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## The Greenium matters: evidence on the pricing of climate risk

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The views in this presentation are those of the authors  
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## Introduction

Paris Agreement, December 2015


- ▶ *“Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 Celsius degrees above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 Celsius degrees”*
- ▶ *“ [...] and low greenhouse gas emission development”*



## Implications of climate change:

- ▶ Physical risk: the direct impacts of climate and weather-related events (typhoons, hurricanes, droughts, ...);
- ▶ Transition risk: the risks that arise from the process of mitigation and adjustment towards a low-carbon economy. Negative (positive) impact on polluting (environmentally friendly) firms.

*The Economist*: Firms urgently need to rethink how they approach climate risk.



## Building blocks (1)

1. How to distinguish greener and browner firms?
  - ▶ Transparent and non-transparent companies.
  - ▶ Firm-level synthetic indicator of greenness based on the quality of the environmental disclosure and the level GHG emissions.

## Building blocks (2)

### 2. Does climate risk affect the cross-section of stocks returns?

- ▶ We identify a priced green risk factor and the associated Greenium.

### 3. How exposed are financial firms to climate risk?

- ▶ Climate change and financial stability: We develop a carbon stress test on equity holdings.

## Related literature

Environmental and financial performances are positively correlated:

- ▶ Ambec and Lanoie (2008), Margolis (2009), Porter (1991), Gore (1993), and Porter and VanDerLinde (1995).

Sustainability and asset pricing:

- ▶ sustainability is associated with higher financial returns (Derwall et al., 2005), and predicting future performance (Trinks et al. 2018);
- ▶ divesting in carbon does not affect portfolios performances (Hartzmark and Sussman, 2018).
- ▶ climate risk hedging portfolios: Engle et al. (2019), Goergen et al. (2019).

Climate change and financial stability:

- ▶ gradual vs abrupt transition (Gros et al., 2016);
- ▶ carbon stress test (Battiston et al., 2017).

## Data


**Stocks returns:** 942 companies listed on the STOXX Europe Total Market Index (TMI). (Source Bloomberg)

- ▶ TMI covers approximately 95% of the market capitalisation of European companies, including large, mid and small caps;
- ▶ time horizon: January 2006 to August 2018, monthly frequency;
- ▶ unbalanced panel of individual stocks returns;
- ▶ firm level information (e.g., market capitalization).

**Observable factors:** market, size, value and momentum factors from French's website.

## Environmental data

- ▶ Transparency: Bloomberg Environmental disclosure score (E score);
- ▶ Emission intensity: total GHG emission normalized by revenues (source: Bloomberg).





## Greenness indicator


The synthetic greenness indicator of company  $i$  at year  $y$  is:

$$G_{i,y} = \gamma K_{i,y} + (1 - \gamma)E_{i,y}, \text{ with } \gamma \in [0, 1],$$


where

- ▶  $K_{i,y}$  is the inverse of the ranking of firm  $i$  in terms of emission intensity;
- ▶  $E_{i,y}$  is the ranking of firm  $i$  in terms of E score;
- ▶  $\gamma$  controls for the relative importance of the two components of the index (benchmark case  $\gamma = 0.5$ ).

## Greenness indicator: International Airline Group



## Green and brown portfolios



- ▶ Value weighted portfolios based on previous year greenness indicator.
- ▶ Green portfolio includes the top 20% transparent companies in term of greenness indicator.
- ▶ Brown portfolio includes the non-transparent firms active in highest emitting sectors.

## The green factor

$$f_{g,t} = \tilde{r}_t^g - \tilde{r}_t^b$$

Factor	Mean	Std	Kurt	Skewn	$f_m$	$f_{smb}$	$f_{hml}$	$f_{mom}$
$f_m$	6.035	1.885	4.690	-0.642	1			
$f_{smb}$	1.671	0.641	3.195	-0.129	-0.034	1		
$f_{hml}$	-1.378	0.788	3.582	0.519	0.533	-0.062	1	
$f_{mom}$	9.398	1.313	19.610	-2.546	-0.439	-0.009	-0.506	1
$f_g$	-4.350	1.291	4.563	0.103	-0.224	-0.483	-0.206	0.268

## Linear factor model

The excess return  $R_{i,t}$  of asset  $i$  at date  $t$  satisfies

$$R_{i,t} = a_i + b'_i f_t + \varepsilon_{i,t},$$

$$a_i = b'_i \nu \Leftrightarrow E[R_{i,t}] = b'_i \lambda$$

where

- ▶  $f_t$  is a vector of  $K$  observable factors;
- ▶  $\varepsilon_{i,t}$  is s.t.  $E_{t-1}[\varepsilon_{i,t}] = 0$ , and  $Cov_{t-1}[\varepsilon_{i,t}, f_t] = 0$ ;
- ▶ approximate factor structure;
- ▶  $\lambda = E[f_t] + \nu$  is the vector of risk premia.

## Empirical results

Carhart model + Green factor			
$\hat{\lambda}_m$	10.659** (0.662, 20.657)	$\hat{\nu}_m$	4.625** (4.144, 5.105)
$\hat{\lambda}_{smb}$	3.326** (0.321, 6.331)	$\hat{\nu}_{smb}$	1.655** (1.030, 2.279)
$\hat{\lambda}_{hml}$	-4.582* (-8.525, -0.639)	$\hat{\nu}_{hml}$	-3.203** (-4.042, -2.364)
$\hat{\lambda}_{mom}$	8.986** ( 2.277, 15.695)	$\hat{\nu}_{mom}$	-0.412 (-2.148, 1.325)
$\hat{\lambda}_g$	-9.860** (-14.455, -5.265)	$\hat{\nu}_g$	-4.076** (-5.453, -2.699)

Investors accept lower compensation, *ceteris paribus*, to hold greener assets.

