSs can also apply indicators i29 and i30 on a voluntary basis, consistently with the applicable national provisions.

4.104 For the purpose of testing their capabilities to contribute to insolvency proceedings, DGSs should use the following abovementioned indicators: i5, i6, i7, i8, i27 and i28.

4.105 When applying indicator i7, DGSs should assess the adequacy of the extra staff for the purpose of quantifying the costs of DGS’s interventions as provided in Article 11(6) of the DGSD.

4.106 DGSs should apply indicator i8 only in case they use other IT systems than the ones used in the context of their repayment function. When applying indicator i8, DGSs should assess the security of the IT systems that are crucial for the purpose of quantifying the costs of DGS’s interventions as provided in Article 11(6) of the DGSD.

4.107 When applying indicator i27, DGSs should take into consideration the national legal, contractual or statutory provisions (if any) related to DGS’s governance and decision-making process specific to the context of contribution to insolvency proceedings.

4.108 For the purpose of testing their capabilities to contribute to insolvency proceedings, DGSs can also apply indicators i29 and i30 on a voluntary basis, consistently with the applicable national provisions.

**Extra stress scenarios and extra indicators**

**Extra stress scenarios**

4.109 DGSs should consider adding another layer of complexity and stress to one or more of the core tests, by adding to the chosen core test a “special” scenario with severe business continuity challenges or external circumstances that would bring extra stress for a DGS to perform its functions.

4.110 A non-exhaustive list of examples of such scenarios includes: multiple DGS payouts at the same time, economic stress and no ability to liquidate or raise funds in the market, IT/operational issues at the DGS or failed credit institution, external circumstances that affect the operations of the DGS, like an epidemic/pandemic, power outage, internet disruption, or strike. When reporting to the EBA, DGSs should describe the test design and the chosen scenario.

4.111 When applying such an extra stress scenario, DGSs should use the following indicator:

| i39: Ability of the DGS to deal with business continuity challenges or external circumstances that create extra stress when performing its functions (qualitative) |
Own-initiative, self-developed areas and indicators

4.112 DGSs can develop – on a voluntary basis – additional, own-initiative indicators to assess areas other than the ones included in the guidelines. A DGS can add such extra indicators for aspects that the DGS considers relevant when assessing its capabilities and which are assessed during the applicable stress testing cycle. This is a voluntary option. The aim of this option is to give DGSs flexibility to test and report on those aspects that a DGS considers relevant for its situation. The inclusion of such areas in the stress test reports that are submitted to the EBA provides the EBA and other DGSs insight in such aspects for future peer reviews.

4.113 When reporting on such indicators, DGSs should report a qualitative score, accompanied by an explanation to justify the qualitative score, and if applicable, quantitative information.
Guideline 5: Qualitative assessment of the outcomes of the tests and DGS resilience

Assessment system for individual indicators

5.1 When grading their resilience in respect of the different indicators included in these guidelines, DGSs should use the following assessment system.

5.2 Since the purpose of stress testing is twofold, assessing the DGS’s resilience and identifying shortcomings or “areas for improvement” in order to improve the DGS’s systems, it is expected and welcomed, that a DGS identifies such areas for improvement when performing its stress test exercises. Therefore, DGSs should report, when applying individual indicators, a qualitative score from the following different categories:

1) the DGS has identified none or a low number of areas for improvement and such areas are unlikely to affect the ability of the DGS to perform its tasks under the conditions of the DGSD.

2) the DGS identified a significant number of areas for improvement, but such areas for improvement are unlikely to affect the ability of the DGS to perform its tasks under the conditions of the DGSD, because, for example, such shortcomings are isolated and/or can easily be addressed at the point of failure.

3) the DGS identified a low number of areas for improvement, however, such areas for improvement would affect the ability of the DGS to perform its tasks under the conditions of the DGSD (therefore, the DGS should indicate which measures have been taken or are scheduled in the near future, and any outcomes resulting from follow-up tests).

4) the DGS identified a significant number of areas for improvement, and such areas for improvement would affect the ability of the DGS to perform its tasks under the conditions of the DGSD (therefore, the DGS should indicate which measures have been taken or are scheduled in the near future, and any outcomes resulting from follow-up tests).

