
Financial Sector Reform after the Crisis: Has Anything Happened?

Alexander Schaefer - Isabel Schnabel - Beatrice Weder di Mauro

Event Study Analysis


- 1 Motivation
- Related Literature
- 3 Hypotheses
- 4 Event Study Methodology
- 5 Findings
- 6 Conclusion

1. Motivation



Motivation

1. Motivation




2. Preliminary Work & Literature



Related Literature


2. Preliminary Work and Literature



Related Literature

- Impact of the Announcement of being Too-Big-Too-Fail
 - O'Hara & Shaw (1990)
- Effect of the Paulson Plan on banks relative to non-financial fims
 - Veronesi & Zingales (2010)
- Public guarantees as TBTF subsidies on debt
 - Ueda & Weder di Mauro (2013)
- The Value of Being Systemically Important Financial Institutions
 - Bongini, Nieri, and Pelagatti (2013)

3. Hypotheses



Hypotheses

3. Hypotheses

Motivation Expected Effects of Regulatory Reforms


2	Preliminary Work & Literature
3	Hypotheses
4	Event Study

Event Study Methodology


5 Findings

6 Conclusion

Reform	Country	Major elements	Expected effect on equity returns	Stronger effect on investment systemic banks banks		Expected effect on CDS spreads	Stronger effect on investment systemic banks banks	
Dodd-Frank Act	United States	Prohibition of activities, enhanced regulation of systemic institutions, resolution procedures	1	yes	yes	1	yes	yes
Vickers Report	United Kingdom	Ring-fencing approach, resolution procedures	↓	yes	yes	1	yes	yes
Restructuring Law	Germany	Resolution procedures, bank tax	↓		yes	1		yes
TBTF Regulation	Switzerland	Enhanced capital requirements for systemic banks	<u></u>		yes	1		yes




Event Study Methodology




Identification of Events

- Reforms take place in several steps
- Initial announcement, sign of intention, outcome of meetings
- Identification of sub-events (Lamdin 2001)
- Investigating all front pages of a reputable national newspaper within a broadly defined period
 - US: FT | US Edition
 - UK: FT | UK Edition
 - Germany: FTD, Börsenzeitung
 - Switzerland: Neue Zürcher Zeitung



Identification of Events





The Data

- 10 biggest banks (market capitalization) of US, UK, Germany and Switzerland
- Equity: Daily returns of stocks and benchmark indices, based on closing auction
- CDS: Differences in mid-prices of 5-year senior credit default swap spreads, end of day
- Sources: Datastream (Thomson Reuters), Bankscope

Regression Analysis

Preliminary Work & Literature

Motivation

- 3 Hypotheses
- Event Study Methodology
- 5 Findings
- 6 Conclusion

- Use of dummy variables for one-step estimation, Karafiath (1988)
- Seemingly unrelated regressions procedure (SUR), Zellner (1962)

$$R_{1t} = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 R_{Mt} + \sum_{n=T-1}^{T+1} \tau_{1n} D_{1nt} + \epsilon_{1t}$$


. . .

$$R_{jt} = \alpha_j + \beta_j R_{Mt} + \sum_{n=T-1}^{T+1} \tau_{jn} D_{jnt} + \epsilon_{jt}$$


. . .

$$R_{Jt} = \alpha_J + \beta_J R_{Mt} + \sum_{n=T-1}^{T+1} \tau_{Jn} D_{Jnt} + \epsilon_{Jt}$$

- Best way to deal with clustering of events across banks



Findings




United States

The Dodd-Frank Act


Dodd Frank Act | Equity


Motivation	Estimation Window			80	140	80	80
				Average	Average	Investment	Systemic vs
Preliminary Work &			Average	Abnormal	Abnormal	vs.	Non-
iterature	Dodd-Frank Act	Date	Return	Return	Return	Commercial	Systemic
	Obama set to target banks with new fees	12-Jan-10	-1.624	-0.536	-0.661	-1.551*	-2.525**
				[0.673]	[0.617]	[0.056]	[0.012]
lypotheses	Obama urges banks to take part in crisis costs	15-Jan-10	-2.187	-0.386	-0.517	-0.481	-0.837
.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,			_	[0.761]	[0.695]	[0.554]	[0.407]
	Announcement of the Volcker Rule	21-Jan-10	-3.060	-0.074	-0.177	-3.357***	-2.944***
		-		[0.953]	[0.982]	[0.000]	[0.004]
vent Study	- Enlarged event window [0-1]		-7.223	-2.012	-2.161	-3.875***	-0.916
/lethodology			[0.261] [0.250]	[0.250]	[0.001]	[0.530]	
	Obama promoted reform plans in New York City	22-Apr-10	0.259	0.466	0.762	-0.136	0.216
	,	•		[0.669]	[0.520]	[0.874]	[0.764]
indings	- Enlarged event window [0-1]		0.141	-0.333	-0.064	. ,	-1.428
				[0.669] [0.520] [0.874]	[0.163]		
	Democrats are willing to dilute rules for swap desks	16-May-10	-0.206	0.371	0.653	0.206	-0.800
		y		[0.736]	[0.590]	[0.825]	[0.328]
onclusion	Reform bill passes the senate	20-May-10	-4.432	-1.188	-0.691	0.317	-0.135
	1	ý		[0.293]	[0.578]	[0.742]	[0.874]
	US Banks set to lose lobby fight on swaps	13-Jun-10	-0.121	-2.208**	-2.186*	-0.330	-0.825
	, 0 1	5		[0.037]	[0.064]	[0.719]	[0.345]
	Consensuns between parties - the dilution -	25-Jun-10	2.825	2.74***	2.796**	0.890	-0.105
	ran	J		[0.009]	[0.014]	[0.325]	[0.895]
	Summation		-12.825	-3.552	-2.832	-5.201	-7.572