## Robustness checks

- ▶ Tuning the parameter  $\gamma$ :  $G_{i,t}$  with  $\gamma = 0.2$  and  $0.8$ ;
- ▶ Alternative specification for the indicator:

$$G_{i,y}^* = \frac{E_{i,y}^*}{K_{i,y}^*} = E_{i,y}^* \left( \frac{Sales}{Emissions} \right)_{i,y},$$

where  $E_{i,y}^*$  is the E score and  $K_{i,y}^*$  is the ratio of total GHG emissions over sales.

- ▶ Extension of the sample including all listed European companies which do some environmental disclosure ( $n = 2, 154$ ).
- ▶ Alternative definitions of the green factor:
  - ▶ green portfolio - non transparent portfolio;
  - ▶ green portfolio - less-green portfolio.

## Carbon stress test

Actual equity holdings (see Battiston et al. (2017)) of :

<b>Institutional sectors</b>	<b>European SIFs</b>
Other Credit Institutions	DEUTSCHE BANK
Governments	BPCE
Individuals	BNP PARIBAS
Banks	UNICREDIT
Insurance and Pension Funds	BARCLAYS
Other Financial Services	CREDIT SUISSE
Non-Financial Companies	BANCO SANTANDER
Investment Funds	UBS
	ING BANK
	SOCIETE GENERALE

Aggregated by climate-policy-relevant sector:

Fossil-Fuel, Energy-Intensive, Transport, Utilities, etc...



## Portfolio returns

$$r_{j,t} = \sum_{\kappa=1}^7 \omega_{j,\kappa} r_{\kappa,t}$$

where

- ▶  $r_{\kappa,t}$  is the monthly VW portfolio of climate-policy-relevant sector  $\kappa$ , with  $\kappa = 1$  for fossil-fuel,  $\kappa = 2$  for energy-intensive, ...;
- ▶  $\omega_{j,\kappa}$  is the equity exposure to the climate-policy-relevant sector  $\kappa$ .

## Marginal expected shortfall (MES)

$$\begin{aligned}MES_{j,t} &= -E[r_{j,t} | -r_{g,t} < -q_\alpha] \\ &= -E[r_{j,t} | r_{g,t} > q_\alpha],\end{aligned}$$

where  $q_\alpha$  is the  $\alpha$  percentile of the distribution of the green factor.

- ▶ *Baseline scenario*: current exposure.
- ▶ *Scenario 1*: reduced exposure to carbon intensive sectors ( $r_{1,t}$  is the corresponding portfolio) by 50%,

$$r_{j,t} = \frac{1}{2}\omega_{j,1}r_{1,t} + \frac{1}{2}\omega_{j,1}r_t^+ + \sum_{\kappa=2}^7 \omega_{j,\kappa}r_{\kappa,t}.$$

- ▶ *Scenario 2*: investing only in green stocks (i.e., stocks with

$$b_{g,i} > 0), r_{j,t} = \sum_{\kappa=1}^7 \omega_{j,\kappa}r_{\kappa,t}^+.$$

## MES computed for an extreme but plausible scenario

$$(f_{g,t} > q_{0.95})$$

### ► Institutional sectors' losses

	MES (%)			MES (Bn \$)		
	Baseline	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Baseline	Scenario 1	Scenario 2
OCIs	-1.592	-1.511	0.113	-8.236	-7.821	0.584
Governments	-1.411	-1.259	-0.085	-8.169	-7.286	-0.493
Individuals	-1.433	-1.383	0.245	-37.270	-35.964	6.375
Banks	-1.495	-1.411	0.062	-40.864	-38.553	1.686
IPFs	-1.434	-1.339	0.096	-46.529	-43.460	3.119
OFSs	-1.447	-1.376	0.200	-50.261	-47.791	6.931
Non-Financial Companies	-1.462	-1.355	0.095	-68.476	-63.444	4.469
Investment Funds	-1.404	-1.323	0.211	-127.646	-120.310	19.194
Average and Total	-1.460	-1.370	0.117	-387.451	-364.630	41.866

## ► European SIFs' losses

	MES (%)			MES (Bn \$)		
	Baseline	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Baseline	Scenario 1	Scenario 2
DEUTSCHE BANK AG via its funds	-1.455	-1.321	-0.032	-2.348	-2.131	-0.052
BPCE SA via its funds	-1.590	-1.539	0.112	-2.325	-2.251	0.164
BNP PARIBAS via its funds	-1.621	-1.518	-0.141	-1.090	-1.021	-0.095
UNICREDIT SPA via its funds	-1.482	-1.415	0.145	-0.438	-0.418	0.043
BARCLAYS PLC via its funds	-1.512	-1.394	-0.079	-0.572	-0.528	-0.030
CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG via its funds	-1.420	-1.325	0.158	-1.300	-1.212	0.145
BANCO SANTANDER SA	-1.912	-1.904	-0.486	-0.155	-0.154	-0.039
UBS GROUP AG via its funds	-1.432	-1.314	0.097	-2.604	-2.390	0.176
ING BANK NV	-2.225	-2.049	-1.120	-0.042	-0.039	-0.021
SOCIETE GENERALE GESTION	-1.571	-1.496	0.088	-0.771	-0.734	0.043
Average and Total	-1.647	-1.552	-0.167	-6.971	-6.496	0.222

## Conclusions

- ▶ Identification of a greenness indicator based on emission intensity and disclosure of environmental data.
- ▶ Evidence of the existence of a pricing factor linked to climate risk;
- ▶ Evidence of climate-related losses for institutional sectors and European SIFs.