5.3 The qualitative scores should be supplemented by quantitative developments and explanations justifying the reported result when requested by the reporting template.

From individual indicators to DGS’s resilience in the achievement of its legal functions

5.4 When grading their resilience in respect of the legal functions assessed in the core tests, DGSs should use the following assessment system.

5.5 DGSs should report, for each core test, if they assess themselves as “sufficiently resilient” or “insufficiently resilient”.
• “Sufficiently resilient” means that the DGS is able to fulfill the function, entrusted in accordance with Directives 2014/49/EU and 2014/59/EU, which has been assessed by means of the relevant core test.

• “Insufficiently resilient” means that the DGS is not able to fulfill the function, entrusted in accordance with Directives 2014/49/EU and 2014/59/EU, which has been assessed by means of the relevant core test.

5.6 DGSs should supplement this assessment by explanations justifying the reporting results.

5.7 In case a DGS is legally mandated to perform a certain task under the DGSD, but did not conduct a certain core test applicable to the DGS, the DGS should report this by filling in “area not tested” in the relevant field of the reporting template and explaining the reasons for not assessing the area.

Assessment system for overall resilience

5.8 When grading their overall resilience, DGSs should use the following assessment system.

5.9 DGSs should report whether the overall resilience in the achievement of its full legal mandate is “Sufficiently resilient” or “Insufficiently resilient”:

• “Sufficiently resilient” means that the DGS is able to fulfill the functions entrusted in accordance with Directives 2014/49/EU and 2014/59/EU.

• “Insufficiently resilient” means that the DGS is not able to fulfill the functions entrusted in accordance with Directives 2014/49/EU and 2014/59/EU.

5.10 DGSs should supplement this assessment by explanations justifying the reporting results.
Guideline 6: Instructions for reporting to the EBA

6.1 If possible, the reporting template should include the outcomes of at least one stress testing cycle fully performed by the DGS.

6.2 DGSs should report the information set out in Annex 1 to the EBA by the date to be announced, where applicable, by the EBA when planning and conducting peer reviews. With a view to the second peer review to be published by the EBA by the 16th of June 2025, DGSs should report their results to the EBA by the 16th of June 2024. Regarding the later stress testing and reporting cycles, the EBA will announce the date of the next reporting deadlines in the later EBA peer reviews or by other means.

6.3 DGSs should use the reporting template set out in Annex 1 and transmission channels provided by the EBA for reporting.

6.4 DGSs should follow these instructions when filling in the reporting template:

- DGSs should provide a qualitative score (1-4) for each indicator (qualitative), accompanied by an explanation to justify the qualitative score. If applicable, DGSs should also provide quantitative information to motivate the score and provide comparable data for future peer reviews (quantitative).

- When quantitative information is required in addition to a qualitative score, DGSs should follow the instructions in the guidelines and reporting template, for example regarding the units of measure.

- When a DGS did not assess a certain area, the DGS should indicate this by filling in ‘area not tested’ in the relevant field in the reporting template. In addition, DGSs should include a literary statement describing the reason for not assessing a certain area.

- For SCV files tests, when reporting the number of unique institutions tested, in case a DGS performed multiple SCV files tests of one credit institution, this counts as one unique institution.
Annex 1 – Template for reporting results

Please see the separate Excel file.
5. Accompanying documents

5.1 Draft cost-benefit analysis / impact assessment

1. As per Article 16(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (EBA Regulation), any guidelines and recommendations developed by the EBA shall be accompanied by an Impact Assessment (IA) which analyses “the potential related costs and benefits”.

2. This analysis presents the Impact Assessment of the main policy options included in this Consultation Paper on the draft revised Guidelines on stress tests of deposit guarantee schemes under Directive 2014/49/EU (“Guidelines on DGS stress tests”). The IA is high level and qualitative in nature.

A. Problem identification

3. According to Directive 2014/49/EU on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGSD), Member States need to ensure that DGS perform stress tests of their systems at least every three years. To this end, the EBA in 2016 issued own-initiative guidelines that set out the scope and principles-based requirements for stress test to be performed by DGS, including predefined reporting templates on the stress test results. Data on these was first received in 2019.

