

# Identifying excessive credit growth and leverage


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European Central Bank

The views in this presentation are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB.

## Aim of the paper

Early warning indicators for macropru instruments targeting credit



# Target variable


## Systemic banking crises and 'near misses'

### Banking crises dataset by Expert Group:

- based on the HoR database compiled by the MaRs
- amended in order to include:
  1. *only* systemic banking crises associated with a domestic credit/financial cycle
  2. periods in which in the absence of policy action or of an external event that dampened the credit cycle a crisis as in 1. would likely have occurred




## Target variable




## Early warning indicators

- **Credit related** indicators, based on total credit and bank credit, credit to households and non-financial corporations, the debt service ratio and public debt
- **Real estate** indicators based on residential property prices, incl. valuation measures
- **Market-based** indicators such as the short and long term interest rates and equity prices
- **Macroeconomic** variables such as real GDP growth, M3, real effective exchange rate, current account

# Classification trees



# Recursive partitioning



$$GINI(f) = \sum_{i,j} C_{ij} f_i f_j$$

# The Random Forest

**Bootstrap** and **aggregation** of a multitude of trees, each grown on a randomly selected set of indicators and observations.




Robust technique




# Random forest performance

AUROC=0.94, out-of-sample missclassification=7%




# Random Forest ranking

## Key indicators



# Early warning tree



## Evaluation metrics

|           | Crisis   | No Crisis |
|-----------|----------|-----------|
| Signal    | <i>A</i> | <i>B</i>  |
| No signal | <i>C</i> | <i>D</i>  |

|                     |   | $\theta = 2/3$ |
|---------------------|---|----------------|
| TPR                 | $\frac{A}{A+C}$                                     | 85%            |
| FPR (Type II error) | $\frac{B}{B+D}$                                     | 4%             |
| Type I error        | $\frac{C}{A+C}$                                     | 15%            |
| N2S                 | $\frac{B}{B+D} / \frac{A}{A+C}$                     | 5%             |
| Loss                | $\theta \frac{C}{A+C} + (1 - \theta) \frac{B}{B+D}$ | 0.12           |
| Usefulness          | $\min[\theta; 1 - \theta] - Loss$                   | 0.22           |
| Rel. Usefulness     | $\frac{Usefulness}{\min[\theta; 1 - \theta]}$       | 0.65           |

















# Out-of-sample exercise

Imagine you were in mid-2006

|            | Crisis                    | No crisis                          |
|------------|---------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Warning    | FR, IE, ES,<br>SE, DK, UK | FI, IT                             |
| No warning | GR, PT, LV,<br>SI, NL     | AU, BE, LU, DE,<br>EE, SK, MT, CY* |

\*Crisis started beyond prediction horizon.

Not classified in terminal nodes owing to lack of data.

|        | AT | BE | CY | DK  | EE | FI | FR  | DE | GR  | IE  | IT | LV | LU | MT | NL | PT  | SK | SI  | ES | SE  | GB   |
|--------|----|----|----|---|----|----|---|----|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|---|----|---|----|---|--|
| 2006Q3 |    |    |    | x   |    | x  | x   |    |   | x   | x  |    |    |    |    |   |    |   | x  | x   | x  |
| 2006Q4 |    |    |    | x   |    | x  | x   |    |   | x   | x  |    |    |    |    |   |    |   | x  | x   | x  |
| 2007Q1 |    |    |    | x   |    | x  | x   |    |   | x   | x  |    |    |    |    |   |    |   | x  | x   | x  |
| 2007Q2 |    |    |    | x   |    | x  | x   |    |   | x   | x  |    |    |    |    |   |    |   | x  | x   | x  |
| 2007Q3 |    |    |    | x   |    | x  | x   |    | x   | x   | x  |    |    |    |    |   |    |   | x  | x   |   |
| 2007Q4 |    |    |    | x   |    | x  | x   |    | x   | x   | x  |    |    |    |    | x   |    |   | x  | x   |   |
| 2008Q1 |    |    |    | x   |    | x  | x   |    |  | x   | x  |    | x  |    |    | x   |    |  | x  | x   |   |
| 2008Q2 |    |    |    | x   |    | x  | x   |    |  | x   | x  |    | x  |    |    | x   |    |  | x  | x   |  |
| 2008Q3 |    |    |    |  |    | x  |  |    |  |  | x  |    | x  |    |    |  | x  |  | x  |  |  |

# Conclusion

- The Random Forest/Early Warning methodology can become a useful quantitative tool to:
  - spur discussion on country risks
  - provide information on the most appropriate policy instrument to address identified vulnerabilities
- Additional relevant (potentially country specific) information can be included