Dodd Frank Act | CDS Spreads


Motivation	Estimation Window			80	140	80	80
				Average	Average	Investment	Systemic vs
			Average	Abnormal	Abnormal	vs.	Non-
Preliminary Work & Literature	Dodd-Frank Act	Date	Return	Return	Return	Commercial	Systemic
- Literature	Obama set to target banks with new fees	12-Jan-10	-0.285	0.170	0.666	0.068	-0.074
				[0.967]	[0.904]	[0.981]	[0.984]
Hypotheses	Obama urges banks to take part in crisis costs	15-Jan-10	3.725	7.131*	7.660	-1.306	1.249
Пурошезез			_	[0.080]	[0.163]	[0.651]	[0.736]
	Announcement of the Volcker Rule	21-Jan-10	7.773	8.242**	8.754	7.863***	7.82**
				[0.036]	[0.107]	[0.006]	[0.033]
Event Study	- Enlarged event window [0-1]		15.970	16.908***	17.932**	5.289	4.022
Methodology				[0.003]	[0.020]	[0.169]	[0.496]
	Obama promoted reform plans in New York City	22-Apr-10	5.103	5.421	5.526	-0.676	0.275
				[0.115]	[0.168]	[0.749]	[0.930]
Findings	- Enlarged event window [0-1]		3.866	8.368*	8.578	2.727	3.526
				[0.087]	[0.131]	[0.413]	[0.426]
	Democrats are willing to dilute rules for swap desks	16-May-10	4.436	0.624	0.573	-5.83**	-5.155
-				[0.913]	[0.910]	[0.021]	[0.154]
Conclusion	Reform bill passes the senate	20-May-10	10.353	10.382**	10.394**	1.962	3.109
				[0.067]	[0.037]	[0.491]	[0.429]
	US Banks set to lose lobby fight on swaps	13-Jun-10	-8.985	-5.797	-5.607	0.805	3.534
				[0.362]	[0.299]	[0.771]	[0.312]
	Consensuns between parties - the dilution -	25-Jun-10	-4.307	-4.514	-4.532	-2.674	-2.628
				[0.489]	[0.404]	[0.714]	[0.571]
	Summation		24.772	38.694	35.664	1.041	7.582






Overview

Remaining Countries



Stock Returns

Estimation window		80	140	80	80
		Average	Average	Investment	Systemic vs.
	Average	Abnormal	Abnormal	vs.	Non-
Summation of coefficients	Return	Return	Return	Commercial	Systemic
Dodd-Frank (US)	-12.825	-3.552	-2.832	-5.201	-7.572
Vickers Reform (UK)	-5.007	-1.211	-3.167	-2.84	-2.038
viciolo reloini (CTI)	3.007	1.211	3.107	2.01	2.030
Restructuring Law (DE)	-0.100	-0.102	-0.253	-	-1.476
TBTF Regulation (CH)	-0.112	-1.769	-2.281	-	-8.371



CDS Spreads

		CDS Sprea	ds		
Estimation window		80	140	80	80
		Average	Average	Investment	Systemic vs.
	Average	Abnormal	Abnormal	vs.	Non-
Summation of coefficients	Return	Return	Return	Commercial	Systemic
Dodd-Frank (US)	24.772	38.694	35.664	1.041	7.582
Bodd Filmin (CO)	21.772	30.071	33.001	1.011	7.502
Wielrom Dofours (LIV)	19.892	15.82	18.40	6.36	18.330
Vickers Reform (UK)	19.692	13.62	10.40	0.30	16.330
Restructuring Law (DE)	2.350	2.309	2.462	-	4.775
TBTF Regulation (CH)	14.548	20.146	20.535	-	-

6. Conclusion

Motivation Preliminary Work & iterature Hypotheses **Event Study** Methodology **Findings** Conclusion

Has Anything Happened?

- Yes!
- Significant reactions on equity and cds markets due to national reforms
- In all cases reforms seem to have lowered bail-out expectations
- Significant heterogeneity effects for investment and systemic banks as well as spill-over effects to other countries
- Effects on equity were partly diluted in subsequent negotiations

Has happened enough?

- We cannot really tell by this approach
- Evidence suggests: lower bail-out expectations lead to lower risk taking
- Comparing results with funding cost differentials (Ueda die Mauro 2013)
 - Against the background of a TBTF subsidy of 60 to 80 basis points, none of the reforms has been enough to fully eliminate the distortion

6. Conclusion

Motivation Preliminary Work & Literature Hypotheses **Event Study** Methodology Findings Conclusion

Has Anything Happened?

Are some reforms better than others?

- We cannot really tell by this approach either
- Our approach is silent on systemic effects
- Volcker Rule possibly amplified by signaling
- German resolution regime hampered by failure to deal with cross boarder issues

Many thanks for your attention!