4. The DGSD mandates the EBA to conduct peer reviews on these data at least every five year. The first peer review has been published in June 2020. The aim of the peer review was threefold: i) assess the resilience of DGSs, ii) identify best practices in relation to DGS stress tests, iii) identify areas for improvement for possible future revisions of the guidelines. While the DGS stress tests has been recognised as an established tool, the 2020 peer review has identified several areas of improvement and concluded that divergence in the types of stress testing exercises performed and in the way that results were reported, hinder the comparability of stress testing performed by DGSs across the EU. In total, 45 areas have been identified for which the stress testing framework and comparability could be improved. Based on this, the EBA decided to update the guidelines.

B. Policy objectives

5. These new guidelines aim at repealing the first guidelines on DGS stress testing published in 2016 and addressing the issues identified as part of the peer review. The new guidelines aim at strengthening the DGS stress testing framework and improve comparability.

10 Directive 2014/49/EU
6. Two categories of improvements are reflected in the guidelines: i) the design and execution of stress tests; and ii) the reporting of the stress test results to the EBA. Another area for improvement identified as part of the peer review relates more to DGS’ systems and processes; these are however not reflected in the update of the guidelines.

C. Options considered, assessment of the options and preferred options

7. Section C. presents the main policy options discussed and the decisions made during the development of the new guidelines. Advantages and disadvantages, as well as potential costs and benefits of the policy options and the preferred options resulting from this analysis are reported. The impact of the options listed decreases in the ordering of the options.

Testing of adequacy and access of funding means

8. Option 1a: Keep the guidelines unchanged: DGSs should test the adequacy of their funding means quantifying their potential shortfall in case of failure of any single one affiliated credit institution.

9. Option 1b: DGSs should test the adequacy of their funding means quantifying their potential shortfall in case of failure of all of the affiliated credit institutions (in turn, not cumulatively).

10. Option 1c: DGSs should test the adequacy of their funding means quantifying their potential shortfall in case of failure of each of the affiliated credit institutions and in addition, DGSs should test the access to their various funding means.

11. In the case of a shortfall in available financial means, DGSs need to meet their funding needs through ex post contributions and/or by accessing funds through alternative funding arrangements (AFAs). DGSs are required to be able to raise such ex post contributions and to have alternative funding arrangements in place.

12. The current guidelines require DGSs to test their funding means by selecting only one credit institution and testing the adequacy of their available financial means, ex post contribution and the AFAs (the potential shortfall is assessed comparing the full amount of funding means to be raised by the DGS and the amount of covered deposits held by the failing institution which should be reimbursed). This might not necessarily show a shortfall. Changing the requirements to testing the adequacy of funding means in case of individual failure of each affiliated credit institutions (option 1b), might still not lead to a shortfall (in cases where a DGS has very ample funding means and hence the amount of covered deposits by any credit institutions never exceeds the former). However, testing the adequacy of the funding means for each affiliated credit institutions will alleviate any bias and potential heterogeneity in DGSs’ selection of credit institutions for assessing any shortfalls. Option 1b is therefore preferred to option 1a.

13. If no shortfall is detected, this could be considered as a DGS’s AFM as adequate. So far, some DGSs not incurring a shortfall when testing the failure of any credit institution has led to some DGSs to not test their processes for raising ex post contributions and accessing funds through
alternative funding means. As a consequence, they did not provide information on indicators i22 and i23 in the reporting templates.

14. This does not only hamper the comparability of DGSs’ stress testing, but crucially it implies different degrees of testing conducted across the DGS and hence potentially also different degrees of meaningfulness of the stress test outcomes. Further, it is crucial that DGSs test their ability to access the various funding means provided in the DGSD. The new guidelines hence introduce a specification in that DGSs need to test their access to various funding means (their ability to timely raise their resources). Inter alia, DGSs should simulate the liquidation of their invested assets. The new guidelines provide that the access should be assessed irrespective of the amount of funding means that is no shortfall-assumption is needed. Whilst this will increase the stress testing burden on DGSs at least in the short term to some extent since they will need to run more stress test scenarios than under the current guidelines (testing the failure of each affiliated credit institutions and assessing the accessibility of their funding means), ultimately, however it allows for more comparability and in particular improved resilience of the overall system and these benefits are assessed to outweigh the additional costs. **Option 1c has therefore been assessed as the preferred option.**

**Aligning core tests to the intervention scenarios**

15. **Option 2a:** Maintaining the GL as they are (priority tests are linked to the funding, operational and cross-border capabilities and DGSs are required to test these capabilities in a repayment scenario). The deadline to conduct priority tests, namely 3 July 2019, would however need to be updated.

16. **Option 2b:** Linking the tests to the different intervention scenarios that DGSs may have to perform, including all intervention scenarios a DGS is legally mandated to perform. And, for the sake of clarity, replacing the concept of “priority tests” by the concept of “core tests” (as a consequence of requiring that all the legal functions for which a DGS is mandated should be stress tested).

17. The DGSD sets out the main requirements of a DGS. Specifically, it needs to be able to compensate depositors once insolvency proceedings are put in place (“repayment function” as per DGDS Article 11(1)) and needs to be able to finance the resolution of credit institutions in order to preserve continuous access to deposits and protect depositors’ funds from bail-in (“contribution to resolution function” as per DGSD Article 11(2) and BRRD Article 109). In addition, the DGSD provides flexibility for Member States to allow DGSs to use their available financial means for additional, alternative measures (DGDS Article 11(3)).

18. In theory, when an alternative measure is allowed by a member state under Article 11(3), DGSs in that jurisdiction should be able to perform these intervention scenarios at all times, and hence any stress testing should prove this, or identify any weaknesses in this regard. The

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12 These alternative measures can include DGSs to use resources to sell depositors to a banking buyer under an insolvency procedure, instead of compensating depositors, or DGS funds being used as for prevention as a crisis management tool, before any insolvency proceedings.
current guidelines however provide flexibility as to the intervention scenarios to be tested, and only set out testing requirements for the “repayment function” (SCV files, operational capability, operational cross-border cooperation and funding capability). Any other alternative measures, if applicable, can be tested on a voluntary basis.

19. As a result, some DGSs only test the binding intervention functions of repayment, whilst others also test any alternative measures that apply\textsuperscript{13}. Like in option 1, this situation hampers any efforts of a comparison across DGSs’ resilience and performance across jurisdictions. More importantly, however, this implies that the extent to which DGSs are testing all possible intervention scenarios they may be legally mandated to perform, varies widely. This could have potential implications for the financial stability of the EU banking system, since the current stress testing framework of DGSs technically does not test if all DGSs are able to perform all their intervention functions. Since the latter is at the core of a reliable DGS system, and as a result is crucial for a safe and functioning EU banking sector, it has been assessed that it is preferred to directly link the tests that need to be performed to all the intervention scenarios a DGS is legally mandated to perform. **Option 2b has therefore been chosen as the preferred option**: the new guidelines provide a maximum list of six possible categories of core tests that need to be performed within any given stress testing cycle\textsuperscript{14}, namely testing of SCV files, repayment, contribution to resolution and - where relevant - repayment with cross border cooperation, failure prevention and contribution to insolvency proceedings (part 6 of the new guidelines).

20. Whilst this will in certain instances increase the costs and efforts for DGSs during their stress test cycles, it has been assessed that these additional costs are greatly outweighed by the benefits of completeness for the resilience of the system as a whole. Flexibility for DGSs to tailor the stress tests to their specific needs has been maintained.

21. In addition, choosing Option 2b also solves the other issue of confusion that seems to exist between priority tests and intervention scenarios (and indicators). Establishing a clear, one-to-one mirroring between core tests and intervention scenarios in the new guidelines will thus also provide much needed clarity for DGSs and supervisors.

**Amendments to the reporting templates**

22. **Option 3a: Keep the reporting templates unchanged.**

23. **Option 3b: Amend the templates by providing further specifications and clearer instructions in the templates.**

\textsuperscript{13} The peer review showed that between 2014 and July 2019 indeed only one DGS reported having performed a test on the use of available financial means for preventive measures. No DGS tested the contribution for insolvency proceedings. Despite not all Member States having implemented Article 11(3) and 11(6) of the DGSD, this demonstrates that an improvement of the guidelines is needed in this regard.

\textsuperscript{14} “Core test” means the stress tests a DGS performs in a stress testing cycle of the tasks entrusted to them in different intervention scenarios.
24. The guidelines issued by the EBA in 2016 were accompanied by reporting templates for the reporting of the stress test results by DGSs to competent authorities. This information collection aims at supporting the EBA when conducting its peer review. Certain changes as part of the amendment of the guidelines now need to be reflected also in the templates and for which new fields will be added to the existing templates, such as the new indicators developed for stress testing failure prevention and contribution to insolvency proceedings. Furthermore, the 2020 peer review identified certain key areas that could be improved in order to enhance the quality and comparability of information provided (such as the level of detail to be provided or more clarity on reference dates).

25. Therefore, a revision of the reporting templates has been performed alongside the revisions of the core guideline document. Whilst some revisions were necessary for the consistency of templates and guidelines, and information provided across jurisdictions, other revisions have been included rather as an improvement measure taking this opportunity. The main objectives when revising the templates has been to have more detailed requirements, more aligned units of account, and including a description of DGSs’ internal rules of functioning and DGSs’ institutional landscape. At the same time, the templates have been streamlined and improvements have been made to their overall presentation.

26. It has been acknowledged that changes in reporting templates always imply an initial costs to the providers of the data, as new data points or new instructions create some additional costs during the filling in of the templates. It has been assessed however that ultimately, in the long-run, a review of the templates will be beneficial for all actors involved. For DGSs it will provide more clarity, the comparability and reliability of the data received by supervisors will greatly improve, and as a result the overall financial stability will be strengthened.

27. **Option 3b has therefore been chosen as the preferred option.**

Clarifying the assessment system

28. **Option 4a:** Provide more clarity in the guidelines on what the DGS stress test aims to achieve (testing both DGS’s resilience and identifying areas for improvement).

29. **Option 4b:** Introducing an overall score for the resilience of the DGS to highlight better the intended goal of the outcome of the stress test and improve comparability.

30. **Option 4c:** Introducing an overall score for both the resilience of the DGS and asking for a dedicated assessment of the areas of improvement.

31. A DGS stress test aims at testing both the resilience of the DGS, as well as identifying areas for improvement. These two have in the past not always seemed clear to all DGSs. Under the current guidelines, a reporting system exists (including 4 scores, ranging from A to D), according to which DGSs have to assess their resilience under each stress scenario. In practice, some DGSs have inserted a score without any justification. This implies that the scores cannot be compared fully across different DGSs and importantly it makes it very difficult to identify the very
problematic cases where DGSs would assess that they are not able to perform their mandates. (Also it means that the areas for improvement, in particular in the cases of low scores, aren’t always clear.)

32. One option considered has been to clarify the objectives of the stress tests in the new guidelines, in order to make clear that a DGS stress test needs to strike the right balance between testing resilience, providing a clear picture of problematic cases and identifying potential areas of improvement. This option 4a has been disqualified however since it has been assessed that this would likely not result in the needed comparability and clarity of outcomes reported.

33. Instead, the new guidelines suggest a new scoring system for the resilience assessment of a DGS. A score between 1 and 4 will be allocated to each indicator reported. The DGS will also need to perform an overall resilience analysis, assigning an overall binary score of ‘sufficiently resilient’ versus ‘not sufficiently resilient’ – where the latter means that the DGS would not be able to perform an intervention scenario if the need arose. Introducing this new binary score will enable competent authorities and DGSs to get a much clearer idea of the problematic cases that need to be worked on. In this regard, the new guidelines in addition went a step further and assessed Option 4c as the preferred option: the overall score for the resilience needs to be accompanied by a detailed assessment of the areas of improvement identified. A dedicated table for the latter has been added as part of the new guidelines. The overall resilience analysis should not be understood as an aggregation of the individual assessments related to the indicators. Indeed, the guidelines should not incentivise DGSs to run tests with the single most important aim to get an optimal score from the perspective of the guidelines. Instead, stress test exercises are performed to identify areas for improvement/shortcomings for every single DGS, which should be addressed by the DGS by implementing improvements and at a later stage need to be tested again.

34. Choosing option 4c ensures that i) it is possible to clearly identify problematic cases, ii) the balance between resilience and areas of improvement is ensured. Whilst again this implies an additional reporting burden for DGSs, incorporating these changes will greatly contribute to early identification of critical issues and importantly will allow to press for improvements in a much more focused and efficient way.

35. Almost all of the impact of the revision of the guidelines is on DGSs themselves, not on credit institutions and the above impact assessment only includes policy options affecting DGS since these have been the most prevalent during the policy discussions. One change that may have an impact on credit institutions, however, are the possible on-site inspections by DGSs at credit institutions to assess the quality of credit institutions’ Single-Customer-View (SCV) files (the files containing the individual depositor information necessary to prepare for a repayment by a DGS), suggested as a possibility to be performed alongside desk-top reviews. DGSs currently have in place their own internal methods to assess SCV files. Another change that may have an impact are the insertions, among the test indicators, of considerations related to DGSs’ ability to collect additional or corrective data from credit institutions after receiving their SCV files.
36. The additional details provided by the new guidelines and in the reporting templates on the
assessment of institutions’ SCV files, and the closer collaboration this may entail between DGSs
and credit institutions, will strengthen the framework but at the same time may imply some
initial additional costs for credit institutions.

D. Conclusion

37. The amendments to the guidelines will have several impacts on DGSs in their stress testing
cycles. The proposed changes include a number of enhancements to the requirements posed
on DGSs when performing the stress tests, as well as more detailed reporting requirements.
Whilst the increased burden on DGSs is acknowledged, added costs versus gained benefits have
been assessed during the drafting of the new guidelines.

38. The new guidelines will inter alia lead to improved comparability across the EU, greater
preparedness and reliability of DGSs’ stress tests and improved resilience of DGSs as well as the
wider banking system. Greater transparency will be ensured through a more comprehensive
EBA peer review and this will therefore improve pre-conditions for effectively addressing
deficiencies.

39. The revisions concluded on in these new guidelines try to strike the right balance between costs
to DGSs and the benefits to the system as a whole. The proposed revisions are assessed to
greatly enhance the EU’s DGS framework.
5.2 Overview of questions for consultation

Question 1: Do you have any comments on the proposals to address the issues of the definitions, the test formats, the use of granular tests and the arrangements to ensure objectivity?

Question 2: Do you have any comments on the proposals to increase the complexity of stress tests (as provided in Guideline 4.109), retest the aspects impacted by significant changes in DGS’s systems and processes (Guideline 3.4), and require stress testing all the legally mandated functions of a DGS (Guideline 3.2)?

Question 3: Do you have any comments on the grading of the outcomes (as proposed in Guideline 5), the deadline for the next report submission (Guideline 6.2), the reporting of the area not required by the Guidelines and the background information on the DGS to fill in the revised reporting template?

Question 4: Do you have any comments on the proposals to address the issues related to the design, execution and reporting of SCV files stress tests, in particular the differentiation into two categories of SCV files stress tests (as proposed in Guideline 4.7), stress testing the SCV files of all relevant institutions (Guideline 4.9), and the definition of substandard entries (Guideline 4.19)?

Question 5: Do you have any comments on the proposals on the assessment of the IT safety (as proposed in Guideline 32), stress tests of reimbursing depositors in complex cases (Guideline 48 and 49) and selection of DGS partner when stress testing cross-border cooperation (Guideline 4.51)? Do you have any further comments on the design, execution and reporting of operational capability tests?

Question 6: Do you have any comments on the proposals on stress testing the adequacy of the funding means for each affiliated credit institutions (as provided in Guideline 4.65), stress testing the access to all of DGS’s funding sources (Guideline 4.72) and stress testing the governance framework of the funding means (Guideline 4.70)?

Question 7: Do you have any comments on the proposals to address the issues related to the design, execution and reporting of stress tests related to contribute to resolution, failure prevention and contribution to insolvency proceedings (as provided in Guideline 3.27, 4.84 and 4.92)?

Question 8: Do you have any other comments on the proposed revised guidelines on stress tests of DGSs?